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The commodification of higher education has been described, within the philosophical and 
sociological literature, in opposition to, or in alliance with principled perspectives about the nature, 
purpose or value of ‘higher education’: for example, as that which is intrinsically valuable, a social 
good, a democratic requirement or an individual entitlement. This thesis argues that such 
approaches are relatively unproductive in providing descriptions that can inform higher education 
practice. Rather, it is argued, they largely seem to operate to reproduce the principled perspectives 
with which they are aligned or opposed. The thesis examines the following question: 
 
How do official texts that describe higher education, operate to (re)produce and/or resist the idea 
of its commodification? 
 
The methodology employed to examine this question, locates ‘official’ texts as empirical objects for 
analysis. The analysis proceeds by identifying and organising oppositions and alliances within these 
texts, to produce a constructive description of how each text is operating within the higher education 
field. Specific descriptions of higher education within official texts are analysed in relation to 
constructed theoretical spaces that describe modes of discursive action, including the commodified 
mode. 
 
The method provides a means of describing commodification as a discursive modality rather than as 
a representation of use-value/exchange-value or market/non-market type oppositions. This approach 
is productive in describing the ways that official texts operate to regulate higher education practice 
without reproducing a principled perspective. Despite some explicit references to the economic or 
commodity value of higher education, official texts tend to use such descriptions to promote the 
introduction or maintenance of bureaucratic and regulatory systems that actually stand in opposition 
to the commodified mode. This conclusion is in contrast with the idea that official descriptions of 
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Chapter one – Introduction to the idea of the commodification of higher education 
 
Introduction  
Which of these two statements, if either, can be described as true? 
 
1. First and foremost, the institutions of higher education should be structured to nurture, 
 examine critically and promulgate the values of a democratic society. Their fundamental 
 normative commitment…is to the values of truthfulness, objectivity, freedom of thought 
 and expression, personal integrity, honesty and democratic ways of thinking. 
 (Williamson and Coffield: 1997, p124) 
 
2. Parents think not in terms of joining an academic collegiate structure, but more in terms 
 of buying a product from a supermarket. They want best value for money and they 
 search [for a higher education product] in the same way. (‘You pays your money and 
 you makes your choice’, Times Higher Educational Supplement: 14.11.2003)  
 
The first reflects many of the values and purposes described in the Dearing Report Higher Education 
in the Learning Society (1997), in which higher education is also viewed as ”…fundamental to the 
social, economic and cultural health of the nation” (p175). The second paints a different, perhaps 
less highly principled, picture of higher education as simply a consumer good that people buy. In 
other words, a commodity. 
 
It could of course be objected that in fact neither of these statements claim ‘truth’ as such. However, 
the first does seem to be making a moral claim about what higher education institutions ‘should’ do 
and what their ‘fundamental normative commitment’ is. The second statement is of course of a 
different kind, in effect, making claims about what parents think about and want, in relation to higher 
education. This deliberately dramatic opposition is designed to illustrate how different descriptions of 
higher education can be related to the idea of its commodification. This thesis will not attempt to 
discover which kind of description of higher education (commodified or otherwise) is true or false, or 
seek to find out what the fundamental principles of higher education are or should be. It will also not 
present a critique of descriptions of higher education on the basis that they represent a flawed or 
partial realisation of educational principles. Rather, this thesis will attempt to describe how 
descriptions of higher education are operating within the discursive field. In particular, the thesis will 
attempt to describe how descriptions of higher education position the idea of its commodification. 
 
This work is primarily concerned with higher education within the United Kingdom (UK) and 
particularly England, although some of the theoretical references will draw on work that discusses 
higher education in the context of other countries. Specifically, the work is concerned with 
descriptions of the commodification of higher education or the ways in which higher education is 
described as commodified. This can include various associated aspects and elements of higher 
education (and its related practices) being described as having become, becoming more like, or 
being treated like, commodities in some way. There are other possible terms that have been used to 
describe associated processes, such as ‘commoditisation’, ‘marketisation’, ‘privatisation’, 
‘corporatisation’ and ‘academic capitalism’, all of which, for the purposes of this introduction, are 
related to and implied by the term commodification. For example, Meek (2003) has argued that  
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The trend towards marketisation and privatisation of public sector higher education has been 
well established over the last decade or more and is clearly visible in the language of policy 
documents (students as clients, knowledge as a product or commodity, price and quality 
relations etc) and in their implementation: the introduction of tuition fees, performance based 
funding and conditional contracting. (Meek: 2003, p4)  
 
This statement associates the ‘trend’ towards marketisation and privatisation, or what I call 
commodification, with both a perceived change in the use of language to describe ‘higher education’ 
and perceived changes to the ways in which it operates. The description of higher education, as 
becoming subject to marketisation and privatisation, is implicitly contrasted with a description of what 
higher education ‘has been’, or even perhaps what it ‘should be’. In other words, the description of 
marketised and privatised higher education constructs an opposition with descriptions of higher 
education as a public sector good. Descriptions of the commodification of higher education are 
implicated in the discursive struggles to establish which descriptions of higher education have 
predominance in the field. The construction of these descriptions is, I argue, implicated in explicit or 
implicit textual strategies, which operate to regulate discursive exchange. The thesis will analyse how 
such descriptions operate within texts that have ‘official’ status. By this I mean those texts that have 
been authored, produced or commissioned by official or governmental bodies and agencies.  
 
The method employed to analyse these texts will attempt to identify associations and differentiations, 
or oppositions and alliances, within each official description of higher education. Through considering 
such oppositions and alliances, the analysis will attempt to describe the strategies employed within 
official texts that position some descriptions of higher education in relation to others. The thesis will 
be concerned with the ways in which descriptions of higher education commodification are 
strategically and dynamically (re)produced within official higher education texts that are positioned to 
influence higher education practices. My hybridisation of the word ‘(re)production’ is designed to 
signify that I am concerned with both the ‘production’ and the ‘ reproduction’ of the idea of the 
commodification of higher education.  
 
The selected official texts, as representative instances of socio-cultural action in the higher education 
field, will constitute the empirical evidence for analysis in the thesis. The rationale for selecting these 
particular kinds of texts will be discussed further in Chapter Two; for now it is sufficient to say that 
they are all designed to have an impact upon the practice of higher education. They are related to, 
implicated in and emergent upon the historically contingent social structures and cultural practices of 
the higher education discursive field. Official texts contain particular kinds of descriptions of higher 
education and as such, it is possible that these descriptions are positioned in opposition to or in 
alliance with the idea of its commodification. In other words, these texts could operate to reproduce 
descriptions of the commodification of higher education or they could operate to resist such 
descriptions. 
 
The research question that the thesis will attempt to answer is: 
 
How do official texts that describe higher education, operate to reproduce and/or resist  
the idea of its commodification? 
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The purpose of this chapter is to introduce some of the wide variety of descriptions related to the 
commodification of higher education within the higher education discursive field to map the territory 
within which the thesis will operate. This will include references from philosophical and sociological 
theory, as well as descriptions from official texts. The first part of this chapter will aim to introduce the 
idea of the commodification of higher education in broad terms.  This section will consider some of 
the ways in which higher education can be described as a commodity, a consumption good, a means 
to capitalise human assets or as an industry sector with a role to stimulate economic growth. The 
next section introduces some examples of the principled ideas of higher education that have been 
contrasted with or allied with its commodification. These are selected as example descriptions that 
attempt to criticise or support the legitimacy of commodification in relation to principles that 
determine the value, nature or purpose of higher education. In other words, such approaches 
describe commodification in opposition to, or in alliance with an ideal or principle of some kind. For 
example, descriptions of higher education legitimised through reference to its contribution to social 
justice or as an antidote to a pernicious ideology.  
 
I argue that such descriptions position commodification as a flawed realisation of higher education in 
relation to principles that are constructed as ‘truth’.
1
 I also argue that this construction is itself a 
historical and cultural phenomenon that is implicated in processes of discursive formation in the 
higher education field. The remaining chapters of the thesis set out to firstly develop an alternative 
approach to the analysis of the commodification of higher education and secondly to produce 
analyses of official texts to address the research question. This chapter will conclude by providing an 
overview of the structure of the thesis.  
 
T H E  I D E A  O F  T H E  C O M M O D I F I C A T I O N  O F  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  
This section will attempt to introduce some of the ways in which the idea of the commodification of 
higher education has been described within higher education related discourse. As indicated above, 
the examples given will be introduced as a means of providing illustrations of the idea of the 
commodification of higher education rather than as an attempt to define it. 
 
The contemporary cultural, social and economic context of higher education, positioned as a 
commodity, is potentially complex. For some, the previously predominant modernist idea of 
education as emancipation, has become problematised and universities and colleges have been 
described as “factories for the production of degree holders” (Hutton: 1996, p216)  
 
Education, not so long ago regarded as a universal welfare right under a social democratic 
model, has been recast as a leading sub-sector of the economy and one of the main 
enterprises of the future ‘post-industrial’ economy (Peters, M: 1995, p394) 
 
In this context, students may be less likely to be conceived of as individuals seeking personal 
enlightenment within a grand scheme intrinsically valued for its contribution to the progress of 
mankind. Rather, they are described as customers seeking value for money, in relation to their 
marketability within an increasingly competitive employment market. Similarly, in a situation where 
government plays a diminishing role in higher education funding, (see for example Trow 1996, 
Robertson: 1997, 1999, Neuman and Guthrie 2002) higher education institutions compete with each 
other to secure their continued existence as commercial enterprises. 
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Lyotard (1984) identifies aspects of late capitalism that position higher education as a means of 
optimising the performance of the global economy. In Lyotard’s terms the ‘grand narrative’ 
justification of education as an intrinsic good leading to the eventual emancipation of mankind is 
illusionary and therefore oppressive. There can be no teleological justification of education and 
therefore the efficiency with which the present system functions becomes the only available value. 
 
The social system is going ‘nowhere’ even as it changes it is simply being driven to 
maximise efficiency…The task of education is to operate in the most efficient ways possible 
to provide individuals with the learning they require to optimise their contribution to the social 
system. (Lyotard: 1984) 
 
Higher education’s traditional grounding in the positivist notion of greater access to truth via scientific 
method have, according to this analysis, been replaced by notions of efficiency, utility and saleability. 
Lyotard’s term for these processes is ‘performativity’, where the valued outcome of education (or 
other social discourses), becomes the successful performance of activities that have social utility as 
defined by late capitalism.  
 
T W O  K I N D S  O F  ‘ C O N S U M E R S ’  O F  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  
Higher education can be construed as a service industry that sells a range of products to a range of 
potential consumers, within the context of a competitive market.  From this perspective, the higher 
education ‘goods’ sold are allocated an exchange value, related to their cultural, social or economic 
currency.  The rights of ownership and distribution of higher education products or goods, in the 
context of this description, would lie with individual higher education institutions or companies who 
market their wares in order to attract consumers.  Here, consumers would select the higher 
education goods they wish to purchase, pay the price and ‘consume’ the products.  There is potential 
to discuss further the notion of ‘consuming’ higher education that could be considered relevant to the 
issue of its commodification. However, for the purposes of this introduction let us presume that it is at 
least conceivable that higher education can be consumed. 
 
Superficially, at least, the idea of higher education as a commodity can be related to at least two 
types of ‘consumers’. Firstly, corporations who sponsor research within higher education institutions 
where ownership of part, or all, of the outcomes of the research undertaken (perhaps knowledge or 
products) is exchanged for the price of such sponsorship. The relationship between research in 
higher education institutions and industry is in one sense an obvious example of how higher 
education can produce saleable commodities, a kind of ‘intellectual capital’. (Barnett: 1990). Within 
this formulation, private funds are exchanged for private (or corporate) ownership, and/or 
consumption, of higher education commodities. Robertson (1999) provides such as description. 
 
As resources from public sources has tightened, so universities have offered themselves as 
partners with corporations...And as companies begin to describe themselves in terms of 
knowledge creation...so universities respond by positioning themselves as part of the 
knowledge economy. (Robertson: 1999, p.18) 
 
More recently, Willmott has argued that 
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In addition to, or perhaps instead of, producing ‘knowledge’, academies are increasingly 
identified and valued as producers of income earning ‘commodities’ in the form of 
publications, awards and patents. (Willmott: 2003, p14) 
 
The second type of potential ‘consumers’ are students who pay to enrol on an identified higher 
education programmes or modules. If students buy or pay for higher education service commodities, 
what is it that they get in exchange for their money? Some students gain what could be broadly 
described as professional license. Doctors, lawyers, accountants and teachers, for example, are 
legally restricted from some professional practices until they (or someone else) have paid for the 
opportunity to gain professional qualifications. Similarly, other higher education qualifications may 
provide students with an employment advantage in a competitive employment market. Both of these 
examples demonstrate what students may get in exchange for their money. In material form, such 
qualifications are represented by certificates that seem to serve as evidence (or perhaps signifiers) of 
something immaterial. This might be the knowledge, understanding, skills and experience that a 
student has in some way demonstrated and is therefore presumed to ‘possess’. 
 
In this sense, it is possible to conceive of higher education qualifications as a primary commodity, 
bought by students to enable them to position ‘themselves’ as a more complex commodity, available 
for purchase (or hire) in a flexible employment market. Qualifications and higher education 
credentials could be compared with product packaging where the nature of the product (or perhaps 
graduate), is communicated to an intended target audience (or employer), providing a form of quality 
guarantee. It is also possible that employers are, in part, able to ‘exchange’ part of a salary package, 
for the right to ‘use‘ the qualifications of its employees, to add market value to the services that are 
offered to potential customers. It could be argued, that such qualifications represent the ‘human 
capital’ of those who posses them. Perhaps, it could also be argued that the recognition of such 
‘capital’ enables and facilitates the exchange of human or cultural capital for economic capital. This 
will be further discussed in chapter two but it is an area of current debate within the higher education 
sector. For example, a recent article entitled ‘Fees ‘do not buy’ a guaranteed degree’ stated that: 
 
It needs to be stressed that the payment of tuition fees is not a matter of ‘buying’ a degree 
(‘results guaranteed’), as if purchasing a holiday or some other consumer service.  
(THE: 10.1.08) 
 
Higher education institutions (with degree awarding powers) have the legal power to ‘admit’ students 
to higher education qualifications, usually in recognition of some form of specified achievement, and 
as such, determine the terms of admission/recognition. This collective, institutionalised agreement 
concerning the authenticity and legality of qualifications is required to establish their market value. To 
take a different example, within Manchester United PLC’s Report and Accounts 2002 “the acquisition 
of players’ registrations are capitalised as intangible fixed assets”. Here the human capital that is 
constituted in the individual players football skills is recorded, through institutionalised accounting 
regulations, as a financial value that is promoted as an indicator of the company’s performance. This, 
arguably, has an affect on its share price and the overall value of Manchester United as a brand and 
a company.  In both instances, the transference (or perhaps translation) of individual embodied skills, 
knowledge and abilities into a financial value, has required an agreed, collectively recognised, legal, 
institutionalised system: on the one hand, legally sanctioned higher education qualification awarding 
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powers and on the other, UK financial accounting standards. For example, the ‘value’ of academic 
staff in terms of their research status and output could quite reasonably be capitalised by higher 
education institutions in the same way as a recent article suggests: 
 
The RAE [Research Assessment Exercise] transfer market had led to the inflation of top 
salaries and worries that some Vice Chancellors might have overspent on recruitment with 
little guarantee of strong financial returns (THE: 10.1.08) 
 
There seems to be a difference with simple commodities here, as in both cases the skills, knowledge 
and abilities that are associated with the financial value are embodied and bound up with specific 
individuals. Here the ‘product’, (football player or qualified person), has, to some extent, the 
opportunity to make conscious choices about what kind of product it wants to be. Football players 
can choose to try to develop football skills perhaps by paying for professional training. Students can 
choose to try to acquire a wide variety of educational qualifications, by paying for a higher education 
service. For students, this could be a means of both defining and communicating, ‘who they are 
and/or what they are worth’, through embodied and institutionalised human or, perhaps, cultural 
capital.  
 
Scott (1997) has argued that:  
 
Increasingly graduate status will be the principal signifier of cultural capital...students by 
participating in Higher Education, will be able to construct their own reflexive biographies… 
If Higher Education...regarded as a consumption good...is associated with lifestyles rather 
than life chances, it becomes more difficult to argue that it should be treated differently from 
other consumption. (Scott: 1997, p46) 
 
There is here, an implied assumption that if higher education is associated with ‘life chances’, it may 
be possible to argue that it should be treated differently from other kinds of consumption. This 
identifies a potential binary opposition. On the one hand, higher education is a ‘lifestyle choice’ 
consumption good, appropriately provided though similar mechanisms to other such goods or 
commodities, i.e. a market. On the other hand, it could be a life chance enhancing good, providing 
individual (and perhaps social) benefits. Here, life chance enhancing goods may be seen as being 
justifiably provided through other mechanisms than those associated with other consumer goods, i.e. 
non-market or in addition to a market. Such a justification for treating higher education differently 
could perhaps be related to notions of social justice, democratic and/or human rights. It may be 
possible to describe higher education as a commodity and to describe what kind of a commodity 
higher education might be. It may also be possible, to consider the type of entitlement to higher 
education that may or may not be justifiable or legitimate, if it is described as such. However, we 
could also analyse the significance of describing higher education as a commodity, in the context of 
the functioning of social and economic structures.  
 
T H E  S T A T E  A S  ‘ C O N S U M E R ’  O F  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  
Higher education is still, to a significant extent, publicly funded by the state through centrally 
collected taxation.  Does this mean that the State can also be described as ‘consuming’ higher 
education products?  Firstly, were this the case, it must represent a more generalised form of 
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consumption, as funding arrangements support an extremely broad range of products, marketed by a 
very broad range of higher education institutions.  Secondly we could ask, what is it that the State 
gets for its money on our behalf?  Who consumes or owns the products the State buys?  Perhaps it 
is possible to suggest that the State is buying a range of services that collectively contribute to the 
economic competitiveness of the nation, thereby securing economic growth and increased 
prosperity.  Willmott argues that in fact  
 
Universities transact with the state as a monopoly purchaser of teaching and pure research 
in circumstances where opportunities to switch to an alternative source of funding are 
limited. (Willmott: 2003, p3) 
 
The products that higher education institutions market are largely consumed by individuals, who are 
members of the State, within which, higher education is funded.  Perhaps the State’s ‘consumption’ 
of higher education, can be seen as facilitating individual consumption, which itself is thought to be of 
instrumental economic value to the State.  However, this presumed instrumental value has itself 
been questioned.  David Smith (1999) argues that: 
 
There is a clear link between being a graduate and having improved earning capacity, but 
there is no rigorously proven causal link between the numbers of graduates a country 
produces and its economic prosperity. (Smith: 1999, p172) 
 
For this reason, Smith believes State funding for higher education will continue to decline and that 
the individual consumer of higher education will contribute an increasing amount towards the cost of 
their learning. For Meek (2003) the moral issue is not whether, or how much, public sector higher 
education should be privately or individually funded but rather that of governmental decision making 
about the distribution of funds.  
 
…when does decline in government funding responsibility reach the point where 
government no longer has the ‘moral’ authority over national higher education policy.  
(Meek: 2003, p18) 
 
From a more cultural/economic perspective, Shumar (1997) relates the commodification (or as he 
calls it commoditization) of higher education to global economic post war contexts. He traces global 
economic developments from a Fordist/Keynesian, mass production, high wage interventionist 
economy to a flexible accumulation model. Within this model Shumar describes the process of the 
production of diverse tailored products that exploit global variations in employment and resource 
markets. 
 
Primarily, commoditization is a term to describe the way in which institutions and systems of 
thought change as the dynamic infrastructure of capitalisation moves to deal with its internal 
contradictions. (Shumar: 1997, p310) 
 
Shumar analyses the process of commodification from several perspectives. He adopts an 
anthropological view of the changing status of academic staff within faculty considering how the 
casualisation of labour within global economy is reflected within faculty working patterns. 
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Perhaps the image to come is one of faculty as pieceworker in a international system of 
knowledge and technologies (Shumar: 1997,p186) 
 
Shumar’s analysis provides a critique of commodification of higher education as a threat to ‘the life 
world of human interaction’ where relations between people are increasingly governed by the 
mechanisms of consumption. From this perspective, the cultural context of higher education could be 
said, arguably, to have changed in relation to developments in late capitalism. It could be argued that 
higher education is increasingly viewed by governments as a mechanism for generating individual 
and national economic prosperity, rather than being valued as an ‘intrinsic collective good’ (Raz: 
1986) or an individual right. For example, Slaughter and Leslie (1999) have argued that post-
secondary education in Britain, Australia, Canada and the US has been increasingly 
 
…directed towards national ’wealth creation’ and away from its traditional concern with the 
liberal education of undergraduates (Slaughter and Leslie: 1999, p37) 
 
Slaughter and Leslie go on to argue that increasingly higher education institutions are acting like 
private corporations as a consequence of what they call ‘academic capitalism’. Many University Vice 
Chancellors have called for greater independence from government funding which would enable their 
institutions to charge tuition fees that they think the market would bear (for example, Guardian, 
Higher Education 21.5.02). In general Universities and other higher education providers may indeed 
own their assets in a similar way to a private company or business. Shumar has argued in College 
for Sale (1997) that 
 
While the university does not produce a commodity in the traditional sense, the service it 
provides is taken as product and the institution uses capitalist institutional arrangements to 
produce it. This for me is the commoditization of higher education, the evolution of a vision 
of education as, not just a product to be bought and sold… but the entire institutional 
rearrangement of higher education into a productive industry. (Shumar: 1997, p31) 
 
For Frow (1997), capitalism and particularly late capitalist economies seem to inexorably translate all 
forms of exchange into the commodity form. 
 
Frow (1997) identifies three stages of commodification: 
i)  Capital resources are applied to an area of production expanding production and  
 destroying all related non-commodified activities. 
ii)  The existing cultural context or purpose is replaced by a profit related purpose. 
iii)  Common resources are transformed into private resources. 
 
It could be possible to approach the analysis of the commodification of higher education by 
attempting to establish the extent to which the stages Frow identifies have occurred or are occurring 
in relation to higher education. For example, if we consider these stages in relation to higher 
education in the UK, the government has expanded higher education provision seeking a 
participation rate of 50% by the year 2010 (DfES: 2003). Increased capital resources have been 
applied to higher education but not solely or necessarily from government funds but from tuition fees 
and what has been called ‘third steam funding’ (otherwise known as business investment).  
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Naidoo has argued that government policies have led to the “erosion of the boundary between higher 
education and society” (Naidoo: 2005, p29) which has changed the basis upon which value is 
determined in higher education practice. She describes this as a shift from “being measured 
according to academic principles to being measured according to narrow financial criteria” (Naidoo: 
2005, p29). Naidoo argues that such a shift is likely to result in the positioning of research as a 
commercial enterprise that compromises the independence of researchers and leads to a ‘distortion 
of teaching’. 
 
Education is likely to be reconceptualised as a commercial transaction, the lecturer as the 
‘commodity producer’ and the student as the consumer. (Naidoo: 2005, p29) 
 
The introduction of variable tuition fees in the UK has led to discussion concerning the economic 
value of higher education qualifications in relation to enhanced future earnings compared with the 
amount of debt incurred. Similarly, governmental bodies have sought to establish the economic value 
of higher education. For example, the Greater London Authority (GLA) specifically commissioned a 
report entitled World City, World Knowledge to establish ‘the economic contribution of London’s 
higher education sector’ (GLA: April 2004). This report suggests that higher education provides a 
good return for individuals, is a significant UK industry and employer, as well as providing a return to 
society as a whole.  
 
Higher education is generally seen as a form of investment. However, it can also be viewed, 
at least partially, as a consumption good…As with any good, people with higher incomes are 
more likely to consume more higher education than those with lower incomes…The social 
return from education is the extent to which society benefits from an increase in the overall 
level of education. (Greater London Authority: 2004, p29)    
 
As an aside, it may however, be a presumption that all goods will be consumed to a greater extent by 
those with higher incomes. For example, low quality food products seem likely to be consumed more 
by those with low incomes at least partially as a consequence of the price. Higher education is 
presumed to be a high value consumption good. Here, the ‘value’ of higher education that is 
presented, is discussed solely in economic terms. The report goes on to discuss the future of higher 
education. It concludes, that if the significant economic contribution of higher education is to be 
maintained, and if participation of 18 to 30 years olds in higher education rose to 50%, in line with the 
Government target, then the sector will require more funds. However, it also states that 
 
The issue of whether and how the costs of higher education should be shared between the 
students benefiting from it and society as a whole is currently the subject of much political 
debate (GLA: April 2004, p63) 
 
Similarly, the draft recommendations of the Admissions to Higher Education Steering Group (AHESG 
- The Schwartz Review) state that: 
 
Higher education (HE) is a valuable commodity: it can affect salary, job security and power 
to influence society. Despite the introduction of fees and the abolition of grants, the financial 
return of an HE qualification in terms of increased earnings is large and is holding 
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steady…Because of the expansion of HE, there is room for almost everyone who applies. 
But the sector is diverse and the  choice of course and institution matters…The graduates of 
the most selective universities and courses tend to do well in later life. They get good jobs, 
they are admitted to the best postgraduate programmes and they develop relationships 
which will support them throughout their careers. 
(AHESG: 2003, sections A5 and A6) 
 
This change in funding patterns provides a significant context for the discourse surrounding the 
political and economic legitimation of higher education.  Higher education has here been positioned 
as the kind of ‘good’ that is economically valuable to individuals, in that it positively positions those 
who have it for success in a competitive employment market. It has also been positioned as a kind of 
public good that is of economic value to the nation, as well as providing other ‘social’ benefits. There 
is also an implied relationship between access to top higher education ‘brands’ or ‘products’ and the 
cultural and social capital that results from such access. The entitlement to access to higher 
education, raised in the Schwartz consultation (DfES: 2003), fairly explicitly acknowledges the 
existence of a higher education provider market that includes diversity of ‘product’ and consumer 
choice. The Schwartz justification for fair access to higher education seems largely predicated upon 
a conflation between consumer rights and an entitlement to equality of opportunity, which in turn, 
could be derived from notions of broader human or democratic rights and social justice.  
 
There is a fairly obvious relationship between descriptions relating to the commodification of higher 
education, and the legitimation of higher education as contributing to national economic prosperity. 
Here, higher education is positioned as a major industry sector, a significant national employer and 
wealth creator. This includes its contribution to the ‘knowledge economy’ as a generator of 
intellectual capital resulting in wealth creating business ‘spin offs’. Higher education is also 
positioned as contributing to the nations economic competitiveness through the creation of human 
capital and a highly educated and skilled workforce.  For example, the Leitch Report Prosperity for all 
in the global economy – world class skills (2006) states that 
 
We have made enormous progress expanding higher education – and this is critical to 
becoming a high-skill economy. Over one quarter of adults hold a degree, but this is less 
than many of our key comparators, who also invest more. (HM Treasury, 2006, p7) 
 
Peters (2005) has argued that the ideology of ‘useful knowledge’ and the ‘knowledge economy’ are 
operating to re-describe ‘traditional relationships’ between research, reaching and scholarship as 
corporate management models and quality assurance procedures are employed to regulate higher 
education. 
 
…the reform process now underway is a shift in regulatory mode, an epistemic shift in 
Foucault’s sense, whereby liberal norms and values, based on authority and expertise of the 
academic-professional is progressively giving way, slowly and imperceptibly, to a neo-liberal 
regulatory regime…What is being witnessed is the end of the liberal modernist university.  
(Peters: 2005, p47) 
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These examples provide illustrations of some of the multiple and/or competing ideas about the value 
and purpose of higher education. The principles that may underlie these ideas are also the subject of 
theoretical discourse within the field of higher education. The following section will attempt to 
introduce some ‘principled’ ideas about higher education, and to consider how they have been 
described in opposition, or in alliance, with the idea of its commodification. 
 
Principled ideas about higher education and its commodification 
There is a history of a variety of theorists, describing the value and purpose of higher education from 
a principled perspective, often in opposition to ideas of its instrumental value or economic 
productivity. Whilst other theorists have criticised the elitist nature of some legitimatory positions, 
they have also described the move towards the commodification of higher education, as a move 
away from some, more genuine or legitimate principle or purpose. Those who criticise the 
commodification of higher education, more or less explicitly, do so in opposition to an ‘idea’ of what 
higher education’s value, nature or purpose ‘is’, or ‘should be’. Those who do not, argue that 
commodification is either desirable, unavoidable or unobjectionable in relation to the achievement of 
an ‘idea’ of what higher education’s value, nature or purpose ‘is’ or ‘should be’.  In other words, even 
when there are polarised or oppositional perspectives concerning the commodification of higher 
education, such perspectives can be related in that they are ‘principled’. The range of principled 
perspectives described below cannot be exhaustive within the scope of the thesis. However, the 
range selected is designed to illustrate a variety of principled positions taken that are of relevance to 
the idea of the commodification of higher education. 
 
In The Idea of a University Newman describes 
 
…a Liberal Education [as] something far higher…than what is commonly called a useful 
education…[where]…knowledge is capable of being its own end…[and]…the culture of the 
intellect is a good itself (Newman in Tristram: 1952, p 27-32)  
 
Here, there is a clear binary opposition between higher education that is intrinsically valuable, ‘a 
good in itself’, and that, which is ‘useful’, instrumentally valuable or that, perhaps, has ’use value’. 
‘The University’ (taken here as equivalent to higher education), is legitimated by a conception of the 
educated ‘man’ as a transcendental virtuous ideal. A university education here separates the 
educated from the uneducated and professional skills are positioned as very secondary to the value 
of an immersion in ‘high culture’.  
 
R. S. Peters argued that the concept of education is, in his terms, “part of the concept of the 
university” (Peters: 1970, p65). However, universities are sharply contrasted with technical or 
regional colleges. Here, applied subjects (such as accountancy) provided in colleges are described 
as ephemeral and in opposition to the ‘fundamental principles’ (such as the theory of numbers) 
provided by the university. Colleges and even some non-residential universities, are also criticised in 
that  
 
They approximate to supermarkets where knowledge is available for those who wish to pick 
it up. (Peters: 1970. p71) 
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Peters also argues that a university implies engagement with research involved with the 
advancement of knowledge rather than just teaching. 
 
A university…is a community of scholars and research workers who also regard it as their 
business to initiate others in the pursuit of truth (Peters: 1970, p72) 
 
Perhaps the clearest distinction is between Peters’ view of the value of a ‘pursuit of truth’ type 
university education, and that which might be received at, what he described as, technical or regional 
colleges. This is illustrated by his judgement concerning the relative merits of qualifications awarded 
by each type of institution. 
 
Whatever the realities of the matter may be, no one will accord the same status to a degree 
awarded by the CNAA to a student at a Regional College as is accorded to a proper 
university degree (Peters: 1970, p70) 
 
Within this (and Newman’s) conception, higher education within the university might have moralistic 
and elitist overtones that may seem problematic to those who position higher education as having a 
more democratic role.  
 
In Towards a Rational Society, for example, Habermas makes a plea for a unification of the  
 
…immanent relation between the enterprise of knowledge at the university and the critical 
enterprise. (Habermas: 1987, p11) 
 
For Habermas, this ‘critical enterprise’ is political in character; students should be engaged in 
discussion and decision-making where, either externally or internally university activity is related to 
politically significant issues or areas of discourse. 
 
Two tendencies are competing with each other. Either increasing productivity is the sole 
basis of a reform that smoothly integrates the depoliticized university into the system of 
social labour and at the same time inconspicuously cuts its ties to the political, public realm. 
Or the university asserts itself within the democratic system. (Habermas: 1987, p5) 
 
This statement clearly describes a binary opposition, between the university as either a means to 
increase (presumably economic) productivity, or as a means to sustain the democratic system, this 
latter role, being achieved through critical engagement by students and academic staff, in political 
discourse. The university seems not be described here, as intrinsically valuable, rather, the ‘value’ of 
the university is derived from the value of the ‘rational society’ it sustains. Within this second 
formulation, higher education is positioned as a positive democratic political force that can be 
employed to counter depoliticising ‘technocratic consciousness’, where only technically exploitable 






T H E  P R I N C I P L E  O F  S O C I A L  J U S T I C E  A N D  T H E  C O M M O D I F I C A T I O N  O F  H I G H E R  
E D U C A T I O N  
One of the most prevalent principles employed to legitimatise ideas of higher education, within 
‘official’ discourse, is that of social justice. One of the most influential is Rawls’ (2001) conception of 
egalitarian liberalism and justice. For Rawls, the notion of individual rights is broadly premised on 
rational decisions that individuals would take concerning the liberties that they would choose to be 
available to them, in an imagined scenario. Within this scenario, the specific circumstances of those 
making the decisions are not known to them, until after ‘the veil of ignorance’ is lifted. Rawls employs 
this device to universalise the principles of egalitarian, liberalism and justice he describes.  
 
These principles are elaborated by Brighouse (2002) to consider what constitutes social justice in 
relation to education provision. Brighouse argues for ‘fair equality of opportunity’ attempting to 
establish a meritocratic principle within his conception of educational justice. Brighouse considers the 
relative social justice of educational policy in the allocation of resources to support the education of 
individuals in relation to a variety of different systems of distribution with outcomes more or less 
justifiable from the perspective of his description of egalitarian liberal social justice.  
 
In discussing School Choice and Social Justice, Brighouse (2000), describes the issue of the 
commodification of education as one of a number of ‘red herrings’ that do not undermine his 
proposals for educational choice.  He argues that “some degree of commodification of education is 
both unavoidable and unobjectionable” (Brighouse: 2000, p48). Brighouse considers three possible 
objections to the commodification of education. Firstly, that education is the kind of good “which by 
its nature should not be a commodity” (Brighouse: 2000, p47), in other words, that valuing education 
in relation to market related values is morally wrong. Secondly, that distributing education through 
market or market like processes changes and damages education “resulting in a loss of an important 
source of value” (Brighouse: 2000, p48). Thirdly, that the market-like distribution of education 
“reduces the scope for public democratic deliberation” (Brighouse: 2000, p 48).  
 
Brighouse concludes that there is nothing inherent in education, itself, that would morally prohibit its 
distribution through market like processes. This is perhaps unsurprising, as Brighouse is positioning 
social justice as the prime determinant of other values, although this value also seems to be 
dependent upon a privileging of the value of individual autonomy, as consistent with liberal 
egalitarianism. If therefore, in Brighouse’s terms, the ‘market like’ distribution of education is socially 
just, facilitating autonomy and educational equality, it is legitimate. Brighouse also argues that it 
seems unavoidable and unobjectionable to train and pay teachers for the job they perform in 
providing education. Education is something that must be bought and paid for and is, as such, to this 
extent commodified.  
 
Lastly, Brighouse argues that the ‘market like’ distribution of education does not necessarily reduce 
opportunities for democratic participation by stakeholders in relation to choices concerning the 
provision of education. In fact, Brighouse argues that some market mechanisms facilitate increased 
choice and the greater involvement of parents in decision-making. In addition, Brighouse also 
concludes that the value of democracy should not be the guiding principle when designing 
educational institutions. He argues that, the value of any system for the delivery of education is 
dependent upon the greater value of the individual rights of those being educated rather than the 
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value of democracy per se. Brighouse also argues that, ‘the proper interests of the children’ should 
be the guiding principle in the provision of education and schooling, in accordance with the values of 
personal autonomy and educational equality. Brighouse’s specific argument is concerned with school 
age children and not adults engaging with higher education. However, it is an example of a rejection 
of objections to the commodification of education, which is reliant on the value of egalitarian 
liberalism and social justice 
 
Tooley (1991, 1994, 2000, 2002, 2003) argues that market based delivery mechanisms are actually 
better placed to achieve outcomes that are appropriate to egalitarian liberal values than state 
regulated mechanisms. Tooley contrasts privately funded educational provision with state or publicly 
funded provision. Tooley criticises the legitimation of public funding derived from notions of education 
as a public good, or as that which is required to bring about desirable public good ‘externalities’, 
(such as social cohesion or less crime perhaps). Tooley argues that private funding arrangements 
are, at least equally, able to result in the promotion of such externalities. He provides a range of 
examples of privately funded systems that he argues effectively deliver educational opportunity (in 
relation to the principle of egalitarian liberalism) in a variety of contexts. In parallel, Tooley also 
argues that public funding is a co-requisite of state regulation of education, which he describes as 
antithetical to liberal values of institutional or practitioner autonomy. Tooley also describes such 
regulation, as inhibiting the enhancement and innovation of educational provision. Tooley’s solution 
is, broadly, private funding of provision with only minimal regulation, driven by market forces. The 
‘brands’ of successful educational providers would ‘self regulate’ in the market place, as education 
providers, perceived to be of poor quality by consumers, would not be able to sustain their market 
position. 
 
Despite this being a formulation that some educational theorists might object to (see for example, 
Wringe: 1994, White: 1994, Grace: 1994, Jonathan: 1997, Robertson: 1999), there is a principled 
claim for the ‘true’ or ‘real’ nature, value or purpose of higher education in Tooley’s description.  
Higher education is described as a good that all citizens have equal consumer rights to, and that the 
best way to provide appropriate access to this good, for Tooley, is through the operation of an 
appropriate market. It is of course also the case, that this description is reliant upon broader notions 
of consumer and other rights in general. Such a description (like some others) would seem to assert 
that higher education ‘is’ such a good. This implies that it is possible to discern, perhaps through 
rational discourse, the ‘right way’ to deliver higher education, derived from principles that determine 
its nature, value or purpose. This would be true of such descriptions even where the ‘nature‘ of 
higher education is minimally and non-uniquely described. 
 
T H E  P R I N C I P L E D  C R I T I Q U E  O F  T H E  C O M M O D I F I C A T I O N  O F  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  
In contrast with Tooley’s attempt to legitimise a move towards market principles, some theorists have 
engaged in zealous critique of commodification.  For example, in considering the predictive power of 
Lyotard’s (1984) work in relation to developments in New Zealand’s higher education provision, 
Roberts (1998) concludes that Lyotard was ‘stunningly accurate’. 
 
Several phases in the commodification of knowledge can be identified: the development of 
standardised units for trading qualifications (and parts of qualifications); the concentration on 
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skills and information in curriculum policy; and, most importantly the redefinition of the 
concept of ‘education’ itself. (Roberts: 1998, p8) 
 
This would of course seem to imply that there is ‘a concept’ of education to be defined. Roberts 
argues that faith in meta-narrative legitimations of higher education such as democratic socialism 
has been undermined and replaced by ‘market liberalism’, as “universities…are now expected to 
measure up to the new imperatives of performativity” (Roberts: 1998, p9) 
 
In ‘Degrees R Us – The marketisation of the university’ (2001) Bertelsen argues that the notion of 
‘transformation’ in the provision of higher education is open to two types of interpretation, one related 
to ‘democratic justice’ and one related to ‘the neo-liberal tenets of business’. In this context Bertelsen 
argues that higher education “…is recast as a service industry for capitalist enterprise” (Bertelsen: 
2001, p3) and that: 
 
Obliged to sell their image and position themselves in a competitive market, universities 
adopt 'branding' strategies developed in business schools to sell the image of companies, 
with a jargon of 'mission' (divine calling) and 'excellence' (quality control and profit) 
indistinguishable from the mission statement of one's Wimpy or local bank. While such idiom 
retains a sense of grand endeavour (to make over and change), it surrenders the idea of 
change to the market, with its compelling creed of efficiency, profit and transformative 
power. In the university's new mission, what gets taught or researched matters less than that 
it is excellently taught or researched, that is, that it satisfies market demand. (Bertelsen: 
2001, p3) 
 
Bertelsen seeks to take this argument to what she sees as its logical conclusion by describing a 
higher education enterprise called ‘Degrees R Us’. This enterprise operates by mirroring business 
practices and marketing its products as a “…genuine ‘knowledge business’” (Bertelsen: 2001, p5) 
would do. However, this ironic proposal is only ironic because it is positioned in opposition to higher 
education’s “Time-honoured principles of truth and intellectual rigour” (Bertelsen: 2001, p4). In 
addition, there does seem to be a rather romanticised notion of the academic community being 
described in opposition to ‘the new corporate model’, where  
 
University culture, while not without its problems, has tended to be intensely collegial and 
value-driven, with decisions made by self-governing academics. (Bertelsen: 2001, p4) 
 
In ‘The University of Life plc - The Industrialisation of Higher Education’ Richard Winter (1999) 
argues that, 
 
...the essence of a commodity...is not that it is a ‘thing’, but that its value is determined by its 
capacity for being marketed for profit, rather than by its usefulness in contributing to 
‘genuine’ human need” (Winter: 1999, p199) 
 
Here, although the word ‘genuine’ is in inverted commas, Winter is contrasting marketable exchange 
value with ‘genuine’ human need.  Within this argument, human need, or perhaps use-value derived 
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from human needs, is privileged as being more ‘genuine’ than exchange-value.  Winter goes on to 
argue that 
 
...this thing-like quality disguises the fact that these properties are merely constructs 
necessitated by the social relationships embodied in the structure of the market, within which 
alone the commodity has value and meaning. The commodity form is thus a displacement of 
meaning (Winter: 1999, p191) 
 
Winter seems to be describing an ideological function of commodity form when applied to higher 
education.  Commodity form is seen as masking the ‘real’ value and meaning of higher education 
and further to this that, 
 
To acquiesce completely in the commodification of knowledge would thus be, at the very 
least, a cultural disaster (Winter: 1999, p.195) 
 
Winter’s text attempts to describe recent market related developments in higher education and to 
identify contradictions, within some of these developments. At the same time Winter does indicate 
that some valuable contributions to “liberating citizens from subjections to elitist cultural authority” 
(Winter: 1999, p194) have been made by the inclusion of market perspectives. However, it seems 
that Winter believes that markets themselves perform an ideological function. 
 
…market orientation (for educational processes as for anything else) involves not simply a 
rational functional relevance but a systematic distortion of meaning, an evasion of questions 
of value, need and ultimate purpose. (Winter: 1999, p194-5) 
 
There do seem to be theoretical paradigms of a broadly Marxian perspective that are not made 
explicit.  For example, the notion of ‘genuine human need’ is untheorised and the ‘displacement of 
meaning’ would seem to indicate the existence of ‘real’ meaning although the means by which ‘real’ 
meaning is established is not made clear. Winter’s critique is however, premised on such principles. 
It is also perhaps arguable that the ascription ‘value’ to all types of ‘things’ is necessarily related to 
social constructs and that, as such, a market value for higher education is no more or less ‘genuine’, 
or more or less ideological.  
 
B A R N E T T ’ S  I D E A S  O F  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  
Ron Barnett has been influential in higher education discourse in proposing descriptions of higher 
education’s nature, purpose and value. In his book The Idea of Higher Education, Barnett (1990) 
argues against the notion that higher education should be seen as a subset of the broader 
conceptual category of ‘education’. He argues conversely, that the broader conceptual category is 
‘higher education’, as it encompasses all that is implied by the term education, and over and above 
this, that which is implied by ‘higher’ education. Here higher education is 
 
…not ‘further education’; it is not simply more of what has gone before. Rather, the term 
(higher education) is a reference to a level of individual development over and above that 
normally implied by the term ‘education’. (Barnett: 1990 p.6)  
 
 24 
Here, Barnett has attempted to identify ‘higher’ education as a separate conceptual category from 
‘further’ education and to identify, through logical argument and conceptual analysis, the 
characteristics that define ‘the’ idea of higher education. This analysis has been criticised (Aviram: 
1992, White: 1997) as being fundamentally flawed. Both Aviram and White identify problems with the 
general methodology of conceptual analysis as originally employed in educational philosophy by 
Peters (Peters: 1970) and latterly by Barnett. Conceptual analysis is intended by Barnett to establish, 
that which can reasonably be said to be implied, or connoted, by the word ‘higher’ when used in the 
context of the term higher education. As can be seen from the above quote, Barnett (here) 
constitutes this to be logically different from that which is implied or connoted by the word ‘further’. 
However, as White (1997) points out, it is not clear why this should be thought of as a logical 
distinction rather than an arbitrary, culturally specific one based on largely administrative 
considerations. Conceptual analysis has, so Aviram (1992) and White (1997) argue, tended to 
conceal inherent ideological value judgements that pre-dispose the result of such analysis, which 
undermines any claims for objectivity of the outcomes. Aviram (1992) notes that Barnett (1990) 
refers to the qualities, ideas or concepts that ‘any well informed person’ would associate with higher 
education, without making clear, who such ‘well informed persons’ are, or what values they hold. 
 
Barnett (1990) also distinguishes ‘higher’ education as being indicative of a particular kind of 
‘individual development’. Specifically, White (1997) points out that the word ‘higher’ in the term 
‘higher education’ is associated, by Barnett, with ‘higher order thinking’. However, White argues that 
there is no necessary or specific relationship between the uses of the word ‘higher’ in each context. 
One of the problems with the methodology of conceptual analysis is that the analysis itself is reliant 
upon establishing a relationship between the concept (as described by the use of certain words) and 
other concepts (also described by certain words) that is assumed not to be arbitrary, culturally or 
ideologically contingent.  
 
As White (1997) argues it is possible to conceive of a person being engaged with higher-order 
thinking in the context of a secondary education or we could conceive of higher-order thinking as 
human beings’ ability to use language or to think abstractly.  None of these are the preserve of 
higher education, it depends how ‘higher-order thinking’ is conceptualised or what associations and 
connotations an author brings to it. Barnett defines the ‘higher’ element of higher education, by 
associating it with certain types of activity and ways of being, certain types of individual development, 
certain types of approaches and responses to knowledge. As such, Barnett is making a plea for a 
particular kind of higher education but there is nothing inherent in the use of the word ‘higher’ that 
necessitates support for one kind of higher education or another. 
 
It should be noted that this represents Barnett’s early work and that his concept of higher education 
and the university have significantly changed. Although, even his later work still explicitly seeks to 
‘recover the liberal university’ (Barnett: 2003).  
 
In Realising the University, Barnet (2000) acknowledges that the idea of the university has been 
comprehensively undermined as a consequence of the ‘supercomplexity’ of the world in which the 
university exits.  
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…supercomplexity is shorthand for the state of affairs in which we find ourselves. It is … 
characterised, at its heart, by uncertainty, unpredictability, challengeability and 
contestability…[this] has led us to conclude that any determinate set of ideas – built around 
such concepts as knowledge, work, democracy, or emancipation – has to be entertained 
only with large provisos. (Barnett: 2000, p167-8) 
 
However, despite this, Barnett does in fact see the university continuing to fulfil its enlightenment 
heritage. By embracing this supercomplexity in all the university’s practices it is able to perform a 
civic function in better enabling the wider community to live with uncertainty. 
 
Supercomplexity requires of its universities…that they become sites for the continual 
production of revolutionary ideas, that graduates are able to live effectively amid radical 
uncertainty, and that the wider society is enabled to understand its condition and make ever 
more insightful evaluations of the large issues in front of it. (Barnett: 2000, p172) 
 
In Beyond All Reason, Barnett (2003) argues that despite the lack of any ‘meta-narrative’ foundations 
for higher education, ideology remains. Barnett identifies two forms of ideology that he agues are 
present within the university - pernicious and virtuous ideologies. The pernicious ideologies that are 
discussed are entrepreneurialism, competition, state sponsored quality and the myth of the academic 
community. Barnet proposes the promotion of virtuous ‘idealogies’ to counter these pernicious 
ideologies. This is to be achieved by appealing to the virtuous ideals and values that, he believes, 
exist “buried deep in the university’s self understanding” (Barnett: 2003, p131), and can yet be 
uncovered.  The liberal university, that Barnett is proposing, ‘self-consciously’ takes responsibility for 
promoting values of open, reflexive, reasonable, critical debate and reflection. 
 
…the university in the twenty first century turns out to be a particular kind of discursive 
space, a generous space that provides for the development of various kinds of human being 
and for their mutual engagement. In its becoming such a generous space, the university 
neutralises any ideology that has found houseroom within it. It also, at the same time takes 
forward, as positive idealogies, the virtuous ideals implicit in the ideals of the university. 
(Barnett: 2003, p175) 
 
Barnett seems (although not explicitly) to be suggesting here, that the university has a moral 
responsibility to create, sustain and continually evolve as a ‘generous’ discursive space to counter 
the pernicious ideologies he identifies. Idealogies are distinguished from ideologies in that the former 
do not actually distort the virtuous ideals of the university. Barnett’s strategy here is to firstly 
acknowledge the impossibility of the ‘grand narrative’ legitimation of higher education but then to 
point out the pernicious effects of existing ideologies. These effects are pernicious, in Barnett’s 
terms, when compared with the virtuous ideals inherent within the university that Barnett identifies. 
Barnett then provides us with a stark choice, either universities contribute ‘to the making of a better 
world’, or succumb to a ’darker prospect’. 
 
Reasonableness, collective self-learning and humanity on the one hand or dogma, blind 
assurance and inhumanity on the other hand: which is it to be? (Barnett: 2003. p171) 
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Barnett seems to be proposing that the university’s purpose can be re-described by drawing on a 
kind of Habermasian ‘ideal speech community’ which is legitimised by MacIntyrian ‘practices’ 
(MacIntyre: 1981), that are sustained by virtues inherent to the ‘practice’ of the university. Barnett 
clearly still sees an emancipatorary role for the university, both for the individual as a space for 
personal development and as a positive force for world betterment. Despite Barnett’s discussion of 
the problems of ‘supercomplexity’ and the traditional enlightenment project, we are left with a reified 
notion of the university and a grand narrative with a happy ending. In asserting this positive role for 
the university, Barnett is willing to take a leap of faith, as a counter to theorists Barnett describes as 
pessimists. If we do not sign up to the positive description of the university that Barnett describes we 
must presumably, according to Barnett, be signing up with the pessimists and the ‘the darker 
prospect’ of dogma and inhumanity. This is, for Barnett, the ‘contested ground’ for the future of the 
university.  
 
Analysis beyond the ‘truth’ of the educational principle 
If the starting point of educational theorising is about the ‘true’ or ‘real’ nature, value or purpose of 
higher education, with respect to polarised principled positions concerning the process of 
commodification, then such theorising may become preoccupied with non-market or market related 
legitimations of higher education. In other words, theoretical educational discourse, that positions the 
idea of the commodification of higher education as ideological, may be limited to theories that relate 
to the market/non-market binary opposition or dichotomy. This, arguably, excludes potential aspects 
of educational theoretical discourse that do not fit within this oppositional framework. In addition, 
such an approach assumes that a ‘true’ or ‘real’ nature, value or purpose for higher education can 
exist and that it can be accessed through ‘rational’ discourse. It could perhaps be argued that a 
principled legitimation of higher education must be oppositional in character, in that, to ‘define’ what 
something ‘is’, or what its value or purpose ‘should be’, is at the same time to ‘define’ what it is not or 
should not be.    
 
However, Foucault has argued the notion of ideology may itself be problematic and limited in its 
usefulness for a number of reasons.      
 
The first is that, like it or not, it is always stands in virtual opposition to something else which 
is supposed to count as truth. Now I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing a 
line between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientific truth, and that 
which comes under some other category, but in seeing historically how effects of truth are 
produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false.  
(Foucault in Rabinow: 1984, p60) 
 
There are of course conceptions of the term ‘ideology’ that do not describe it as that which ‘stands in 
virtual opposition’ to that which is described as ‘truth’, for example see Gramsci (Forgacs (Ed), 
1988). However, if we take, for example, Barnett’s description of (pernicious) ideology, it is 
positioned in opposition to the ‘true’ values of the university that Barnett argues he is able to uncover. 
However, even his description of (virtuous) ‘idealogy’, defined in opposition to ideology, does not 
seem to account for its own discursive construction within his text. Where authors construct an 
oppositional discourse that seeks to identify the ‘truth’ about higher education from a principled 
perspective, they present a de-historicised description of the ‘object’ or ‘thing’ they refer to. 
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Hunter (1994), has described how both ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ intellectuals, have criticised 
educational proposals, as not representing the ‘true principles of education’, within public policy 
relating to school education. Not only are such principles problematic for Hunter, but he also argues 
that such approaches serve to devalue the contingent cultural, and other circumstances, that have 
operated to position (and perhaps construct) ‘the school’. It is argued here, that this may also be the 
case with higher education. The idea of the commodification of higher education has been employed 
by some writers (for example, Lawrence and Sharma: 2002, Bertelsen: 2001, Winter: 1999, Neimark: 
1998) pejoratively to describe a move away from principled descriptions of higher education’s 
purpose or value. Broadly, the application of market, or ‘market like’, mechanisms in the provision of 
higher education, are described in opposition to ideas of higher education as that which is 
intrinsically valuable in the search for truth, a social good and a democratic requirement or an 
individual entitlement within the context of social justice. 
 
However, Hunter (1994) argues that such, seemingly, ‘principled positions’ within academic debate 
concerning school education actually have a common principle to which they are committed, “the 
famous image of the person as a self reflective and self realising moral agent” (Hunter: 1994, p2). 
Hunter believes that it is in relation to this ideal image that all descriptions of the school are 
positioned as the “flawed or partial realisation of the principles of education” (Hunter: 1994, p3). It is 
not difficult to see how the principled descriptions of higher education, by authors such as Barnett, 
can also require the description of higher education provision and practice as flawed in relation to a 
similar ideal principle. Hunter proposes that we  
 
…free ourselves from the spell of the educational principle. To achieve this exorcism it will 
be necessary to expel our belief in the metaphysical distinction between the ideal and the 
real, the abstract and the concrete, theory and history. More particularly, this will involve 
learning to treat adherence to educational principle itself as an historical phenomenon. 
(Hunter: 1994, p3) 
 
This thesis will attempt to develop an alternative approach to the analysis of descriptions of the 
commodification of higher education beyond that of critique in relation to principled perspectives. The 
following chapters will seek to describe a method that can generate descriptions of how official texts 
operate to strategically position the idea of the commodification of higher education and then use this 
method to describe how official texts operate to deploy commodified descriptions to construct the 
‘truth’ about higher education.  
 
An overview of the remaining chapters of the thesis 
 
C H A P T E R  T W O  –  S P E C I A L I S I N G  A N D  L O C A L I S I N G  T H E  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  F I E L D  
Chapter two sets out to establish the theoretical ground for the alternative methodological approach 
to the analysis of descriptions of the commodification of higher education. This includes the 
description of ‘higher education’ as a discursive field, drawing on the work of Foucault (1972) and 
Bourdieu (1988). Reference is also made to Simola et al’s (1998) Foucaultian ‘catalogue of 
possibilities’ that describe technologies of ‘truth’. This is as a useful means of describing the 
theoretical terrain of the higher education discursive field. However, this methodology alone is also 
described as being too self-referential to generate constructive analytical descriptions motivated by 
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empirical sites (in this case object texts). It is, however, described as a coherent means of selecting 
the official texts as empirical objects for analysis. The analysis proceeds to consider the technologies 
that empower and constrain social and cultural (re)production in relation to Bourdieu’s (1998) 
conception of the social discursive field and the exchange of different forms of cultural capital. 
 
The higher education discursive field is then localised as a site for empirical enquiry by selecting 
three kinds of official text in relation to the technologies of ‘truth’ described by Simola et al (1998). 
The QAA Handbook for Academic Review (2004) is selected as an example of the ‘technologies of 
subjectivity’ describing the processes of determining who is an ‘approved’ higher education provider. 
The Future of Higher Education’ White Paper (DfES: 2003) is selected as an example of the 
‘technologies of government’ that describes ‘why’ the Government is right to implement change in 
higher education provision. The Schwartz Report (AHESG: September 2004) is selected as an 
example of the ‘technologies of discourse’ and the construction of ’knowledge’ about fair admissions 
to higher education.. 
 
Following this, Dowling’s method of ‘constructive description’ (2004, 2007, in press) is introduced 
with reference to a range of textual examples are provided to illustrate how discursive formation can 
operate to regulate practice. Lastly, the thesis is itself identified as an object text implicated in the 
construction of the organisational language employed to generate recontextualised descriptions of 
higher education. 
 
C H A P T E R  T H R E E  –  
T H E  C O N S T R U C T I O N  O F  A  S P E C I A L I S E D  O R G A N I S A T I O N A L  L A N G U A G E  
This chapter further ‘specialises’ the theoretical field by constructing an ‘organisational language’ 
designed to generate analytical descriptions of the dynamic relations between identified strategies 
operating within selected object texts. Dowling’s (2004a, 2007, in press) ‘modes of authority action’ 
are employed to introduce this method in the analysis of the QAA Handbook for Academic Review. 
 
I then introduce my specialised theory and describe two modes of action.  Firstly, I describe modes 
of capital exchange drawn from Bourdieu’s (1998) opposition between ‘explicit economic capital 
exchange’ and ‘euphemistic symbolic capital exchange’. Secondly, I describe modes of discursive 
objectification drawn from Kopytoff’s (1986), opposition between unique, singular and non-
comparable things and non-unique, homogeneous, comparable commodities. This mode of action 
describes ‘aesthetic’, ‘iconic/ symbolic’, ‘institutional’ and ‘commodified’ modes. This specialised 
theoretical device provides a means of generating descriptions of the ways in which official texts are 
operating to (re)produce and/or resist of the idea of the commodification of higher education. 
 
C H A P T E R  F O U R  –   
R E A D I N G  T H E  R E G U L A T I O N  O F  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  Q U A L I T Y  A S S U R A N C E  
This chapter focuses on the analysis of the QAA Handbook for Academic Review (2004). The 
chapter locates the Handbook within the higher education field and identifies other related texts, 
which are described within the Handbook as the ‘Academic Infrastructure’. The analysis considers 
the specific authorial and audience voices that are constructed within the Handbook, such as ‘the 
QAA’, as the prime authorial voice and higher education provider institutions, as the audience. In 
doing so it is argued that the Handbook constructs an esoteric domain of higher education practice 
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and that it operates as a pedagogic text apprenticing reviewers and academic staff into the practice 
of Academic Review.  
 
A modes of review discursive space is constructed from identified oppositions and alliances within 
the text. This space is specifically constructed from the binary variables of ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ 
relations (as textual subjectivities) and non-hierarchical/hierarchical authority relations. Modes 
include ‘facilitation/therapy’, ‘inspection’, ‘peer review’ and ‘peer exchange’. The analysis considers 
the strategic distribution of these modes within the Handbook text. Lastly, the oppositions described 
in relation to modes of review are recontextualised in the analysis of modes of discursive 
objectification. 
 
C H A P T E R  F I V E  –  R E A D I N G  T H E  F U T U R E  O F  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  
This chapter is an analysis of The Future of Higher Education White Paper (DfES: 2003). The 
analysis proceeds by locating the text within the higher education discursive field in relation to a 
range of antecedent policy texts including; The Dearing Report (NCIHE, 1997); The Learning Age 
(DFEE, 1997); and Higher Education and the 21
st
 Century (DfEE1998). The Future of Higher 
Education text is identified as a key document in the UK higher education policy context.  
 
Having described the construction of the authorial and audience voices within the White Paper, the 
analysis considers the specific ways in which the text has recontextualised higher education as 
governmental practice. As a product of this analysis oppositions and alliances are identified within 
the text, which are employed to construct a specialised and localised mode of action – modes of 
higher education participation. The White Paper describes closed categories of potential participants 
such as ‘the talented and the best’ and in doing so constructs an opposition with an open category of 
participants. At the same time the White paper also describes the introduction of governmental 
means of regulating access to higher education such as the creation of an ‘Access Regulator’. Such 
descriptions construct an opposition between access that is not formally regulated and that which is. 
By relating these two sets of binary variables I construct a discursive space with which to generate 
descriptions of how the text is operating in any of four modes of higher education participation. The 
modes of higher education participation described include; ‘Bespoke’, ‘Selected’, ‘Mass’ and 
‘Universal’ modes. 
 
The oppositions and alliances that are described in the analysis are then recontextualised in relation 
to modes of discursive objectification to generate a description of the extent to which the text is 
operating in the commodified mode. This analysis specifically considers the dynamic relationships 
between the ways in which the texts operates across all modes and consider the extent to which this 
constitutes strategic discursive action.  
 
C H A P T E R  S I X  –  R E A D I N G  F A I R  A D M I S S I O N S  T O  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N   
This chapter is an analysis of the Admissions to Higher Education Steering Group’s Fair admissions 
to higher education: Recommendations for good practice, known as The Schwartz Report (DfES: 
September 2004). The analysis proceeds by locating the text within the higher education discursive 
field. An overview of the textual authorial and audience voices describes the processes by which this 
independent review was commissioned by the Government. This includes the appointment of the 
members of the Steering Group and the specific terms of references within which the Steering Group 
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are required to operate. The analysis also considers how the text operates to recontextualise higher 
education as fair admissions practice. For example, by describing higher education in relation to the 
issues and problems in admissions practice and the ‘high-level principles’ that are positioned as the 
solutions to the problems identified.  
 
One of the key tasks of the Steering Group is described as providing recommendations for best 
practice in assessing the merit of applicants to higher education. By identifying oppositions and 
alliance within the text I construct a localised and specialised mode of action – modes of assessing 
merit and potential. The text describes the validity and the reliability of methods of assessing merit 
and potential as a high-level principle of fair admissions. By relating the binary variables of valid/non-
valid methods, and reliable/non-reliable methods I generate descriptions of how the text is operating 
in relation to modes of assessing merit and potential. The oppositions and alliances that have been 
described in the analysis are then recontextualised in relation to modes of discursive objectification 
to generate a description of the extent to which the text is operating in the commodified mode 
reflecting the method of analysis employed in chapters four and five. 
 
C H A P T E R  S E V E N  –  C O N C L U S I O N  
The concluding chapter provides a description of the achievements and outcomes of the research 
undertaken, an identification of the scope of the findings and the implications for practice including 
some examples of potential future work. This chapter also provides some examples of how the 
outcomes of the research are of direct relevance to contemporary higher education discourse and 
national debates. The development of a method of analysis that avoids reliance on one or other 
educational principle is identified as an achievement in providing a non-reproductive approach to 
textual analysis. In particular, the development of a method of analysis that can generate 
descriptions of the ways in which texts operate in a commodified mode (in relation to other modes) is 
described as an original contribution to knowledge.  
 
Other achievements include the description of the ways in which official texts construct ‘higher 
education’ in a variety of modes that are often in dynamic relationships with each other. The 
description of these constructed relationships can inform practice by demonstrating of how they are 
operating strategically to promote the regulation of various aspects of practice. The research also 
identifies that even where official texts explicitly describe higher education as a commodity or in 
terms of its economic value, this does not mean that such texts are primarily operating to reproduce 
the idea of its commodification.  
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Chapter two – Specialising and localising the higher education field 
 
Introduction 
The last chapter began by asking which, if any, of two very different descriptions of higher education 
could be described as ‘true’. Each description exemplified different perspectives concerning the 
value, role or purpose of higher education. One description represented a principled view of the 
democratic purposes of higher education, which was juxtapositioned for the purposes of dramatic 
effect, in relation to a description of higher education as something similar to a supermarket product 
(or commodity). However, as discussed in the previous chapter, I will not, within this work, be 
seeking to establish what might be a ‘true’ and/or untrue, description of higher education, from any 
‘principled’ perspective, or indeed at all.  
 
Rather, I will attempt to describe higher education as a historical phenomenon in the context of social 
structures, cultural practices and discursive action. This will include the description of higher 
education as a ‘discursive field’ drawing on the work of Foucault and Bourdieu. As such, I will 
consider how the idea that descriptions of higher education are ‘true’, is produced. What is included, 
and what is excluded, in the production of such ‘truths’, how are techniques employed to (re)produce 
and legitimise such ‘truths’? In other words, what are the technologies that afford and constrain 
social and cultural (re)production within the higher education discursive field? In particular, 
Bourdieu’s conception of the exchange forms of cultural capital will be considered with reference to 
the idea of higher education as a (re)productive social mechanism. 
 
This chapter will also describe the rationale the selection of specific ‘official’ higher education texts, 
as the localised instances of the higher education empirical field, for analysis. Lastly, I will discuss 
Dowling’s approach to ‘constructive description’, as a means of generating analytical descriptions of 
texts in preparation for the description of my specialised theory and method in chapter three. 
 
T H E  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  D I S C U R S I V E  F I E L D  A N D  T H E  C O N S T R U C T I O N  O F  ‘ T R U T H ’  
Foucault’s conception of ‘discourses’ (Foucault: 1972) can be employed to analyse the idea of higher 
education commodification. For Foucault discourses are not a way to uncover the hidden meaning of 
a concept or text by unravelling layers of signification. Foucault’s approach is  
 
…to distinguish among events to differentiate the networks and levels to which they belong, 
and to reconstitute the lines along which they are connected and engender one another…a 
recourse to analyses in terms of the genealogy of relations of force, strategic developments, 
and tactics. (Foucault in Rabinow: 1984, p56) 
 
Discourses, for Foucault, are not in themselves true or false, the question is rather how are ‘truths’ 
produced and sanctioned. For example, in higher education discourse, what types of statements are 
accepted and not accepted as ‘true’? What are the ways in which ‘true’ and ‘false’ statements are 
identified and who is empowered with the status, or role, to determine what is and what is not ‘true’? 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Hunter (1994) adopted a Foucaultian approach to his analysis 
of the school. Rather than trying to access ’the truth’ about the nature, value or purpose of the 
school, Hunter considered how the contingent economic, social and historical factors, related to the 
school, as a practice, have operated. Simola, Heikkinen and Silvonen (1998), have also attempted to 
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adopt a Foucaultian approach to educational research by developing an analytical tool based on the 
idea of discourses. 
 
Discourses, in the Foucaultian sense of the word, are first and foremost techniques, 
practices, and rules, which can be divided into three sets: those concerning the speaking 
subject, those connected with power relations, and those internal to discourse itself.  
(Simola, Heikkinen and Silvonen: 1998, p65) 
 
Simola et al’s approach includes the construction of a research tool to analyse discourses that, they 
argue, can be used to generate ‘a catalogue of possibilities’ rather than any specific totalising theory 
of ‘truth’.  
 
It is not a method for concrete empirical research, but a way to ask questions about 
conditions of empirical inquiry, going beyond dichotomies of essentialism and nominalism or 
deduction and induction. (Simola, et al: 1998, p84) 
 
F I G U R E  1 :  T E C H N O L O G I E S  O F  T R U T H  ( S I M O L A ,  H E I K K I N E N  A N D  S I L V O N E N :  1 9 9 8 ,  P 7 0 )  
 
Simola et al construct an equilateral triangular model (Figure 1) at the centre of which is the question 
‘how are the technologies of truth operating within an identified discourse?’ The bottom left corner of 
the triangle is concerned with questions about knowledge or the ‘techniques of discourse’. This 
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includes questions such as; what are the rules internal to a discourse that allow the reproduction of 
knowledge? Who has access to the means with which to speak such knowledge; what cannot be 
said and by what means are some statements excluded?  
 
The top of the triangle is concerned with questions about subjectivity or ‘the techniques of self’. This 
includes questions such as; through what means do human beings recognise themselves as 
subjects in relation to moral agency? How are subjects created in the enactment of governmentality, 
in other words “..the capacity simultaneously to govern and be governed” (Simola, et al: 1998, p67)? 
Through what ways is the willingness to subjectify oneself in relation to knowledge regimes through 
self-examination and categorisation facilitated?  
 
The bottom right of the triangle is concerned with questions about power or ‘the techniques of 
government’. This includes questions such as; how is power strategically and tactically employed. 
What are the disciplining practices employed? Who are included and who are excluded by 
individualising (dividing) practices? 
 
Simola et al describe of the technologies of truth model using the three ‘axes’ of knowledge, 
subjectivity and power. The model is fractal in construction in that each axis (knowledge, subjectivity 
and power) is repeated when considering each specific technology. For example, technologies of 
discourse include ‘the internal rules of discourse’ (knowledge), ‘the rareification of speaking subjects’ 
(subjectivity) and ‘systems of exclusion’ (power). Simola et al relate this model to ‘the truths of the 
modern Finnish teacher’ but following this example, it could be possible to construct a similar 
‘catalogue of possibilities’, in relation to the ‘truths’ of higher education in the UK. This could provide 
a theoretical map of the higher education discursive field, by cataloguing the possible ‘differentiated 
networks’, ‘lines along which they are connected’, ‘relations of force, strategic developments and 
tactics’ (Foucault in Rabinow: 1984).  
 
In relation to the knowledge axis, we might consider, ‘what is the true knowledge about higher 
education’? If we consider this question in relation to knowledge, subjectivity and power, we might 
ask, ‘what is spoken (or written) about higher education’, ‘who is authorised to speak (or write) about 
higher education and how’, and ‘what, is not to be spoken (or written) about higher education and 
how’? In relation to the subjectivity axis, we might consider the question, ‘who is the ‘good’ higher 
education subject’? Again, if we consider this question in relation to knowledge, subjectivity and 
power we might ask, ‘what must a ‘good’ higher education subject know and want to know’. ‘What 
must a higher education subject do to be ‘good’, and ‘how must a ‘good’ higher education subject be 
able to govern and be governed’? Lastly, in relation to the power axis, we might ask, ‘what kind of 
power is legitimate in relation to higher education’? If we consider this question in relation to 
knowledge, subjectivity and power we might ask, ‘how is the higher education subject to be 
examined’, ‘how is the higher education subject to be individualised’, and ‘how is the higher 
education subject bound up in relations of forces’? It should be noted here that the term ‘higher 
education subject’ is deliberately employed here to avoid individualising differentiations such as 
‘practitioner’ or ‘student’ that are themselves bound up in power/knowledge relations. 
 
This approach is productive, to a degree, in providing a theoretical map with which to think about the 
kinds of ‘technologies’ (or perhaps strategies) that might be operating in any given discursive 
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instance (or object text). As indicated above, texts construct subjectivities (authors and audiences) 
that are bound up in power/knowledge relations. Similarly, oppositions and alliances (for example, 
the bureaucratic differentiation between ‘university’ and ‘further education college’) within texts can 
be described as operating as strategic technologies, that determine ‘who’ can speak, and how. By 
considering these possibilities, we might be able ‘to ask questions about the conditions of empirical 
inquiry’ (Simola et al: 1998) to identify the kinds of texts (as empirical objects), that are relevant for 
this analysis. Identified texts could include descriptions that reflect some of the possible discursive, 
subjective and governmental ‘technologies’, that may be operating to (re)produce and/or resist the 
idea of the commodification of higher education.  
 
This provides a means with which to construct coherence between the theoretical and the empirical 
fields, relevant to this work by providing a rationale for selecting texts for analysis related to the 
categories of subjectivity, knowledge and power. The relationship and dynamic, between these 
categories seems likely to be differentially represented in individual cases. It will of course be the 
case that any text may be related to all three of these categories, but different types of text, may be 
more or less, indicative of one category than others. For example, an Act of Parliament (text) could 
be reasonably assumed to relate particularly (yet not exclusively) to the category of power and the 
technologies of government. 
 
The oppositions and alliances contained within this model are self-referring and as a consequence 
coherent. Knowledge, power and subjectivity are all described in relation to each other. This self-
referential (coherent) approach data. is useful for this thesis in providing a ‘catalogue’ or ‘map’ of 
possible kinds of oppositions and alliances, technologies and strategies within the higher education 
discursive field. However, whilst the model has the benefit of theoretical coherence, it does not itself 
facilitate sufficient purchase on the empirical to produce descriptions that can generate new theory 
for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
As a consequence, the analysis of texts as empirical objects in this thesis will require analytical 
mechanisms that relate to, or that are constructed from, oppositions and alliances identified within 
the empirical sites (object texts) being investigated. In addition, the analysis of texts will also need to 
be able to generate descriptions that shed light on the specific research question that is the focus of 
this thesis. In other words, the analysis will need to generate descriptions that are directly relevant to 
the (re)production and/or resistance of the idea of the commodification of higher education. The 
following sections will attempt to specifically draw on the work of Bourdieu and Dowling to begin the 
process of specialising the theoretical territory relevant to this task.  
 
Higher Education as a discursive social field 
In the context of the conceptual framework being constructed within this text, higher education will be 
described as a discursive social ‘field’ (Bourdieu: 1998). This field, following Bourdieu, is conceived 
of as including ‘agents’ (individually identified entities including individual institutions, organisations 
etc), practices and texts. It should be noted that for the purposes of this work, ‘agents’ are conceived 
of as ‘textual subjectivities’, that are identifiable as a consequence of individualising strategies 
deployed within texts. This work will not (as Bourdieu does) be drawing on any empirical data that 
directly corresponds to the identification of ‘agents’ beyond that which emerges from the analysis of 
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texts. I will argue that ‘subjectivities’, such as authors and audiences, emerge from the structuring or 
patterning of oppositions and alliances identified within texts.  
 
Higher education is conceived of here as a theoretically specialised and empirically localised field 
within a broader social space that includes a wide (perhaps potentially infinite) range of other fields. 
The nature of those relationships and the extent of the higher education field itself are conceived of 
as historical and to this degree, contingent.  
 
It is the relatedness of subjects, practices and texts within this field that establishes higher education 
as an identifiable, if contingent, discursive social field. This approach differs from attempts to define 
specific disciplines in relation to their ‘logically’ distinct practices (such as specific criteria for 
establishing forms of knowledge, for example Hirst and Peters: 1970). I do not, as such, argue that 
higher education can be defined in relation to identified practices in any analytic sense. There is also 
no attempt to describe a conceptually distinct category of ‘higher’ education differentiated from for 
example, ’further’ education, (see Barnett 1990 for an example of this kind of description) 
 
Rather, the notion of a higher education field is conceived of as one in which the relational 
differentiation between subjects, practices and texts constitute positions that emerge out of 
oppositions and alliances. In this sense the higher education field largely corresponds with that 
described by Bourdieu. 
 
That is what I mean when I describe the global social space as a field. That is, both as a 
field of forces, whose necessity is imposed on agents who are engaged in it, and as a field 
of struggles within which agents confront each other, with differentiated means and ends 
according to their position in the structure of the field of forces thus contributing to 
conserving or transforming its structure. (Bourdieu: 1998, p.32) 
 
However, as indicated above, I will not seek to objectively establish the position of identified ‘agents’ 
within this conception of the higher education field. Rather, it will be primarily concerned with 
describing the discursive strategies employed within specified object texts and the ways in which 
such strategies operate to (re)produce and/or resist the idea of the commodification of higher 
education. The specified texts will be ‘read’ as instances of and the product of, socio-cultural action 
that operates to deploy particular descriptions of higher education (as textual objects), in relation to 
other potential descriptions for strategic advantage in the field.  
 
The focus on strategic moves, rather than ‘identifiable’ positions within the higher education field, 
aligns the approach taken here with that of Foucault (1972) in relation to discursive formation. For 
Foucault, discourses are “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” 
(Foucault: 1972, p49). In other words, practices are ‘systematic’, in that they operate in relation to a 
‘system’, a set of more or less strongly institutionalised social structures. For example, the higher 
education practice of awarding degree qualifications is strongly institutionalised. Institutions wishing 
to validate degrees, must submit to ‘examination’, in relation to highly bureaucratic procedures, 
sanctioned by the Privy Council, to gain the power to do so.  Such structures provide the framework 
for the construction of discursive objects, in this case recognition as a higher education institution 
with degree awarding powers. However, these structures are themselves dynamically formed (and 
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reformed) and are, as a consequence, historically contingent. The status of degree awarding powers 
has a history. Different institutions and organisations have employed a variety of discursive 
strategies to gain the status of degree awarding powers. This history ranges from the role of the 
ancient universities, and includes the development of the Council for National Academic Awards 
(CNAA) in the 1960’s, as well as the recognition of polytechnics as new universities in 1992. For 
example, Aldrich’s (2002) The Institute of Education 1902-2002: a centenary history charts the 
history of the change in status of the institution from a Day Training College awarding teachers 
certificates to a University Institute awarding higher degrees. More recently, the proposals to allow 
some further education colleges to apply for degree awarding powers can be read as an example of 
the systematic, yet dynamic, formation of higher education practices. For example, The Times Higher 
Education Supplement (THES) has described what can be read as a strategic discursive contribution 
of one university lobby group, in relation to this proposal. 
 
Universities UK said it still had concerns that extending foundation degree-awarding powers 
to colleges could have "serious unintended consequences" for collaborative partnerships 
between further and higher education. (THES: 9.3.07)  
 
This text seems to position Universities UK as an ‘authority’, in relation to the identification of such 
"serious unintended consequences". This could be read as an attempt to assert this authority as a 
strategy to mitigate the potential loss of the unique powers universities hold to award degrees. 
Higher education is constructed within this example text as that, in relation to which, universities (or 
in this case a universities representative body) are uniquely authorised to speak. 
 
It is in relation to this kind of approach, that this text will attempt to reconstitute higher education as a 
discursive field: not by identifying what higher education ‘is’, or ‘is not’, nor by describing what ‘is’ or 
‘is not’ ‘true’ about higher education. Rather, this work will seek to describe the discursive strategies 
and tactics at play within the higher education discursive field, through the analysis of texts. The 
analysis of this field, as exemplified by selected texts, will identify oppositions and alliances and 
construct descriptions of the modes of strategic action, that higher education related texts evidence. 
In this way, the description of identified modes of strategic action can indicate the extent to which 
texts are operating to (re)produce or resist particular ideas about higher education, in this case the 
idea of its commodification. 
 
The following section will consider some of the ways in which Bourdieu’s conceptions of ‘habitus’ and 
‘capital’ can be employed to further specialise the theoretical field and construct a means to generate 
descriptions of modes of strategic action. 
 
H A B I T U S  A N D  F O R M S  O F  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  C A P I T A L   
The construction of the higher education subject is of direct relevance to this work, in that this text 
will itself construct an author and categories of audience. It is important to note that both authors and 
audiences are constituted by the reader of a text. My reading of the specific texts that I analyse 
establishes textual authors and audiences. In the same way, whilst the author of this thesis is my 
‘avatar’ in the text, this author will also be constituted by the reader. As a thesis produced to gain 
recognition within the philosophical and sociological terrain of the higher education field, the 
audience will include practitioners who are similarly located. This text, in ‘constructing’ its audience is 
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in one sense reproducing existing institutionalised structures by conforming to the norms of thesis 
production when addressing an audience of academic assessors. However, as a ‘thesis’ (required to 
represent the authors original work) it is producing a specialised version of this audience. There is 
also an inherent presumption that there is a relationship between the constructed (textual) audiences 
produced, within this text, and the individuals (academic peers), within the higher education field, 
who read it. 
 
Higher education has been described above in relation to historically contingent social structures and 
cultural practices, which operate within the higher education discursive field. Higher education 
managers, researchers, PhD supervisors, faculty and students, for example, are types of subjects 
who can be described as engaging with higher education practice, albeit in a variety of different 
ways. To be able to engage with higher education practice, arguably, requires an understanding of 
the current and accepted norms of such a practice to be taken seriously, to be accorded a voice, or 
perhaps, to be afforded the opportunity to so engage. As a higher education practitioner, the 
processes of induction into and gradual internalisation and habituation of norms of practice, arguably, 
constitute an identification of ‘self’ related to, and subject to, such norms. Even where a practitioner 
sought to act to resist such norms, the context of such resistance may be determined by that which is 
being resisted. As Blacker has put it 
 
One’s idea of what one is struggling against has a direct impact on what one becomes as 
one struggles. (Blacker: 1998, p357) 
 
Bourdieu’s conception of ‘habitus’ is an attempt to reconcile the relation between social structures, 
cultural practices and the dispositions of individuals. Habitus is described as 
 
…that system of dispositions which acts as a mediation between structures and practice; 
more specifically it becomes necessary to study the laws that determine the tendency of 
structures to reproduce themselves by producing agents endowed with the system of pre-
dispositions which is capable of engendering practices adapted to the structures and 
thereby contributing to the reproduction of structures. (Bourdieu: 1973, p72) 
 
This work is concerned with the ways in which the idea of higher education commodification is 
located within social structures and how such structures (re)produce themselves in higher education 
practices. For Bourdieu, education and particularly higher education, is seen as a significant 
contributor to the reproduction of power structures and cultural capital distribution, whilst 
“…concealing…the fact that it fills this function” (Bourdieu: 1973, p72). For Bourdieu, this is 
significant, in relation the processes that ‘translate’ economic capital into cultural or ‘academic’ 
capital, which itself is then translated into economic capital and so on, reproducing social structures 
and cultural practices. 
 
In ‘The Forms of Capital’ (1986), Bourdieu argues that capital is ‘accumulated labour’ that can exist 
in incorporated/embodied or materialised/objectified forms. Bourdieu proposes, that his concept of 
capital is necessary, to “account for the structure and functioning of the social world” (Bourdieu: 
1986, p46). Here, capital is positioned as both, a social energy, or force, that is inscribed in social 
structures, and that which structures cultural practices, limiting and constraining social possibilities, 
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by reproducing itself. Bourdieu argues, that forms of capital cannot all be reduced to economic 
capital and he criticises economic theory, for narrowly defining all human exchange, as ’mercantile 
exchange’. Economic theory, Bourdieu argues, positions forms of human exchange, other than 
economic exchange, as ‘disinterested’. In fact, Bourdieu argues, economic theory is dependent upon 
the description of a variety of cultural practices, as ‘disinterested’, to enable the definition of other 
practices as having the purpose of ‘maximising monetary profit’. In other words, the description of the 
category of practices that constitutes ‘interested exchange’, as defined by economic theory, requires 
the definition of other cultural practices as ‘disinterested’. As such, economic theory is criticised, in 
that, it  “takes for granted the very foundations of the order it claims to analyse” (Bourdieu: 1986, 
p47). In contrast to this, it is argued that ‘mercantile exchange’, is only one form of ‘interested 
exchange’. As such, Bourdieu proposes that there are at least two other forms of capital, ‘cultural 
capital’ and ‘social capital’. In addition, Bourdieu (1986, 1998) also agues that any form of capital can 
be represented as ‘symbolic capital’ and that such representation “…presupposes the intervention of 
the habitus, as a socially constituted cognitive capacity” (1986, p56). In other words the symbolic 
representation of capital requires, according to Bourdieu, a system of internalised dispositions that 
reflect and reproduce socially constituted structures. 
 
More precisely, symbolic capital is the form taken by any species of capital whenever it is 
perceived through categories of perception that are the product of the embodiment of 
divisions or of oppositions inscribed in the structure of the distribution of this species of 
capital (strong/weak, large/small, rich/poor, cultured/uncultured). (Bourdieu: 1986, p47) 
 
Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital can be seen to have specific relevance to the idea of the 
commodification of higher education.  Cultural capital, according to Bourdieu, can exist in three 
forms, the embodied state, the objectified state and the institutionalised state. The embodied state is, 
here, a form of capital that results from work ‘on one’s self’, individuals acquire cultural capital 
through self-improvement, which incurs costs such as time, effort and perhaps money. Here, cultural 
capital becomes an integral part of the dispositions and perhaps knowledge (what Foucault might call 
‘savoir’, the “…subject…modified by…the labour performed in order to know…the reciprocal genesis 
of subject and object”, (Foucault: 1991, p69-70) of the person who acquires it, part of their being, 
their way of living or ‘habitus’. In this sense, embodied cultural capital  
 
…cannot be transmitted instantaneously (unlike money, property rights, or even titles of 
nobility) by gift or bequest, purchase or exchange. (Bourdieu: 1986, p48) 
 
For Bourdieu, this form of capital is bound up with an individual in ‘biological singularity’, in that, its 
acquisition is determined, to some extent, by the capacity of an individual to acquire it and is 
specifically bound, to the biological existence of the person who posses it. It is however, for 
Bourdieu, exactly this that obscures the relationship between this form of cultural capital and the 
economic and social conditions of its acquisition.  
 
For example, if we consider an excerpt from The Schwartz Report (2004), there do seem to be 
concerns, identified within the text, that it is at least possible, that the recognition of an individual’s 
‘potential to benefit from higher education’, may not in all cases be being ‘fairly’ recognised.  
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A fair and transparent admissions system is essential for all applicants. As we enter an era 
in which students may face substantial tuition fees, applicants must become informed 
consumers. They need to know how to compare institutions and courses and how to 
interpret a prospectus. All applicants, including those from backgrounds currently under-
represented in HE, also need to know how to present their attainments to admissions staff 
so that their achievements are fairly assessed...Given the fierce competition for the benefits 
of HE, it is vital that all stakeholders in the applications and admissions process – including 
schools, colleges, admissions staff, employers and, of course, applicants and their families – 
believe that the system is unbiased. The system must not only be fair, but must also be seen 
to be fair. Everyone must feel confident that all applicants with the ability to succeed have a 
fair chance of gaining admission to higher education.  
(AHESG: 2004, p15) 
 
It is interesting that the drive towards ‘fair admissions’ in higher education is associated, within the 
text excerpt, with the fact that individuals are being asked to pay tuition fees, which means that, 
‘applicants must become informed consumers’. What seems to be excluded is the possibility, for 
applicants, not to be ‘consumers’. If all applicants are ‘informed consumers’ who choose to engage 
with a ‘fair and transparent admissions system’ then we can presumably all ’be confident’ that the 
cultural advantages of an economically advantageous background will be appropriately mitigated.  
What is implied, through its absence, is that an unfair system, would be one in which applicants are 
not able to act as informed consumers. It could of course be possible that applicants might not be 
thought of as ‘consumers’ at all. It is certainly not the way that some of the principled critics of the 
idea of the commodification of higher education (for example Bertelsen: 2001), discussed in the 
previous chapter, would wish to describe the nature of higher education practice. 
 
Interesting also, is the association of the need for a ‘transparent’ system to enable applicants ‘to 
compare institutions and courses and how to interpret a prospectus’ and for applicants, to ‘know how 
to present their attainments to admissions staff’. Applicants from ‘under-represented groups’, are 
also specifically mentioned as needing to possess these skills and abilities. This is, presumably, 
because they are the groups that are least likely to have them. From the excerpt above, it would 
seem that providing transparent information about institutions’ courses and their respective 
admissions procedures would enable any cultural deficit (of applicants) to be bridged. Lastly, it is 
also interesting that a clear outcome identified in the report is that ‘all stakeholders…believe that the 
system is unbiased’ and that ‘everyone must feel confident that all applicants with the ability to 
succeed have a fair chance of gaining admission to higher education’. There seems to be the 
presumption that it is both possible and good, that ‘applicants with the ability to succeed, can be 
identified through the application of ‘fair’ admissions systems. This seems very much like an example 
of ‘symbolic capital’ described by Bourdieu above where “it is perceived through categories of 
perception that are the product of the embodiment of divisions or of oppositions inscribed in the 
structure of the distribution of this species of capital” (Bourdieu: 1986, p47). The recognition of an 
applicant as having the ‘ability to succeed’ or as one ‘without ability to succeed’, is inscribed within 
the method of ‘distribution’ (the admissions system). Similarly, ‘the benefits of HE’, can be conceived 
of as equivalent to the cultural capital, gained as a consequence of being afforded the opportunity to 
engage with higher education. The emphasis on consumer confidence and belief in ‘the system 
being unbiased’ (within the text), could then be described as the admissions system being 
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represented as a form of symbolic capital. In this sense, The Schwartz Report text could be read as 
evidencing a strategic attempt to gain symbolic capital for the UK higher education admission 
system. 
 
In the consideration of ‘fair’ methods of assessing the potential of applicants to benefit from higher 
education, Schwartz identifies issues about the reliability and validity of some methods that the 
reports recommendations are designed to address. 
 
A wide range of methods of assessment are in use in addition to Level 3 examinations. 
These range from considering GCSE results, to aptitude tests, to interviews. Only some of 
the assessment methods used have been demonstrated to predict undergraduate 
success…the Admissions to Higher Education Steering Group is concerned that there is 
generally no expectation within institutions that the reliability and validity of methods being 
used should have been established and no processes within institutions to approve the 
criteria adopted. The Group is also concerned that there is no central and authoritative 
source of advice for admissions staff about the reliability and validity of different methods. 
(AHESG: 2004, p26) 
 
The ‘concern’ described in the text could perhaps be used to illustrate Bourdieu’s concept of the 
translation of one form of capital into another by describing it in relation to the role of interviews in the 
selection process. Applicants to a higher education course may have acquired embodied cultural 
capital, by being a member of an economically well off family, that lives in a house full of books and 
other cultural artefacts, where family members have the time to promote the value and practice of 
family discussion. The embodied cultural capital (described by Bourdieu) may exist in the form of a 
familiarity and an ability to engage with others in debate, in relation to a relatively wide range of 
issues of the day. The value of debate and discussion may be reproduced, in the form of a formal 
interview procedure, employed by the higher education institution. This may require the 
demonstration of an ability to competently discuss issues at interview. This procedure may be 
thought to be a reliable and valid way to ascertain an applicants ‘potential to benefit’ from the higher 
education course. The interview process may also have been made ‘transparent’ to all applicants 
through the provision of detailed and comprehensive information, made readily available. However, 
none the less, if the process inherently recognises abilities that are more likely to be possessed by 
applicants from economically advantageous backgrounds, then the embodied cultural capital may be  
 
…unrecognised as capital and recognised as legitimate competence…an example of the 
markets in which economic capital is not fully recognised. (Bourdieu: 1986, p49) 
 
This is interesting as it would seem to suggest that the embodied nature of this form of capital, as 
conceptualised by Bourdieu, could, in this illustration, disguise the economic and social conditions 
that may be reproduced by explicitly non-economic or ‘disinterested’ higher education selection 
processes. Whether this is the case or not is of course an empirical question that will not be 
addressed within this work. It may to some extent, however, indicate that some descriptions of higher 
education include models of exchange, in addition to that of ‘mercantile exchange‘, in the narrow 
sense of the term described by Bourdieu.  
 
 41 
The objectified state of cultural capital, described by Bourdieu, is constituted in material objects, 
cultural goods and artefacts such as books and paintings. These goods can be exchanged and 
traded, in the same way as other commodities. It could therefore perhaps be argued, that this form of 
capital can be reduced to economic capital. However, Bourdieu argues that legal ownership of a 
cultural capital object does not necessarily mean that the ‘owner’ can ‘consume’ such an object. In 
the same way perhaps, that someone who owns a car, yet does not posses the skills to drive, cannot 
‘consume’ (use/drive) the car they own, Bourdieu argues, that owning a cultural object does not 
necessarily constitute “the precondition for specific appropriation” (1991, p50). In other words, 
Bourdieu argues that the consumption of a cultural object requires the possession of relevant 
embodied cultural capital (such as the dispositions, knowledge and understanding of the habitus to 
which the object relates). 
 
The institutionalised state of cultural capital as academic qualifications, according to Bourdieu, 
constitutes an objectification that is at the same time embodied in that it is specifically related to a 
specific individual bearer. 
 
With the academic qualification, a certificate of cultural competence which confers on its 
holders a conventional, constant, legally guaranteed value with respect to culture, social 
alchemy produces a form of cultural capital which has relative autonomy…  
(Bourdieu: 1986, p50-51) 
 
In this context recognition by higher education institutions through its degree awarding powers (for 
example) would to a large extent determine the form, process and type of cultural capital that an 
individual effectively possesses. Degree awarding powers or the recognition, status and authority 
granted to institutions to perform the ‘social alchemy’ necessary to individualise cultural capital in the 
form of degree qualifications, is itself also a form of institutional cultural capital: what Bourdieu 
describes as 
 
…the performative magic of the power of instituting, the power to show forth and secure 
belief or, in a word, to impose recognition. (Bourdieu: 1986, p51)  
 
If we take an excerpt from the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) text, ‘Applications for the 
grant of taught degree-awarding powers, research degree-awarding powers and university title’, the 
mechanisms (or technologies) for establishing such powers are clearly described. 
 
Section 76 of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 and Section 48 of the Further and 
Higher Education (Scotland) Act 1992 empower the Privy Council to specify institutions of 
higher education as competent to grant awards, in other words to grant them powers to 
award their own degrees. In considering applications for such powers, the Privy Council 
seeks advice from the appropriate territorial Minister with higher education responsibilities. 
In turn, the appropriate Minister seeks advice from the Agency [Quality Assurance Agency 
for Higher Education]… 
 
The [degree awarding powers] criteria are designed to establish that the applicant 
organisation is a well-founded, cohesive and self-critical academic community that can 
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demonstrate firm guardianship of its standards. To this end, the Agency will be judging, 
through its examination of the evidence provided, and against the criteria, the extent to 
which an organisation can engender public confidence in its capacity to maintain the 
academic standards of the degrees it offers in the UK and, where relevant, overseas. While 
some of the evidence that organisations will provide will be quantitative, some will also be 
qualitative. All evidence will be subject to peer judgements by senior members of the 
academic community. (DfES: 2004, p1-2) 
 
Within this example text, the symbolic authority to impose recognition is clearly stated as vested 
through Acts of Parliament, the Privy Council and Ministers of State. Similarly, the bureaucratic 
process for gaining degree-awarding powers is identified, namely, that institutions need to submit 
applications as evidence that they meet explicit criteria. The implied relationship between the stated 
criteria seems to be, that institutions that are ‘self-critical communities’ are able to guard the 
‘academic standards’ of their degrees and thereby, secure ‘public confidence’. This evidence that 
criteria are met is then, ‘subject to peer judgements by senior members of the academic community’. 
The reference to the fact that ‘judgements’ are made by ‘peers’ seems to some extent to euphemise 
the process by recruiting the authority of  ‘the academic community’. This seems to present the idea 
that such a community exists, and can be identified, as a given, and yet does not (within the 
document) make explicit what is meant by this. Perhaps, it might be argued that this text serves to 
misrecognise the mechanism for granting degree-awarding powers, as one that is designed to 
provide and objective guarantee of the currency of institutional cultural capital. 
 
Bourdieu argues, that the academic qualification makes possible an exchange market for 
qualification holders. The collective recognition of academic qualifications, in the process of selection 
in employment markets, determines the form and type of judgements that are made about the 
cultural capital that an individual possesses. In this way, academic qualifications have currency. 
Certain jobs require particular academic qualifications; certain types of qualification may have more 
value than others in both securing a job, and the level of economic return, associated with a job. 
This, according to Bourdieu, establishes a conversion rate between institutionalised cultural capital 
(also here described as academic capital) and economic capital. For Bourdieu, there are costs 
associated with the conversion process between economic and cultural (academic) capital and vice 
versa, which can be governed by structural changes in scarcity and demand as well as ‘qualification 
inflation’. However, Bourdieu argues that  
 
…academic investment has no meaning unless a minimum degree of reversibility of the 
conversion it implies is objectively guaranteed. (Bourdieu: 1986, p51) 
 
If academic capital is functioning in the way that Bourdieu describes, it might be reasonable to expect 
to see institutional attempts to establish an ‘objective guarantee’ of the economic value of academic 
capital (qualifications). It is possible to point to instances within government sponsored texts where 
there seems to be an explicit attempt to establish the ‘truth’ of the economic value of higher 




The previous sections have attempted to identify the specialised higher education discursive field 
and to consider some of the kinds of technologies and/or strategies that might be operating within 
this field. They have also attempted to consider how Bourdieu’s conception of the distribution of 
forms capital, could contribute to the construction of a theoretical framework to analyse the idea of 
the commodification of higher education. The following sections will attempt to localise the higher 
education empirical field, by identifying the rationale for the selection of official texts, as the objects of 
analysis. 
 
The localisation of the higher education field as selected texts 
If we are to analyse the processes, technologies and strategies related to the discursive field of 
higher education, that operate to (re)produce and/or resist the idea of its commodification, we must 
consider where empirical evidence of this may be found.  
 
One place that such evidence may be found is within ‘official’ texts, such as government sponsored 
texts. Statements in such texts seem to have a seal of government approval, that sanction them as 
‘official truths’ (Simola et al: 1998). Statements within government sponsored texts, are produced by 
individual people but may appear as if they are ‘authored’ by ‘the government’, or their authorised 
representatives. One example of this, is the process for producing governmental reports, further to 
applications from institutions, to the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) for 
degree awarding powers. The bureaucratic processes for producing such reports, are described in 
the excerpt from the DfES guidance document below.  
 
The detailed scrutiny [of the application] will culminate in a final report to ACDAP [Advisory 
Committee on Degree Awarding Powers] by the assessors. The assessors will not make a 
recommendation on the application, but will offer peer-referenced views on the detail of the 
organisation’s operations in the light of the individual criteria [for degree awarding powers]… 
 
Where the final report raises matters for further consideration or clarification, ACDAP may 
decide to convene a sub-panel of its members to undertake a short and focused visit to the 
organisation, prior to formulating its advice…The visit will result in a further report to 
ACDAP. On occasion, ACDAP may wish to supplement the membership of a sub-panel with 
additional external expertise. 
 
The applicant organisation will be provided with an opportunity to check the factual accuracy 
of the evidence cited in the assessors’ draft final report, prior to the submission of the 
completed report to ACDAP…The Agency reserves the right to edit the text submitted to the 
organisation, to the extent necessary to protect the confidentiality of the process and the 
anonymity of those who have given evidence to the assessors. (DfES: 2004, p6) 
 
This ‘appearance of anonymity’ (Simola et al: 1998) is, here, legitimated by governmental 
committees, containing ‘experts’ and others, who are authorised to speak ‘official truths’ about higher 
education. It could be argued that such texts may exhibit ‘mythologised authorships’, to the extent 
that the processes of producing such texts are not made explicit to their respective audiences. It can 
be seen from the above text that there are clear divisions about who is authorised to ’speak’, and 
how. In the production of ‘final reports’, ‘assessors’, ‘ a sub-panel of experts’, the ‘Advisory 
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Committee on Degree Awarding Powers’ (ACDAP) and the organisation (or institution) making the 
application for degree awarding powers, are all authorised to ‘speak’ but in different and specifically 
regulated ways. For example, assessors are authorised to ‘offer peer referenced views’, but are 
explicitly not authorised to ‘make recommendations’ to the ACDAP. Similarly, organisations, which 
are the subject of such reports, can only ‘check factual accuracy’. Technologies of discourse are 
clearly operating to regulate the production of knowledge in the form of the ‘final report(s)’ of this 
governmental committee (ACDAP). Such governmental texts may provide evidence of these and 
other kinds of strategies, operating to (re)produce and/or resist the idea of the commodification of 
higher education.  
 
The following section will attempt to describe the process of the construction of an ‘organisational 
language’ designed to recontextualise official higher education texts, such as those discussed above, 
for the purposes of analysis, particularly drawing on the work of Dowling. 
 
T E X T S ,  C O N S T R U C T I V E  D E S C R I P T I O N  A N D  O R G A N I S A T I O N A L  L A N G U A G E  
As previously indicated above, the ‘object(s)’ of the analysis in this work will be a number of texts 
identified as localised instances of higher education discourse. These texts have been selected to 
establish a degree of relational coherence between the specialised theoretical field and the empirical 
field containing all possible instances of higher education discourse. In other words, there is an 
explicit rationale for the selection of the specific texts chosen for analysis that reflects the 
construction of the specialised theoretical field and the specific research question. This approach to 
educational research is largely drawn from Brown and Dowling (1998), which specifically introduces 
the idea of textual analysis in educational research.  
 
For the purposes of this analysis, the term ‘text’ will include that which can be physically manifested 
to provide a locus for the generation of meaning. This could be a written text printed on paper, or 
distributed through electronic media. However, a text could, potentially, also include a far wider range 
of objects; images, films, exhibitions, buildings, performances, clothing, sounds, music etc, etc. All of 
these physical ‘objects’ can provide a locus for the generation of meaning, have significance, or be 
‘read’. It is however, the fact that they are read, that transforms these objects, into ‘texts’. Following 
Barthes (1972), a thing becomes a text, as a consequence of the significance that is generated 
during the act of engagement with it, by a reader. The ‘signifier’, the thing or physical object, only 
generates meaning if it is associated in the mind of the reader with a conceptual category or, that, 
which is, ‘signified’. The association of the signified with the signifier generates the ‘sign’, as 
something, which embodies meaning. The dynamic parameters of this process include; the 
construction and positioning of the signifier, the conceptual framework brought to the signifier by the 
reader, the signified, and the relationship between the two. On the one hand, this may lead us to the 
conclusion that each reading is unique and that there can be no one authoritative reading. On the 
other hand, Barthes contends, that culture is reflected in the construction of texts and that such 
construction is ideological, what he calls ‘myth’. The idea that, by uncovering layers of ‘myth’, we 
gain access to previously veiled truth would underplay the ideological position of any such reader. 
One problem with semiological analysis, as Barthes identified, is that a reader of a text, who aims to 
deconstruct the myths contained within, is doomed to generate further myths in the process. 
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To avoid producing a reading that would itself construct such myths Dowling (1999) posits a ‘specific 
language of description’ (subsequently (Dowling, in press) ‘organisational language’), which is a kind 
of reflexive semiological textual analysis. For Dowling, a language of description 
 
…constitutes activity as the defining context for social action. That is activity regulates who 
can say or do what. Activity is produced and reproduced in texts that deploy positioning and 
distributing strategies in constituting hierarchies of voices and esoteric and public domains of 
practice. (Dowling; 1999, p4) 
 
This work/text (thesis), which is concerned with the idea of the commodification of higher education, 
is itself an instance of higher education research activity, equally implicated by this description. 
Dowling’s ‘specific language of description’, is an attempt to explicitly identify that activities, such as 
producing educational research, regulate ‘who can say or do what’, by deploying a range of textual 
strategies. Dowling’s approach seeks to make this textual activity, and the strategies deployed, 
explicit. It also employs a methodology that seeks to create structural linkages and coherence 
between an identified, and increasingly specialised, theoretical field and an identified and 
increasingly localised empirical field. As a consequence, it is argued, ‘’knowledge is constructed as 
an artefact rather than a representation” (Dowling: 1999, p11).  
 
T H E  E S O T E R I C  D O M A I N  O F  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  P R A C T I C E  
The practice of higher education provision is richly described. Philosophers, sociologists, economists 
and many others have produced many texts concerning higher education, for example. Both higher 
education research and higher education in general, could be described as what Dowling calls ‘high 
discursive saturation practices’ where “the principles of the practice are to a substantial extent 
available within a systematic discourse” (Dowling: 1999, p12). Dowling distinguishes such practices 
from craft or manual practices which “are dependent upon the immediate physical context of the 
practice” (Dowling: 1999, p11).  
 
Higher education practice(s) can also be described as constituting an esoteric (as opposed to a 
‘public’) domain or discourse. Higher education discourse is specialised, including terminology and 
jargon that has specific relevance to the practices that practitioners engage with. However, higher 
education practitioners can also draw on non-specialist areas of discourse in the construction of their 
own. This is exemplified within a recent THES article ‘You pays yer money…’. This text includes a 
selection of academics’ comments, from a variety of higher education institutions, in response to the 
question, ‘Is higher education being killed by a commercial culture and a consumer mentality?’ One 
senior academic is quoted as follows: 
 
[In] the early 1980s…US colleges and universities borrowed from business an enthusiasm 
for total quality management…In the early 1990s, British higher education was penetrated 
by the language and logic of the market, specifically in the form of new public management. 
 
Vice-chancellors and council chairs…embraced strategic planning, mission statements, 
flatter structures, line managers and cost units; their balance sheets were soaked in third-
stream income. In this steamy encounter, zero-based budgets trumped Senate votes; the 
bottom line was tops. 
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Within this broader discursive shift, students were constructed anew. They are no longer 
recipients of social benefit but purchasers of an increasingly expensive product. They are 
choice-conscious, rationally autonomous consumers; they are sharp shoppers on the 
lookout for the best value for their fees. Higher education is the new Ikea - no, the new 
eBay… 
 
If we must borrow from the marketplace, let us not shortchange our students, any more than 
a decent shopkeeper would shortchange customers.  (THES: 29.9.06) 
 
This text highlights, what might be described as, a ‘discursive shift’ in the language of higher 
education senior managers to ‘the logic of the market’. This is, on the one hand, a description (from 
the perspective of the author) of the discourse of one esoteric domain (higher education), drawing on 
(being penetrated by?) the discourse of another (total quality management). On the other hand, this 
text is, itself, an example of the esoteric domain of higher education discourse recruiting the public 
discourse of various kinds of retail industry practice - Ikea, eBay and ‘decent shopkeepers’. In doing 
so, the text recontextualises retail practice to conform to the principles of higher education discourse. 
As a specialist higher education publication, the THES is unlikely to be read by retail practitioners. If 
they happen to read it however, the juxtaposition of retail examples with the specialist academic 
conception of a ‘discursive shift’ would most likely render the reference from public retail practice to 
some degree, unrecognisable. Put another way, the public discourse of retail practice is 
recontextualised by the principles of higher education academic discourse. As such, access to the 
esoteric domain is ‘regulated’ through its recontextualisation of the public domain. 
 
This strategy has been identified by Dowling (1999) as a ‘pedagogic activity’ that facilitates access to 
privileged content by those who are being ‘apprenticed’ into an otherwise esoteric practice. This 
pedagogic activity is not confined to educational practices but includes any activity where information 
is transmitted from an informed position to someone in an uninformed position. 
 
A pedagogic activity constructs transmitter and acquirer positions and the transmission or 
regulation of a privileged content such that the principles of evaluation of performance are 
located with the transmitter (Dowling: 1999, p.2) 
 
Dowling distinguishes between ‘transmission texts’ and ‘regulatory texts’ in relation to high discursive 
saturation practices. Transmission texts are those that “make explicit the systematic nature of the 
discourse”. (Dowling: 1999, p11). In other words if a text’s authorial voice initiates a reader into an 
esoteric domain without making explicit the principles that generate such a domain, then it is not, in 
Dowling’s terms, a transmission text. Dowling describes such texts as a ‘regulatory texts’, regulating 
a reader’s access to the esoteric domains by “rendering invisible the principles that generate them” 
(Dowling: 1999, p3). In employing such strategies, texts (strictly speaking my reading of texts) not 
only differentiate between authorial and audience voices but also, between kinds of author and kinds 
of audiences, in relation to levels of access to esoteric domains. 
 
The likely and intended audience for this work/text is, broadly, those educational practitioners who 
might have an interest in (higher) education research and practice. More specifically, potential 
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readers will include those having interests in the technologies, strategies and/or tactics employed in 
‘official’ or government sponsored texts, related to the idea of the commodification higher education, 
from either a philosophical or sociological perspective.  
 
However, if this work/text is to meet the criteria for recognition as doctoral standard work it must 
demonstrate that it constitutes an original contribution to knowledge in this field. As such, the 
work/text must communicate/transmit something that is ultimately esoteric (and original) to an 
interested audience who are none the less uninitiated in relation to the ‘knowledge 
construction/artefact’ produced by this work/text. If the methodology employed to do this is to avoid 
the criticism of constituting a mythologising strategy, the ‘specific language of description’ must be 
made explicit. 
 
For Dowling, (1999) such a methodology for textual analysis is founded on a ’constructive’ 
epistemology where the requirement for knowledge claims is dependent upon coherence. 
 
1. The text must be bounded as an object rather than as a field for data collection.   
2. The referent activity must be declared. It is this referent that constitutes the principal site of 
theoretical statements.   
3. The principal question that is to be addressed to the text is, how does it operate as an 
instance of its referent? In particular, how does it construct its authorial and reader voices?  
4. In addressing this question I look for polarisations and associations.    
5. I aim to produce an exhaustive reading of the text. 
6. I aim for coherence between the description of the object text and the theorising of the 
referent activity. (Dowling: 1999) 
 
O F F I C I A L  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  T E X T S  A N D  T E C H N O L O G I E S  O F  ‘ T R U T H ’  
The localised empirical field, which will comprise the object of analysis, will be three selected official 
higher education texts. The rationale for selecting these texts relates to the analysis of technologies 
of ‘truth’ (Simola et al, 1998), or more specifically, technologies of subjectivity, government and 
discourse. This approach is designed to produce a degree of coherence between the localised 
empirical field (object texts) and the specialised theory employed to construct the analysis. 
 
Chapter four will focus on the analysis of the QAA Handbook for Academic Review (2004). This text 
is concerned with the regulation of practice seems particularly relevant to the analysis of the 
technologies of self and ‘subjectivity’. This text invites higher education providers/practitioners to 
individualise themselves through a process of subjectification by self-evaluation in relation to 
constructed (self-generated) aims and ‘rational’ goals for higher education provision. 
Providers/practitioners are then required to subject themselves to a process of ‘quality review’, 
conducted by ‘reviewers’, who are described as ‘peers’. This process is designed to produce an 
official description of who is an ‘approved’ higher education provider. 
 
Chapter five will specifically focus on the analysis of The Future of Higher Education White Paper 
(DfES: 2003). This type of text seeks to persuade the reader of the rational goals of higher education 
within the UK and seems particularly relevant to the analysis of technologies of government and 
‘power’. The White Paper describes an official rationale for governmental action and change in the 
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field of higher education and ‘why’ the Government is right to implement change in higher education 
provision. 
 
Chapter six will focus on the analysis of The Schwartz Report into fair admissions to higher 
education (AHESG: September 2004). Governmental ‘consultative texts’ are particularly relevant to 
the analysis of the technologies of discourse and ‘knowledge’. Here, the construction of ‘truth’ is 
legitimated through a series of consultation procedures including identified ‘stakeholders’, experts, 
committees and institutional representatives. This text was produced following the circulation of a 
series of consultative documents structured around questions, concerning the definition of fair 
admissions to higher education. The final report, aims to establish the ‘true’ knowledge about higher 
education admissions to guide the policy and practice of higher education institutions.  
 
T H E S I S  A S  T E X T  
More recently Dowling (2004, 2007, in press) has revised his terminology so that a ‘specific language 
of description’ has become an ’organisational language’. Dowling (following Barthes: 1974, 1975) 
employs the terms ‘text-as-work’ (a kind of ‘text in waiting’, a potential object of description not as yet 
structured by an organisational language) and ‘text-as-text’ (an object of description structured by an 
organisational language) to illustrate possible differences in strategic structural relations in a number 
of examples. Dowling argues that  
 
…the structural coupling between text-as-work and its audience (or, alternatively the author 
of its reading as a text-as-text) is that which establishes the possibility of the text-as-text. 
However, the nature of the text-as text will be given by the organisational language-the 
strongly or weakly institutionalised discourse or practice-that the audience deploys.  
(Dowling: 2004, p13) 
 
As such, Dowling argues, the text once ‘read’ is at that time, and in that occurrence, a specific text-
as-text. That is, an instance of the particular organisational language, within which, it is constructed 
as text-as-text. Dowling points to examples, that he argues, constitute a ‘conjuring’ (a kind of sleight 
of hand), where textual analysis, using one type of organisational language, is used to make 
statements about a text, that is itself, constituted by a different organisational language. Dowling 
concludes, that it may be impossible to ‘transmit’ (thus avoiding ‘conjuring tricks’) an organisational 
language, as a consequence of the possibility of slippage between organisational languages, which 
an ‘author’ may be, more or less, aware of. This is no doubt the case with this text. However, there is 
an attempt to be as explicit as possible in the employment of this specific organisational language 
and to demonstrate coherence between it, and the selected localised empirical setting (‘official’ 
higher education texts). The approach taken in designing the specific methods of analysis is equally 
applicable to the analysis of this text, as an instance of education research activity. 
 
If this approach is to be coherently and consistently applied there is another text that must be 
identified as an instance of the organisational language employed within this work (or more 
consistently, text).  The construction of this text is of course itself the product of discursive practice 
and, as such, could be described as being related to another ’catalogue of possibilities’. We could, 
for example, consider the ‘techniques of the self’ employed or how the subject is constituted in 
relation to this text. In the context of a PhD thesis this text constitutes (or positions) an individual as 
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an author who as a ‘good’ subject aspires to define themselves in relation to the ’rationally’ 
legitimised practices of institutionalised doctoral recognition. 
 
In order to obtain a PhD a candidate must demonstrate that they have produced an original 
contribution to knowledge in the relevant field and that it is their own work.  
(Dowling: 2004a, p29) 
 
There are ethical ways to behave in the production of a PhD thesis such as avoiding plagiarism, 
referencing and crediting the work of other ‘authors’ that is being employed or deployed in the 
production of new work (text). A PhD candidate, as author of a thesis as text, must subject 
themselves to these norms and rules but may also exploit them to position a text as legitimate or 
credible. 
 
At the same time this text ‘constitutes’ individuals as readers or an audience who through their 
engagement with the text define themselves, for example, as PhD assessors, authoritative critical 
readers with expertise in the relevant field or perhaps interested practitioners. In doing so, an 
audience (reader) is also constituted in relation to norms and rules related to academic discursive 
practice. An individual may seek to define themselves as, for example, ‘good’ critical readers by 
providing a critical commentary on the text. This practice will be governed by explicit or implicit’ rules 
of engagement’ dependent upon the extent to which the practice of critical reading is institutionalised. 
Here, this text would become newly authored as ‘text-as-text’ in that it would become an instance of 
the ‘organisational language’ of the reader. This new organisational language is also likely, in this 
context, to be institutionalised, at least to some extent. 
 
This text offers itself as an instance of an explicit organisational language (as far as that is possible). 
It is offered subject to the rules and regulations concerning academic discourse, in the philosophical 
and sociological fields, related to higher education and the idea of its commodification. As a PhD 
thesis the ‘author’ is positioned as a subject who is willing to ‘confess’ individual knowledge to the 
particular institute of education that governs the PhD award. Forms of this ‘confession’ include the 
production of this text and other related institutionalised practices such as viva voce. 
 
Clearly there are also techniques that govern the production of this text, that constitute strategic 
moves, in an attempt to gain alliances with those who are identified as its intended audience. These 
technologies are deployed, in the context of thesis production, as a disciplinary practice, which is 
bound up in, elaborates, and (re)produces, knowledge/power relationships. As such, this text must 
be established as ‘a contribution to knowledge in a relevant field’. Such fields, are of course 
themselves bound up in constructed knowledge/power relationships that determine the relative 
stability of ideas and practices, within each respective field. As Johannesson has argued 
 
When the metaphor of a field is used, discourse is limited to a space in which groups of 
people align themselves with certain practices and ideas that have value (symbolic capital) 
in that field (Johannesson: 1998, p303) 
 
As a PhD thesis, this text is deployed as a means of producing alliances with ‘authorities’, within an 
identified discursive field, to establish sufficient ‘symbolic capital’ to gain doctoral recognition, and the 
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award of institutionalised cultural or academic capital. In this way, within this text, the rules internal to 
academic discourse and thesis production are perpetuated and reproduced. In order to be identified 
as a ‘speaking subject’ in the context of the production of doctoral thesis, there are a series of ‘rituals’ 
that an aspiring PhD student must subject himself or herself to. For example, in some institutional 
settings, thesis proposals may be submitted, to ascertain their ‘viability’, to individuals who are 
institutionally authorised to operate as gatekeepers regulating access to an ‘academic community’, 
within a discursive field. 
 
This sketch has attempted to identify that this text can be described as an instance of the 
organisational language that is being deployed to address the research question identified above. As 
such, this text does not stand outside the organisational language constructed in relation to the idea 
of the commodification of higher education, but is rather an instance of it. 
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Chapter three – The construction of a specialised organisational language 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will attempt to set out the specific methodology that will be applied to the analysis of 
selected texts. As indicated in the previous chapter, the work of Dowling (1999, 2004, 2004a, 2007, 
in press) will be employed to construct a specific ‘organisational language’ with which to generate 
elaborated descriptions of higher education by recontextualising selected ‘official’ texts concerned 
with higher education. Such texts will be identified as ‘object texts’, representing relevant examples, 
drawn from the discursive field of higher education, that can provide evidence of the (re)production or 
resistance of the idea of the commodification of higher education. 
 
The methodology described will include the identification of authorial and audience ‘voices’ within the 
object texts. To take a well worn example, if someone sits in a university lecture hall in seats that 
have been designated and differentiated by their position within the hall in relation to the central 
lectern, as audience seats, then that person will be, in the context of this particular social setting a 
member of the audience. The physical construction of the hall, as well as a range of other 
institutional hierarchies, differentially distribute authority and to some extent prefigure the kind of 
social interaction that may occur. The person who the stands behind the lectern is, as such, identified 
as the one who is given authority to speak. This, together with the delivery of a lecture in this setting, 
can be described as constituting a text as an object for analysis. Within written texts, textual author 
and audience voices are also constructed. The way that such voices are constructed may 
differentially regulate access to the principles that generate the associated discourse. For example, a 
physics teacher may, for pedagogic reasons, not introduce the theory of general relativity when 
attempting to describe basic physical science concepts. However, the relationship between 
differentiated authorial voices is more complex than a binary opposition between author and 
audience. For example, a lecturer may invite a student to lead a seminar and undertake an authorial 
role for pedagogic reasons. Similarly, the modes of differentiation employed by any particular text 
may be more dynamically related as different textual strategies move in and out of play within a text. 
 
Dowling’s approach includes the creation of ‘conceptual’ or what I shall call discursive spaces, which 
are constructed from the identification of oppositions and alliances within identified texts. Discursive 
spaces relating at least two sets of binary variables are constructed to comprehensively encompass 
all possible modes of operation within the discursive space that has been ‘opened up’. For example, 
Dowling describes modes of authority action by relating two binary variables; oppositions of open or 
closed authorship and open or closed practice. This provides a means with which to generate 
recontextualised descriptions from ‘object texts’ that can identify dynamic position takings or 
strategies present within such texts. To illustrate how these spaces operate the QAA Handbook for 
Academic Review, as an object text, will be related to Dowling’s ‘modes of authority action’ (2004a, 
in press). This will also be the object text for chapter four.  
 
Having illustrated Dowling’s approach, I will then develop or ‘open up’ two new discursive spaces 
that are designed specifically to relate to the central question concerning the (re)production of the 
idea of the commodification of higher education. The first will constitute an opening up of the 
discursive space related to Bourdieu’s (1986, 1988, 1998) oppositions between different ‘species’ of 
capital, for example, between economic and symbolic capital. This discursive space is constructed 
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as a means of generating descriptions concerning the different strategies related to different modes 
or ‘economies’ of capital exchange. I will then describe the opening up of a discursive space that I 
call modes of discursive objectification. Here the oppositions identified by Kopytoff in discussing ‘The 
Cultural Biography of Things’ (1986) between (for example) art objects of singular or unique value 
and commodities will be employed to describe the construction of textual or discursive objects. 
 
The analysis of each of the selected official higher education texts introduced in chapter two will be 
structured as follows: 
 
1. The introduction to the location of the text within the higher education field. 
2. An overview of the authorial and audience voices constructed in my transaction with the text and 
reconstructed in the reader’s transaction with the text 
3. An analysis of how the text is operating to recontextualise higher education practice. 
4. The identification and analysis of oppositions and alliances within the text to construct a 
specialised and localised mode(s) of action. 
5. The recontexualisation of oppositions and alliances described in the analysis (items 1-4 above) 
in relation to modes of discursive objectification. 
6. An analysis of the dynamics of the distribution and exclusion of textual objects in relation to 
modes of discursive objectification, including the extent to which the text is operating in the 
commodified mode. 
 
However, I would first like to introduce the method of analysis by relating Dowling’s modes of 
authority action to a selected official higher education text to illustrate the method of textual analysis. 
I will then introduce my own specialised modes of action. Firstly, I will describe modes of capital 
exchange and secondly I will describe modes of discursive objectification which will be employed in 
following chapters to specifically address my research question. 
 
Dowling’s modes of authority action 
This section will attempt to describe how the application of Dowling’s methodology of textual analysis 
can help to identify how the kind of regulated recontextualisation, exemplified above, can be 
analysed to construct a means of understanding how such texts are operating. In ‘Mustard, 
Monuments and Media’ Dowling (2004a, see also in press) describes and exemplifies a methodology 
of textual construction that he describes as ‘pastiche’. His approach identifies an ‘organisational 
language’ as a kind of theoretical description mechanism that is juxtaposed with identified ‘object’ 
texts. In doing so, he identifies the socio-cultural terrain as that which is constituted in and by, the 
strategic formation, maintenance and destabilising of oppositions and alliances. Dowling’s departure 
point in his constructive analysis is an identified object text (or texts) and the relationship between 
that text and his constructed organisational language. For Dowling, it is the construction of the 
organisational language that structures his recontextualisation of the object text, which is produced in 
the form of a third textual construction or ‘commentary’. In the consideration of example texts that 
Dowling describes his organisation language is concerned with the construction of two discursive 
spaces, one relating to ‘modes of interactive social action’ and one relating to ‘modes of authority 
action’. I am going to focus on the latter but I will briefly describe the former. 
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Dowling’s examples with respect to interactive social action (2004a, 2007, in press) focus on an 
analysis of texts that constitute subjectivities engaged in discursive action in the context of an 
alliance of some kind. For example, settings could include two or more people discussing something 
in a room, or others interacting through written communication of some kind or perhaps through 
some kind of visual or other exchange. The ‘modes of interactive social action’ discursive space (See 
Figure 2 below) includes a closed range of four ideal types conceived and derived from the analysis 
of selected scenarios (as texts). Each text is ‘read’ as an example of each ideal type (or mode) 
delimited by relations between an alliance of similars or dissimilars where the target of discursive 
action is openness or closure.  
 
Target of discursive action Alliance 
Openness Closure 
Dissimilars Pastiche Hegemony 
Similars Exchange of narratives Equilibration 
 
F I G U R E  2 :  M O D E S  O F  I N T E R A C T I V E  S O C I A L  A C T I O N  ( D O W L I N G :  2 0 0 4 A ,  2 0 0 7 ,  I N  P R E S S )  
 
The mode of hegemony describes interactive social action (evidenced by empirical object texts) 
where one discourse predominates another. The mode of equilibration describes interactive social 
action where discourses recognised as similar aspire to synthesis or resolution. The mode of 
exchange of narratives describes an interactive social action context where discourses are 
recognised as similar without further engagement. Lastly, the mode of pastiche describes interactive 
social action where discourses are recognised as dissimilar but where their engagement or 
juxtaposition does not produce dominance or negation as ‘closure’. Rather than the attempt at 
closure as with hegemony or equilibration, pastiche is a form of social interaction that does no 
conceptual violence to the text(s) it is elaborated from. Dowling’s analysis is focussed here on 
describing texts as types of interactive social action rather than the types of strategies that may by 
involved in the instigation of such action. 
 
The discursive space described by Dowling (Figure 3 below) as ‘modes of authority action’ (2004a, 
2007, in press) exemplifies and illustrates each mode in reference to a range of literary, filmic and 
artistic texts. Here, each ideal type, or mode of authority action, is delimited by relations between 
open or closed authorship, and open or closed fields practice. Modes of authority action describe 
strategies that might be employed to establish the authority of one who is, as such, authorised to 
‘speak’. These strategies could be highly discursive in what Dowling calls ‘high discursive saturation’ 
practices or less discursive in more practical fields such as ceramics for example. It is important to 
note that this discursive space is not designed to categorise empirical texts, rather it is used to map 
the dynamic relationships between the multiple, competing, predominant or otherwise, authority 








Field of practice Authorship 
Open Closed 
Closed Charismatic Traditional 
Open Liberal Bureaucratic 
  
F I G U R E  3 :  M O D E S  O F  A U T H O R I T Y  A C T I O N  ( D O W L I N G :  2 0 0 4 A ,  2 0 0 7 ,  I N  P R E S S )  
 
Texts can be described as evidencing authority strategies or modes of authority action implicating 
relations of authors and audiences associated with categories of closed or open authorship. Authority 
action can also be described as relating to unregulated or regulated, non-institutionalised or 
institutionalised open or closed practice. This opens up the discursive space to comprise of four 
ideal-typical categories (or modes) of authority action; ‘traditional’, ‘bureaucratic’, ‘liberal’ and 
‘charismatic’. It should be noted that these categorisations do not describe texts as being in one state 
or another but rather describe the dynamic interplay between authority strategies. A move to an 
alliance of strategies is also a move to an opposition in relation to others. Each object text constitutes 
a strategically complex utterance where multiple and competing strategies may be deployed. By way 
of analogy, I can think of the description of weather systems that are mapped in relation to binary 
variables such as high/low pressure or high/low temperature where each variable is implicated in its 
opposite. 
 
M O D E S  O F  A U T H O R I T Y  A C T I O N  A N D  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  Q U A L I T Y  A S S U R A N C E  
P R A C T I C E  
Using the QAA Handbook for Academic Review as the object text, we can describe how this text 
strategically constitutes differing categories of author as it recontextualises higher education practice. 
Within this discursive space the category of authorship can be open or closed. For example, the 
identification of ‘the Agency’ as the primary author (or authority) within the Handbook would indicate 
a more singular or closed category of authorship. On the other hand the fact that Further Education 
College’s (FECs) are positioned as the author of ‘Self Evaluation Documents’ in the process of 
Review, would signify a more open category of authorship. Similarly, the possibility of describing 
higher education practice, without regulation of the form that such a description can take, would 
constitute an openness of discursive practice. The regulation of the form of such description would, 
on the other hand, constitute a move towards closure of practice, a regulation of the practice of 
describing localised instances of higher education.   
 
The Handbook could be described as an instance of closed discursive practice in that the practices 
that it constitutes are limited or regulated. The description of higher education provision, within the 
Handbook, is specifically constructed to include some potential descriptions and to exclude others. 
For example, only higher education that is delivered by FECs who are directly funded by HEFCE, are 
included within the context of Review described the Handbook. Higher education that is delivered by 
Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) is described differently in other QAA texts concerning a different 
method of ‘Institutional Audit’. In addition, the method of quality review that is described within the 
Handbook, results in ‘judgements’ on ‘academic standards’ and the ‘quality of learning opportunities’. 
These ‘judgements’ are defined in terms of the achievement of stated ‘aims’ and ‘intended learning 
outcomes’ and this constructs a particular conception of what higher education ’is’. Higher education 
is constituted within the text as that which is described in relation to ‘aims’ and ‘learning outcomes’.  
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A (higher education) practice not described in this way is, as such, excluded by the Handbook text. 
Discursive practice is, as such, regulated or closed in relation to higher education ‘appropriately’ 
described for the purposes of quality review. A counter example might be a higher education 
practitioner who engages in an open discussion forum on the internet and describes higher 
education as an intrinsically valuable activity, the value of which resides in the love invested in it by 
its participants, or perhaps in relation to its unintended outcomes. However, such a description would 
not be recognised in the context of Academic Review. Only some descriptions of higher education 
are given official recognition within the Handbook text and, as such, discursive practice is closed 
representing either ‘traditional’ or ‘bureaucratic’ modes of authority action by the QAA. 
 
On the one hand the authority strategy in play would seem to be clearly bureaucratic given the 
systematising design of the Handbook text. However, the authorship of the Handbook, at the level of 
the institution, is ‘closed’ as only the QAA are legitimated (legally contracted by HEFCE and the UK 
Government) to practice quality reviews or produce official texts such as the Handbook and Final 
Reports. As such, the mode of authority action evidenced by the Handbook can be described as 
‘traditional’. As a legally and publicly ‘consecrated’ body, the QAA have authority to determine what 
is, and what is not, described as higher education, in the context of the quality assurance procedures 
they have constructed. The closure of authorship mystifies the actual process of textual production, 
in that the identity of actual authors (QAA officers etc) as well as consultation, drafting and approval 
processes are all subsumed within the singularity of the organisational body described as the ‘the 
Agency’ or the QAA. The Handbook does make one explicit reference to the consultation of identified 
stakeholders (FECs, Reviewers etc) as indicated above. However, whilst the text states that it ‘takes 
account of suggestions for improvement’ we are not told, within the Handbook, what these 
suggestions, or processes for implementing suggestions, might have been. 
 
The regulatory and proceduralised practices of higher education quality assurance are legitimated by 
a traditional mode of authority action. However, the practice described within the Handbook draws on 
open authorship by requiring higher education providers to describe themselves and their associated 
practice in equivalent terms, through ‘self-evaluation’. The Self Evaluation Document (SED) requires 
institutions to define their own aims for providing higher education, in the specific subject (as defined 
by the QAA) under review. Judgements (made by Reviewers) must explicitly refer to the extent to 
which these self-initiated aims have been met. In one sense, the institution is required to act as the 
charismatic author of the criteria against which its own success (or otherwise) will be evaluated. The 
description of the enactment of Review, in the production of the institutional Self Evaluation 
Documents, constitutes an openness of authorship and a bureaucratic mode of authority action. 
However, once a specific institution’s practice is described in a SED the category of authorship would 
become closed in a claim for recognition through a traditional mode of authority. It is the requirement 
for self-recognition in the context of bureaucratic forms of ‘self-evaluation’ and submission to 
examination by governmental bodies (in this case the QAA) that regulates the recognition as a higher 
education institution within the higher education field. 
 
The Handbook subjectifies the category of author in its description of the process of ‘self evaluation’. 
For example, only directly funded further education colleges (FECs) can, in this context, author 
SEDs. The process described is an invitation to FECs to individualise themselves in accordance with 
the regulation, or closed discursive practice, of QAA SED production described in the Handbook. 
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Here, the Handbook’s description of ‘self’ evaluation is presented as a charismatically authored and 
discursively open practice. However, the specific requirements of SED production are clearly not 
open but regulated. The text makes it clear that QAA retain the authority to determine if an SED is 
‘appropriate’ or not, as the basis for Review.  
 
The text describes ‘self-description’ as if the category of authorship is closed to include the specific 
FEC producing the description as an individualised author. However, the ‘slippage’ is not so much 
between open and closed categories of authorship but rather between open and closed discursive 
practice. The Handbook employs a bureaucratic authority strategy to regulate the practice of FEC 
self-description  
 
Reviewers are recognised as authors in the production process of the Final Report described within 
the Handbook. The category of authorship is here limited to Reviewers and the contribution of 
colleges is confined to commenting on ‘matters of factual accuracy’ in the draft report. Discursive 
practice is also closed as the form and content of the Final Report is strongly regulated by the 
protocols and structures described in the Handbook. To this extent, the Handbook could be 
described as an instance of ‘traditional’ authority action. However, the category of author described 
in the context of Final Report production is limited to Reviewers. The identification of Reviewers as 
Reviewers is achieved by a bureaucratically objectified description that leaves the specific 
identification of authorship open. In addition, the anonymisation of individual Reviewers, in the 
production of the published Final Report reinforces the description of the Handbook as an instance of 
‘bureaucratic’ authority action. On the other hand, the positioning of the QAA or ‘the Agency’ as 
singularised (closed) author of both the Handbook and Final Reports can be seen as an attempt to 
establish a ‘traditional’ mode of authority. The positioning of the QAA as a singular author mystifies 
the actual process of discursive action and as a consequence, serves to misrecognise bureaucratic 
authority as traditional authority action. 
 
If we consider the distribution of authorial or audience voices in relation to the modes of authority 
action we can provide a snapshot of how the Handbook seems to be operating as a regulatory text. 
For purposes of simplicity, we can limit the range of authorial and audience voices to those that are 
explicitly identified as most significant within the Handbook. This would include; The Agency (QAA), 
Providers (institutions under review); Reviewers; and lastly, Academic Subject Peers (including 
Reviewers and academic subject staff). 
 
Taken in reverse order, Peers are implicitly positioned in relation to a liberal mode of authority. A 
peer group seems to some extent to intuitively imply an equivalence and openness of status in 
relation to authority claims and a homogeneous categorisation of subjectivity or authorship. However, 
it is clear that the notion of ‘peer’ referred to within the Handbook is in fact regulated and, as such 
can be associated with a closed discursive practice. For example, the academic subjects 
(disciplines) within which peers are to be recognised are bureaucratically constituted, by the QAA, 
and not, as such, open. The effect is that there is potential for a misrecognition of bureaucratic 
authority for a more liberal authority in the constitution of an academic subject peer audience. 
 
Reviewers are also explicitly identified, within the Handbook, as being drawn from within the 
academic peer group relevant to the subject of the provision under review. The category of 
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authorship for Reviewers is in one sense open within a closed discursive practice (Academic 
Review). The role of Reviewer is to some degree open, although Reviewers do require a ‘traditional’ 
recognition from the QAA prior to engagement with the processes of Academic Review described 
within the Handbook.  Reviewers are for example, described as being recruited in relation to the 
extent to which they meet specific criteria identified within the Handbook. Reviewers are identified as 
potential authors, drafting sections of the Final (Judgement) Report. However, Reviewers do not 
have the authority to publish such reports and their input is subject to editorial control both by the 
Review Coordinator and the Agency. In this sense The Agency retains traditional authority over the 
process and the outcome of the practices described within the Handbook.  
 
Lastly, if we consider Providers, the Handbook seems to indicate that institutions under review have 
charismatic authority in determining and defining, the principles, in relation to which, the quality of 
provision will be judged. This is indicated by the way that each individual institution can ‘author’ its 
own academic subject related higher education aims, against which, quality judgements are made. 
However, the highly bureaucratic framework and procedures (described within the Handbook) with 
which providers are required to comply with, may indicate that the association of charismatic 
authority with the production of the SED is also a misrecognition of bureaucratic authority. The 
distribution of the authorial and audience voices constituted within the Handbook text can be 
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Authorised to carry out quality reviews by Government 
Author of the Handbook 




Individually authorised to carry out Academic Reviews  
on behalf of the Agency 
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F I G U R E  4 :  D I S T R I B U T I O N  O F  A U T H O R I A L / A U D I E N C E  V O I C E S  I N  R E L A T I O N   
T O  M O D E S  O F  A U T H O R I T Y  A C T I O N  
 
The two areas that seem to provide potential for misrecognition are firstly, the modes of authority that 
are described here as being associated with Institutional providers, as authors of the SED and 
secondly those associated with Academic Subject Peers and Reviewer Peers. The production of the 
SED is a comparatively closed discursive practice, which is potentially misrecognised as the 
charismatic authority of institutional providers. The description of Reviewers as peers seems likely to 
misrecognise bureaucratic authority (or even traditional authority) as liberal authority. This is perhaps 
achieved by eliding the differences in the discursive practice of Academic Subject Peers and that of 
QAA Reviewers in the process of conducting Academic Reviews. Interestingly, the Handbook 
explicitly refers to Academic Review as a ‘peer review process’, but leaves the association with peer 
review in academic production implicit, perhaps to avoid explicit comparison. 
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This section has attempted to indicate how Dowling’s approach can be applied to a text selected 
from the higher education field. The following sections will introduce two new modes of analysis that 
are more directly related to providing descriptions concerning the (re)production or resistance of the 
idea of the commodification of higher education. The first, modes of capital exchange, will be an 
elaboration from the opposition drawn by Bourdieu (1998) between ‘explicit’ economic capital 
exchange and ‘euphemistic’ symbolic capital exchange. The second, modes of discursive 
objectification, will be an elaboration from the opposition drawn by Kopytoff’s (1986) between 
culturally unique and singular social objects and universally exchangeable commodities.  
 
Bourdieu’s economy of capitals  
Within Bourdieu’s concept of a social ‘field’ as a ’field of struggles’, he describes how the position of 
individuals with an identified field, as dominant or dominated, is relative to the capital ‘resources’ 
available to such individuals. Having more capital, for Bourdieu, positions individuals as dominant in 
relation to those with less. For example in Homo Academicus (1988) Bourdieu describes the relative 
position of academics, or more specifically university professors.  
 
As authorities, whose position in social space depends principally on the possession of 
cultural capital, a subordinate form of capital, university professors are situated rather on the 
side of the subordinate pole of the field of power and are clearly opposed in this respect to 
the managers of industry and business. But, as holders of an institutionalised form of cultural 
capital, which guarantees them a bureaucratic career and a regular income, they are 
opposed to writers and artists: occupying a temporally dominant position in the field of 
cultural production. (Bourdieu: 1988, p.36)  
 
As discussed in chapter two, Bourdieu also describes several kinds of capital in ‘The Forms of 
Capital’ (1986) where a distinction is made specifically between economic capital, cultural capital and 
social capital. Very broadly economic capital is that which is “immediately and directly convertible 
into money” (Bourdieu: 1986, p.47), cultural capital includes “long-lasting dispositions…cultural 
goods…[and] educational qualifications” (also described as ‘academic capital’ (Bourdieu: 1998a). 
Social capital is “made up of social obligations (conversions)” (Bourdieu: 1986). However, elsewhere 
in the same article Bourdieu seems to identify social capital as the extent to which individuals can 
“utilize by proxy the capital [economic or cultural] of a group” (Bourdieu: 1986, p.56). Also, Bourdieu 
argues that  
 
economic capital is at the root of all other types of capital and that these transformed, 
disguised forms of economic capital, never entirely reducible to that definition, produces their 
most specific effects only to the extent that they conceal (not least from their possessors) the 
fact that economic capital is at their root. (Bourdieu: 1986, p.54) 
 
Bourdieu (1986), also discusses what he calls symbolic capital in relation to his conception of social 
capital in its institutionalised form (as title or nobility). However, he also seems to indicate that 
symbolic capital can be any form of capital “insofar as it is represented, i.e. apprehended 
symbolically” (Bourdieu: 1986, p.56). Bourdieu distinguishes this form of capital (as well as the others 
mentioned above) by the nature of the exchange rates or ‘conversions’ that he argues take place 
between different forms of capital. If social action is targeted at maintaining or improving an 
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individual’s position within ‘the field of struggles’ then, for Bourdieu, it is the kinds of strategies that 
are employed in the conversions of different kinds of capital that, in effect, differentiate them. 
 
The convertibility of the different types of capital is the basis of the strategies aimed at 
ensuring the reproduction of capital (and position occupied in social space).  
(Bourdieu:1986 p.54) 
 
In discussing Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital, Moore (2004) argues that cultural capital is 
contrasted with economic capital as ‘culture’ is disinterested, non-instrumental and ‘for its own sake’ 
whereas, ‘mercantile exchange’ and “economic investment is always a means to an end” (Moore: 
2004 p.446). However, Moore argues that 
 
The mercantile form represents the basic characterising of capital in their most visible 
aspect, but these are still present in cultural and social capital even though their values of 
the aesthetic and altruism formally deny their instrumentalism (Moore: 2004, p446) 
 
Nonetheless, Moore argues that economic capital is ‘translated’ into cultural capital and that it is 
systematically ‘misrecognised’, as such, as a consequence of its representation in symbolic forms of 
capital (Moore: 2004). Moore argues that the ‘relative autonomy’ of the cultural field, as 
“institutionally distanced from the economic and political fields” (Moore: 2004 p.449) with its own 
institutions, traditions etc., facilitates the ‘symbolic violence’ that such misrecognition constitutes. 
Interestingly, Moore argues that the seeming autonomy within the cultural field, is correlated with 
increased reproduction of power relations in that field. 
 
The more autonomous a field appears, the more effectively it performs its role of 
consecration and reproduction of relations of power. It works best by doing what it is meant 
to do by appearing to be doing something else entirely (Moore: 2004, p.449) 
 
By way of an aside, this view seems to contrast with those who argue for greater autonomy of the 
cultural field of higher education, for example Grenfell and James (2004) employ Bourdieu’s 
conception of ‘field’ to argue that ‘autonomy’ is productive in “opening up spaces that run counter to 
the present orthodoxy “ (Moore: 2004, p510). They also argue that an autonomous field can generate 
its ‘own problems’ rather than being reliant on, or subject to, those from outside a field and that these 
are the only conditions where a field can attain the ‘universal’. Putting to one side the discussion of 
‘substantialist’ and ‘relational’ thinking described in this article, Grenfell and James do seem to 
underplay the potential for the changing nature of field formation in relation to other more or less 
associated fields. It also seems to be the case that the heteronomy of a field is largely described in 
pejorative terms, whereas, it seems entirely possible that an ‘influence’ described as external to a 
field may also creatively disrupt an existing ‘doxa’. Discursive interaction from ‘outside’ a field can be 
creative as well as reproductive, where for example the charismatic authority that is being exercised 
in constructing a ‘pastiche’ (Dowling: 2004a, in press) is itself a (relatively) coherent aspect of its 
production. 
 
In Homo Academicus (1990), Bourdieu identifies a list of types of capital (as indicators) that he has 
used to establish the relative position of higher education practitioners within the French university 
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field. The types of capital include (in addition to those already mentioned above); educational capital; 
the capital of academic power; the capital of scientific power; the capital of scientific prestige; the 
capital of intellectual renown and the capital of political or economic power (Bourdieu, 1990 p.40). In 
describing different kinds of capital Bourdieu is, on the one hand, attempting to identify relational 
positions of higher education practitioners within social fields. On the other hand, Bourdieu also 
describes theoretical relations between his conception of the differences in the ways that each 
species of capital is maintained, accumulated and reproduced in relation to both objective social 
structures and the ‘habitus’ of social subjects.  
 
The various types of capital cited can be related to differential strategies associated with maintaining, 
accumulating, exchanging or deploying such capital. However, the intention here is to open the 
discursive space, within this text, to provide a coherent and conceptually comprehensive framework 
within which to ‘capture’ descriptions of discursive strategies in the higher education field. In this 
context, the opposition, described by Bourdieu (1998), between economic capital and symbolic 
capital could describe at least one dimension of the discursive space envisaged. Bourdieu describes 
this opposition in consideration of (although not exclusively) the exchange of gifts. 
 
Thus the exchange of gifts (or women, or services, etc.), conceived as a paradigm of the 
economy of symbolic goods, is opposed to the equivalent exchanges of the economy as 
long as its basis is not a calculating subject, but rather an agent socially disposed to enter, 
without intention or calculation, into the game of exchange. (Bourdieu: 1998, p.98) 
 
Bourdieu employs the opposition between economic and symbolic exchanges as a means of 
analysing the respective similarities and dissimilarities of each. Bourdieu argues that the 
requirements of the recognition of symbolic capital include the promotion of ‘disinterestedness’, the 
avoidance of explicitness and the ‘repression or censorship of economic interests’ through 
‘euphemistic’ exchanges where the terms, conditions and rate of exchange is left implicit and 
ambiguous. (Bourdieu:1998) 
       
 …the strategies and practices characteristic of the economy of symbolic goods are always 
ambiguous, two-sided, and even apparently contradictory (for example, goods have a price 
and are “priceless”). This duality of mutually exclusive truths, as much in practice as in 
discourse (euphemism), should not be thought of as duplicity, but rather as denial 
assuring…the coexistence of opposites”. (Bourdieu:1998, p.121) 
 
This points up one problem with ‘reading’ the position of any particular individual or text, as being 
associated with any one strategy. Rather, the strategies and practices Bourdieu associates with 
economic or symbolic capital can be described in the context of a dynamic relation, or indeed, 
perhaps additionally, as being euphemistically co-located. For example, academic papers may be 
described as being produced in the pursuit of ‘knowledge for its own sake’ yet the recognition that 
results from such academic production potentially rewards both institutions and individuals with 





M O D E S  O F  C A P I T A L  E X C H A N G E   
This section will attempt to open up Bourdieu’s economy of capitals to construct a discursive space 
that can be used to (relationally) describe all possible modes of capital exchange. The construction 
of this space will initially be drawn from the opposition between economic capital and symbolic 
capital, described by Bourdieu (1986, 1998). Given that Bourdieu is also concerned with the 
conditions of exchange between different ‘forms’ of capital, we can consider how such differences 
might relate to the type of discursive space constructed by Dowling. Bourdieu (1986) argues that the 
description of self-interested economic (mercantile) exchange in economic theory serves to exclude 
the description of “a general science of the economy of practices, which would treat mercantile 
exchange as a particular case of exchange in all its forms” (Bourdieu:1986, p.47). For Bourdieu, the 
fact that ‘cultural’ practices are described in opposition to ‘economic’ practices as ‘disinterested’ 
excludes and ‘euphemises’ the description of the ways in which ‘cultural’ exchanges occur to 
reproduce, maintain and accumulate advantage in the struggles that occur in fields of power. In this 
context, Bourdieu’s ‘general science of the economy of practices’ means that there can be a 
symbolic economy, a cultural economy in addition to an ‘economic’ economy. (1986, 1998). 
Bourdieu’s project here is to 
 
endeavour to grasp capital and profit in all their forms and to establish the laws whereby the 
different types of capital (or power, which amounts to the same thing) change into one 
another. (Bourdieu:1986, p47) 
 
Explicit exchange, drawing on Bourdieu’s description of economic exchange (1998), is where the 
terms and conditions of exchange, the ‘rate’ of exchange, the relationship between the capital that is 
exchanged is explicit, or perhaps calculable. It is also where the ‘interestedness’ of those engaged 
with exchange is a transparent feature of subjectivity. Euphemistic exchange, drawing on Bourdieu’s 
description of the exchange of symbolic goods, is that which only implicitly identifies equivalents in 
exchange, if at all, ”in a language of denial” (Bourdieu:1998, p98). 
 
Arguably, all economic capital exchange needs to include agreement concerning the price. The price 
stands as an abstracted equivalence between whatever is being exchanged as a comparable value. 
This points up a potential practical relation between minimal and maximal institutionalisation in the 
construction of an economic exchange market. In any case, we are not here concerned with 
empirical specifics but with the construction of discursive space. However, the conception of a 
relatively institutionalised ‘technology’ that provides ‘descriptions of the price of economic goods as 
equivalent comparable values, may point to a bureaucratic cultural function that is targeted at 
(though perhaps never achieving) equilibrium.  
 
The London Stock Market, for example, describes from moment to moment equivalences between 
economic goods as stocks and shares. The price of shares (perhaps as listed in digital displays on 
the trading floor) is set at any one moment and at that moment is exchanged with the buyer as an 
equivalent value. At the point of sale the price represents an explicit and precise equivalent value 
that parties engaged in exchange have agreed to. A very similar thing happens on the betfair.com 
website where betting odds are traded based upon a technology that describes momentary 
equivalences in relation to the ‘odds’ associated with gambling bets placed. ‘eBay’ would be an 
example of a more loosely institutionalised technology as an on-line auction house. The economic 
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exchange of goods, facilitated by the eBay website, seems explicitly interested as ‘mercantile 
exchange’, although, there are, in this instance, relatively minimal criteria for participation that 
regulate the practice of exchange.  
It is possible to describe the exchange practices (strategies) associated with the different types of 
capital that are conceived of by Bourdieu, by producing a discursive space constituted by the product 
of binary variables identified in relation to each form of capital. However, in doing this Bourdieu’s 
conception of cultural capital will be deformed and fragmented to construct three 
(additional/elaborated) modes of capital exchange. For example, economic capital exchange 
constitutes an explicit form of exchange and also represents a homogeneous subjectification of those 
who conduct such exchange. Economic capital exchange is not associated with a ‘singularised’ or 
‘embodied’ individual subject. There is no theoretical restriction on the type of subject that can 
engage in such exchange. However, symbolic (cultural) capital exchange is singularised. For 
example, titles such as ‘Doctor’ for those awarded a PhD, are associated with specific individuals 
who have been recognised as such. Only those individuals who have been subjectified in relation to 
the criteria for approval are recognised by the award of such titles. This second oppositional variable 
(between singular and homogeneous subjectification), ‘opens up’ four possible modes of capital 
exchange. Human (cultural) capital (which includes intellectual and other skills and abilities) will here 
represent cultural capital that is singularised (perhaps embodied) and yet explicitly exchanged. 
Institutional (cultural) capital (which includes the institutional frameworks, and perhaps networks, that 
enable capital exchange) will here represent cultural capital that is potentially available to all but only 
exchanged euphemistically. Economic exchange and symbolic exchange remain relatively intact 




Explicit  Euphemistic  
Singular Human (cultural) Symbolic (cultural) 
Homogeneous Economic Institutional (cultural) 
 
F I G U R E  5 :  M O D E S  O F  C A P I T A L  E X C H A N G E  
 
The construction of modes of capital exchange (Figure 5) could be used to describe how texts 
operate strategically to maintain, establish, develop, deploy and exchange, different ‘species’ of 
capital (in the Bourdieuian sense). The ‘exchange’ binary variable in such a space would be 
constituted in the transactions between reader and text that could be described as more or less 
explicit or euphemistic in the sense that Bourdieu uses these terms with respect to economic and 
symbolic capital. Within this discursive space, what Bourdieu might call ‘agents’, I call textual 
‘subjectivities’. The constitution of subjectivities (such as author and audience) would be determined 
in relation to their relative singularity or homogeneity within text. A singular subjectivity would 
constitute a closed type of subjectification for example, through the identification of a singular author 
of a given text. This could also apply to the constitution of an organisation or institution as a singular 
subjectivity, such as the use of the term ‘the Agency’ to describe the Quality Assurance Agency for 
Higher Education in a range of texts (www.qaa.ac.uk). A homogeneous subjectivity would constitute 
a more open type of subjectification for example, ‘employers’ or ‘students’. 
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C A P I T A L  E X C H A N G E  A N D  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  P R A C T I C E  
I will now attempt to describe each of the four modes of capital exchange in relation to higher 
education practice. Naidoo (2004) argues that 
 
the type of capital operating in the field of university education is an institutional form of 
cultural capital that has generally been termed ‘academic’ capital. (Naidoo: 2004, p.458) 
 
Naidoo specifically describes academic capital as power over the ”instruments of reproduction of the 
university body” (Naidoo, 2004, p.458) however, she further distinguishes academic capital as either 
one of two types: firstly, ‘intellectual’ or ‘scientific capital’, as equivalent to “scientific authority or 
intellectual renown” and secondly, ‘institutionalised cultural capital’. This second form, for Naidoo, is 
both the recognition of prior educational achievement and the embodiment (and perhaps 
reproduction) of ‘academic’ dispositions (habitus). 
 
Higher education is conceptualised as a sorting machine that selects students according to 
an implicit social classification and reproduces the same students according to an explicit 
academic classification, which in reality is very similar to the implicit social classification. 
(Naidoo: 2004, p.459) 
 
Naidoo’s description identifies the higher education selection process, as the ‘consecration’ of 
institutionally ’valid criteria for entry’, as the legitimate means of identifying ‘academic talent’; a 
‘misrecognition’ of the cultural as the ‘natural’. The authority (in Dowling’s terms) that the university 
would bring to bear in this description of the (re)production (exchange) of economic/cultural capital 
would be bureaucratic. Fair access and equal opportunities legislation require that universities can 
demonstrate that they select ‘on merit’ and do not discriminate on other ‘inappropriate’ grounds. For 
example, The Schwartz Report into ‘fair access to higher education’ describes the identification of 
‘talent’ in opposition to access though economic advantage. 
 
I believe that we should be trying to build a society in which as many people as possible are 
free to make choices about how they live and free to achieve their potential. The fairest and 
most acceptable way to achieve this is through higher education. If we have a fair 
admissions system, then success will not depend on connections, money or influence but on 
talent and motivation…The Steering Group does not believe that the higher education 
admissions system should be responsible for compensating for social disadvantage or 
shortcomings in other parts of the education system. What it does believe is that universities 
and colleges have a responsibility to identify the talent and the potential of applicants and to 
treat all applicants fairly and transparently.  
(AHESG: September 2004, Foreword and Paragraph B6) 
 
In this sense, the category of those who can apply to be selected for a higher education course is 
open. All those who apply (at least in theory) are in the context of the application process, an alliance 
of similars, or in other words, a homogeneous grouping, anyone can apply. However, the practice of 
university selection is closed, its target is closure, in that, the criteria for selection are regulated by 
the university who are authorised to resolve the problem of ‘fair selection’. In this sense the system 
that constitutes university admissions practice, as the institutional recognition of cultural capital, 
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employs bureaucratic authority to mystify the process as that which is targeted at equilibration, the 
equalizing of different successful applications as meritorious. Once ‘academic talent’ has been 
legitimately identified the university has achieved closure, and applicants gain recognition as 
university students, once again equivalent in status, equilibrium has, once more, been established. 
 
Once an applicant has submitted him or herself to the bureaucratic authority of the university and has 
received recognition as a university student, the student has gained the symbolic capital that the 
status of such recognition affords. The student has gained entry to the field of higher education and 
has the associated and differentiated, relational status dependent upon the institutional status of the 
institution to which he/she is now an apprenticed member. As a student, the target of interactive 
social action is closure, closure with respect to the hegemonic nature of the discourse associated 
with tutor-student engagement and closure in relation to the singular identity of the university as a 
recognised institution for admitting students to higher education programmes and awarding the 
symbolic capital of personalised qualifications. Whilst there will invariably be economic capital 
exchange in the process of recognition of symbolic capital (such as higher education qualifications) 
this must, according to Bourdieu, remain an ambiguous aspect of the process. For example, if we 
consider the speeches made at graduation ceremonies, whilst reference may be made to the 
required financial commitment a student or their family has made to make an award possible, any 
reference to ‘buying a degree’ would be sacrilegious. Rather, any financial aspect (such as tuition 
fees) may be more likely to be couched in terms of sacrifice or the overcoming of external obstacles 
to academic success. Awards themselves, at such occasions may tend to be associated with less 
explicitly calculable meritorious attributes such as diligence, personal development and achievement 
as much as the recognition of talent. 
 
For example, a newsletter from my own university described the achievement of graduates at its 
graduation ceremony as follows: 
 
The ceremonies marked the culmination of years of hard work by each individual…We hope 
each special day will be one the graduates and their families will remember for the rest of 
their lives …Inspirational [student]…received her degree in History with Psychology. A 
mother of two, she juggled family and studies and the emotional difficulties of losing both her 
parents from cancer within a short space of time. In a message to others, [she]…said: “Don’t 
make excuses, don’t use your age and domestic situation as a reason for not getting an 
education, anything is possible. (University of Hertfordshire: 2005) 
 
In such a context it would seem in gross bad taste to even refer to the fees that such a student might 
have paid for the course of study from which she graduated. Here mentioning ‘the price’ is taboo as it 
could associate the achievement described with calculated (self) interestedness. This might entail 
explicitly weighing the economic benefits of gaining a qualification as equivalent to the price paid, as 
opposed to euphemistically comparing personal sacrifice with well deserved reward. As Bourdieu 
has argued 
 
The economy of symbolic goods rests on the repression or the censorship of economic 
interests (in the narrow sense of the term). As a consequence, economic truth, that is, the 
price, must be actively or passively hidden or left vague. The economy of symbolic goods is 
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an economy of imprecision and indeterminacy. It is based on a taboo of making things 
explicit (a taboo which analysis violates by definition, thus exposing itself to making seem 
calculating and interested practices which are defined against calculations and interest).  
(Bourdieu: 1998 p.120)   
 
This leaves one discursive space still unpopulated in the modes of capital exchange; the kind of 
capital exchange that implies a singularity of authorship, in the context of explicit exchange. Naidoo’s 
first description of ‘academic capital’, that of intellectual or scientific capital’ as ‘scientific authority or 
intellectual renown’ (Naidoo 2004 p.458), may be illustrative in this respect. Scientific authority could 
be conceived of as both bureaucratic and traditional, where the authority in question is either based 
on an institutionalised technology (for example, compliance with scientific method in academic 
journals), or the authority of those whose work constitutes the recognised scientific ‘canon’. Similarly, 
‘intellectual renown’ could be conceived of as symbolic capital constituted by the recognition of status 
in the higher education field. However, the claim for such status must first be made prior to its 
recognition. 
 
By way of further illustration, we can consider the ‘trajectory’ of a PhD award in relation to the 
dynamic ‘struggles’ to maintain, gain, and accumulate capital within the higher education field. 
Proposals for PhD level study may be submitted in accordance with institutionalised procedures 
legitimated by bureaucratic authority. For example, London University Institute of Education website 
describes the requirements for MPhil/PhD proposal as follows: 
 
If you are applying for an MPhil/PhD you should supply a clear, well-defined research 
proposal as this is essential to academic staff when considering your acceptability and 
potential for doctoral level studies. Your research proposal should be about four pages in 
length (A4 size). It should give the aim and rationale for your research, the expected 
outcomes, how you hope to make a contribution to the proposed field and should include a 
short bibliography of the reading you have undertaken in the area of interest.  
(http://ioewebserver.ioe.ac.uk/ioe/cms/get.asp?cid=7319&7319_0=7324, last accessed 
24.09.08) 
 
Here the MPhil/PhD proposal provides a means of recognition of cultural capital, supplemented by 
the usual requirement to possess appropriate symbolic capital in the form of appropriate 
qualifications. The development of a thesis is also regulated by institutionally authorised forms and 
processes. The claim to authorised ‘originality’ and ‘contribution to knowledge’ is regulated by 
institutionalised processes. The principles of final evaluation of a submitted thesis may also be to 
some extent regulated by the awarding institution. This might for example be in the form of 
institutional guidance for examiners in producing thesis evaluation reports/recommendations.  
 
The recognition of human (cultural) capital is simultaneously the recognition of legitimate presence, 
within the higher education field, as one who can operate as a ‘player’. It is, under usual 
circumstances, only when institutional (cultural) capital facilitates the recognition of human (cultural) 
capital, that such capital is consequently consecrated symbolically, through the award of a PhD (or 
other means of symbolic recognition). It is only when symbolic recognition of one’s membership to 
the higher education club (field) is activated, that the academic ‘play’ can commence. In other words, 
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the bureaucratic practices of higher education institutions provide the initial authority or perhaps the 
cultural framework with which to legitimate the emergence of human (cultural) capital. This 
institutional/cultural ‘framework’ then facilitates charismatic authority claims for the recognition and 
exchange of human (cultural) capital, for symbolic capital and traditional authority. 
 
S T R A T E G I C  M O V E S  I N  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  C A P I T A L  E X C H A N G E  
We might then describe a number of possible strategies that might target the maintenance, or 
accumulation, of different species of capital. A strategy to weaken traditional authority, by making 
exchange explicit whilst maintaining singularity of authorship, is a move to generate human capital 
and distinction, with a view to gaining enhanced recognition and future symbolic capital (for example 
the PhD thesis). A strategy to maintain regulated, closed or euphemistic exchange practices, whilst 
weakening the singularity of authorship, emphasises and strengthens the institutional mechanisms 
for establishing cultural capital as a system, rather than any specific cultural content of such capital: 
for example, governmental quality assurance practices that determine the recognition or otherwise of 
the degree awarding powers of institutions. The governmental authority to grant ‘degree awarding 
powers’ has potentially significant beneficial financial implications for institutions. However, the 
symbolic capital that is gained by such recognition is primarily couched in terms of ‘disinterested’ 
quality assurance procedures that ‘establish’ the ‘academic standards’ and ‘quality of student 
learning opportunities’. The ‘misrecognition’ of ‘interest’ as ‘disinterestedness’ attains the moral high 
ground and legitimates higher education as public service. In Bourdieu’s terms, the economic 
aspects of symbolic capital exchange remain implicit and subject to euphemistic description. 
 
Lastly, a strategy to make explicit the possibilities for exchange and at the same time, homogenise 
potential authorship (ownership), constitutes a weakening of traditional authority, towards a 
‘liberalising’ move to establish economic capital in the field. In such a context there is no authority to 
establish the value of an exchange, other than the explicit price someone is willing to pay. Here 
participation is the only requirement or measure of success. For example, higher education 
institutions sometimes offer ‘adult education’ courses that do not lead to any recognised qualification 
but are offered to people as a ‘lifestyle product’. However, even here, the fact that such courses are 
offered by a recognised higher education institution means that the symbolic capital, or status, of the 
institution operates to offer partial and informal recognition of this status by association. This may of 
course be the case with all economic capital goods, in that they are implicitly implicated in the 
symbolic economy, in the same way that symbolic capital goods are euphemistically implicated in the 
‘economic’ economy. Whenever such a higher education product is offered, its value (recognised 
capital) can be significantly affected by the status of the ‘brand’ of the provider.  
 
As has been indicated above, modes of capital exchange can be used to describe the relationship 
between the different strategies employed in the exchange ‘species’ of capital, including economic 
capital. This could be used to produce an analysis of the predominance or otherwise of one or more 
modes of capital exchange in a given text: for example, a predominance of the mode economic in 
relative opposition to symbolic capital exchange. However, this would not directly provide evidence of 





Commodification as a mode of discursive objectification 
An alternative description of a higher education economy is provided by Marginson (2004) in his 
paper ‘Competition and Markets in Higher Education’. Marginson argues that competition for status is 
not an essential human motivation but does accept “the ubiquity of the desire for relative advantage” 
(Marginson: 2004, p.84). He describes fours ‘layers’ of educational competition, which he has 
developed from Braudel’s (1981) three layers of economic society. Marginson’s four education 
competition layers are firstly, the pre-market work of lived educational practices; secondly, pre-
market competition for social status in education; thirdly ‘economic market competition’ for status 
goods and fourthly ‘a capitalist market’, where although the ‘goods on sale‘ are ‘status goods’, 
economic revenue is ‘the driving force’. 
 
This derivative of the Marxian economic base and superstructure formulation equates ‘status goods’ 
with a kind of personalised commodity. 
 
Like economic capital, with which it is not identical but is closely implicated, status is a social 
‘good’ whose possession has fecund economic, political and cultural potentiality for the 
possessor. Status in higher education thus functions in the manner of an individualisable 
commodity benefit, albeit one that can be possessed by whole institutions as well as single 
persons. (Marginson: 2004 p.178) 
 
Marginson argues that different institutions with different levels of status will engage with different 
types of, or in his terms, layers of economic or market activity. He argues that ‘high status 
institutions’ will compete for ‘high value’ students who can reproduce the status of the institution.  
As such, ‘elite’ institutions will, according to Marginson, take part in a ‘status’ economy. Low status 
institutions, according to this description, will face intense revenue competition, as students seek 
value for money. As such, Marginson argues that those institutions at the lowest end of the status 
hierarchy will have to engage in an increasingly full capitalist market. 
 
Surprisingly, Marginson makes no reference to the work of Bourdieu in his analysis of higher 
education ‘status goods’, but seems to somewhat conflate his conception of them with economic 
capital to facilitate a Marxian commodity market analysis of higher education. For example, Kopytoff 
(1986) describes the commodities in opposition to that which is individualisable and singular, rather 
describing commodities as equivalent or homogeneous at the point of exchange. If ‘status goods’, 
such as higher education qualifications, are singular, unique and unexchangeable (in an explicit 
sense), then Marginson’s argument that they are an ‘individualisable’ commodity benefit may be 
undermined and the conflation of ‘status goods’ with commodity goods could be a category error. 
 
In ‘The cultural biography of things: commoditization as process’ (1986) Kopytoff considers the 
differential modes of exchange that he describes as existing in different types of society. He also 
describes ‘exchange’ to be a universal feature of human social activity. He argues that economies of 
exchange become increasingly ‘commoditised’ in relation to the development of the available 
exchange technology within a given society. He contrasts commodity exchange with various kinds of 
obligated gift exchange in both ‘small-scale’ and ‘complex societies’.  
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To be saleable for money or to be exchangeable for a wide array of other things is to have 
something in common with a large number of exchangeable things that, taken together, 
partake of a single universe of comparable values…to be saleable or widely exchangeable 
is to be “common” – the opposite of being uncommon, incomparable, unique, singular and 
therefore not exchangeable for anything else. The perfect commodity would be one that is 
exchangeable with anything and everything else, as the perfectly commoditised world would 
be one in which everything is exchangeable or for sale. By the same token the perfectly 
decommoditised world would be one in which everything is singular, unique, and 
unexchangeable. (Kopytoff: 1986, p.69) 
 
Kopytoff acknowledges that neither ‘perfectly commoditised’ or ‘perfectly decommoditised’ worlds 
exist. However, his relational conception of ‘the singular’ and ‘the commodity’ as opposites can 
perhaps be ‘opened up’ to more comprehensively describe a range of possible culturally constructed 
‘things’.  
 
Kopytoff argues that the availability of ‘exchange technology’, an explicit monetized system, a 
regulated system for establishing property rights as well as perhaps market trading technologies, 
operate as the ‘drives’ for increasing commoditisation. Commoditisation, for Kopytoff, constitutes the 
homogenisation of value as a price equivalent with a universe of comparable values. He goes on to 
describe the social ‘forces’ that are oppositional to commodification. 
 
The counter forces are culture and the individual, with their drive to discriminate, classify, 
compare, and sacrilise.  (Kopytoff: 1986, p.87) 
 
There is a tension in Kopytoff’s description, in that commodities are defined as that which is 
‘comparable’ and yet the drive towards commodification is opposed with the counter forces of ‘culture 
and the individual’ which drive to ‘compare’ (amongst other things). Presumably, the outcome of 
cultural and individual comparative processes can either be the establishment of commonality or a 
singularity. Perhaps then ‘culture and the individual’, in Kopytoff’s terms, could operate to increase or 
resist commodification. This may provide insight into how the oppositional variables identified by 
Kopytoff as ‘the commodity’, ‘the individual’ and ‘culture’, could be reorganised to construct a more 
productive and conceptually comprehensive discursive space with which to describe cultural 
practice. Kopytoff describes commodities as ‘the opposite of being uncommon, incomparable, 
unique, singular’, as such commodities are for Kopytoff, ‘common’ or ‘homogeneous’. This provides a 
clear opposition between things or objects that are homogeneous and those that are singular. 
Kopytoff also describes another opposition; that which is between a world in which ‘everything is 
exchangeable’ and one in which everything is ‘unexchangeable’. This can be described as a binary 
variable between the openness and the closure of exchange practice. Interestingly, Kopytoff 
identifies regulated systems of ‘exchange technology’ as operating to drive commodification and as 
such open exchange practice but it may also be the case that regulated systems can operate to 
close or exclude some forms of exchange practice. Similarly, objects that are ‘sacrilised’ and ‘non-
exchangeable’ must be recognised as such in relation to social structures and cultural practices that 




T H E  D Y N A M I C  A M B I G U I T I E S  O F  C O M M O D I F I C A T I O N  A N D  S I N G U L A R I S A T I O N  
Kopytoff describes some examples of objects whose value is personally or culturally singularised and 
some of the ways in which related exchange practices are ambiguous, inconsistent and at times 
contradictory: for example, in relation to personal singularisation, Kopytoff considers the ambiguity 
relating to a family heirloom in the context of potential exchange. 
 
What to me is an heirloom is, of course a commodity to the jeweller…to the jeweller, I am 
confusing two different systems of values: that of the marketplace and that of the closed 
sphere of personal singularised things both of which happen to converge on the object at 
hand. (Kopytoff: 1986, p.88) 
 
In relation to processes of cultural singularisation Kopytoff provides the example of the ‘Star of India’, 
an object, which might ordinarily be traded as a commodity, on the diamond market, that is 
sacralised or consecrated by the British monarchy and the state, as a ‘crown jewel’. Here, exchange 
is closed as cultural tradition excludes all possibility of sale for any price. Kopytoff also discusses 
(using the work of Picasso as an example), how the ‘pricelessness’ of art is in practice established by 
the association of an ‘immense valuation’ as a ‘price’. Kopytoff argues that we are habituated into 
recognising examples of art that are established as national treasures, or perhaps canonical, as 
more valuable than the price they might be sold for. Here, Kopytoff argues that the recognition of the 
singularity of a work of art’s status is not only defined in relation to a snapshot of its position, in what 
Bourdieu would call the symbolic economy, but is also a result of the history of its socially mediated 
relations to economic (and perhaps other) exchange markets. Kopytoff argues that in the same way 
that individuals are constitutive of the historical construction of multiple identities in complex 
societies, so likewise, ‘things’ also have historical biographies. 
 
It is from these cases that we can learn how the forces of commodification and 
singularisation are intertwined in ways far more subtle than our ideal modes can show, how 
one breaks the rules by moving between spheres that are supposed to be insulated from 
each other, how one converts what is formally unconvertible, how one masks these actions 
and with whose contrivance, and not least, how the spheres are reorganised and things 
reshuffled between them in the course of a society’s history. (Kopytoff: 1986, p.88) 
 
It is in consideration of the ambiguous and dynamic relationships between the binary variables or 
oppositions discussed above that I will construct a discursive space that I call modes of discursive 
objectification to attempt to describe the discursive strategies in play within official higher education 
texts. . 
 
M O D E S  O F  D I S C U R S I V E  O B J E C T I F I C A T I O N  
This thesis is concerned with the analysis of texts identified as instances of socio-cultural action 
within the higher education discursive field and as such, the form of exchange that is relevant is 
‘discursive exchange’. By this I mean the transaction between reader and text and more specifically 
the ways that texts strategically construct textual subjectivities (for example author and audience) 
and textual objectivities. The thesis is specifically concerned with describing the strategies which 
operate to construct ‘higher education’ as a commodified textual object and those strategies that are 
employed to resist this.  
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In addition to constituting subjectivities (for example authors and audiences) texts also constitute the 
‘object(s)’ of which they speak. Texts constitute relative subjectivities and relative ‘objectivities’. Texts 
that describe higher education, (re)construct ‘higher education’ as a socially produced discursive 
‘object’. The analysis of modes of discursive objectification will attempt to describe how the 
recontextualisation of higher education practice within selected texts (re)constructs higher education 
as that which is more or less singularised in the context of more or less open discursive exchange. 
Here, homogeneous objectification is that which is constituted as equivalent with an open category of 
comparable other objects. In other words, a mode of objectification that is homogeneous describes 
(positions) an object as that which can be compared with other objects in some way. A 
homogeneous category of objectivity is a description of a commonality between objects, whereas a 
singular objectivity is that which is constituted as unique and non-comparable.  
 
By constructing a discursive space from the binary variables of singularity and homogeneity with 
those of open and closed discursive exchange, we can attempt to describe the dynamic relationships 
between the textual strategies identified in my analysis (reading) of official higher education texts. In 
other words, modes of discursive objectification are not used to describe or categorise texts as being 
one or other type of textual object. Rather, the various modes describe a comprehensive range of 
discursive strategies that can be employed to construct a textual object. It may of course be the case 
that a text employs a number of modes of discursive objectification concurrently. It may also be the 
case that texts may employ modes dynamically, evidencing strategic moves from one (or several) 
mode(s) to another. The analysis of texts will describe a ‘modality’ between a defined range of 
discursive strategies that operate to construct textual objectivities including the commodified mode. 
 
In opposition to commodified discursive objectification, three other ideal types (or modes) are here 
described; iconic/symbolic objectification, aesthetic objectification and institutional objectification (see 
Figure 6 below). Within this construction commodified discursive objectification emerges as that 
which is described as homogeneous, within the context of open discursive exchange (where 
everything is potentially exchangeable). This is oppositional to iconic/symbolic discursive 
objectification, which describes that which is sacralised or consecrated as singular, unique and non-
exchangeable as a consequence of symbolic recognition as beyond price, or perhaps outside price 
and not for sale. Here, it is possible to think of religious or royal artefacts, art that constitutes national 
treasure, iconic public buildings, gifts, awards and titles etc. The aesthetic mode of discursive 
objectification describes that which is singular and positioned as openly exchangeable. Whilst 
consecrated art might achieve iconic status, art that is singular, unique and charismatically authored 
can be, and usually is, marketed. This could also be applied to the publications and sale of ‘non-
artistic’ texts including academic books, amongst other things.  
 
Lastly institutional discursive objectification is conceived of as that which represents ‘contentless’ 
regulation; the gallery exhibition plinth, (see Dowling: 2004a, in press) used to (re)contextualise an 
object as art, would be a good example. The institutional mode describes a technology of exchange 
to categorise, classify and regulate, it is the mechanism that facilitates both iconic/symbolic 
consecration and commodification. The institutional mode describes that which contextualises ‘art’ as 
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F I G U R E  6 :  M O D E S  O F  D I S C U R S I V E  O B J E C T I F I C A T I O N  
 
For example, a description of ‘the autonomy of universities in academic matters’ could be read as 
constituting an aesthetic objectification of higher education practice as it implies that each individual 
university operates autonomously in an openly discursive environment. On the other hand, it also 
implies that universities have the individual authority to regulate ‘academic matters’ which would 
constitute a closing of discursive exchange and an iconic/symbolic objectification. If however, ‘the 
autonomy of universities in academic matters’ is read as a homogeneous description that excluded 
those outside the sector from having a voice in academic matters then it could constitute an 
institutional objectification. This illustration is designed to demonstrate two things. Firstly, that not all 
textual constructions constitute the commodified mode and secondly, that descriptions of higher 
education practice can operate in multiple and conflicting modes simultaneously. 
 
Chapters four, five and six will include an analysis of three selected official higher education texts 
employing the methodology described within this and the previous chapter. This will include the 
specific analysis of oppositions and alliances drawn from each text followed by the 
recontextualisation of these oppositions and alliances in relation to modes of discursive 
objectification. The analysis of each text will attempt to describe how the strategic relationships 
between discursive objectification modes employed operate to reproduce or resist the idea of the 
commodification of higher education.  
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L O C A T I N G  T H E  H A N D B O O K  F O R  A C A D E M I C  R E V I E W  W I T H I N  T H E  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  
F I E L D  
Since 1997 the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) has conducted reviews, of 
individual institutions and subjects, into the standards and quality of higher education within the UK.  
The QAA is contracted by the Higher Education funding bodies within the UK to carry out this work.  
The QAA has developed a number of review methods since 1997, for example ‘Subject Review’, 
‘Academic Review’ and ‘Institution Audit’, amongst others.  For each review method, the QAA have 
produced a ‘Handbook’. This is a ‘practical guide’ for Reviewers (those contracted by the QAA to 
conduct reviews) and staff within institutions whose higher education provision is to be reviewed. 
 
These handbooks however, are part of an extensive regulatory framework that, to a significant 
degree, defines UK higher education.  The QAA has produced a range of other documentation, 
developed in consultation with representatives from higher education institutions.  This 
documentation, collectively referred to as ‘The Academic Infrastructure’ is designed to provide 
“reference points that help define clear and specific standards” 
(www.qaa.ac.uk/aboutus/qaaintro.asp). 
 
The Academic Infrastructure includes the following documents: 
- The Framework for higher education qualifications, which establishes the “achievements and 
attributes represented by the main qualification titles” (www.qaa.ac.uk/aboutus/qaaintro.asp). 
- Subject benchmark statements, which “set out expectations about the standards of degrees in a 
range of subject areas” (www.qaa.ac.uk/aboutus/qaaintro.asp). 
- Programme specification guidelines, “A programme specification is a concise description of the 
intended learning outcomes from a higher education programme, and the means by which 
these outcomes are achieved and demonstrated.” 
(www.qaa.ac.uk/academicsinfrastructure/programmespec/default.asp.) 
- “The Code of practice for the assurance of academic quality and standards in higher 
education… is a guideline on good practice for universities and colleges, relating to the 
management of academic standards and quality.” 
- Guidelines for HE Progress Files. “Progress Files make the outcomes, or results, of learning in 
higher education more explicit, identify the achievements of learning, and support the concept 
that learning is a lifetime activity.” 
(www.qaa.ac.uk/academicinfrastructure/progressfiles/default.asp.) 
 
The QAA also “advise Government on applications for the grant of degree awarding powers, 
university title, or designation as a higher education institution” 
(www.qaa.ac.uk/aboutus/qaaintro.asp.) 
 
The QAA’s broad ranging regulatory framework, in a sense, significantly ‘defines’ the scope or 
territory of UK higher education.  The documents, or texts, that the QAA produce seem therefore 
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likely to provide evidence relevant to an analysis concerning (re)production or resistance of the idea 
of the commodification of higher education within the UK.   
 
The review Handbooks, amongst other QAA texts, are constituted as guides for Reviewers and 
institutions being reviewed. These texts have been distributed in printed form to relevant institutions 
providing higher education and are publicly available on the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher 
Education (QAA or the Agency) website (qaa.ac.uk). 
 
T H E  A N A L Y S I S  O F  T H E  H A N D B O O K  F O R  A C A D E M I C  R E V I E W  
This chapter will constitute an analysis of a specific Handbook text as a relevant example of an 
official text concerned with the regulation of the quality of higher education. The specific text selected 
for analysis is the Handbook for academic review: England, (2004) (the Handbook). In describing the 
higher education discursive field, chapter two described Foucaultian ‘technologies of truth’, following 
Simola et al (1998), which included ‘technologies of self’, ‘technologies of government’ and 
‘technologies of discourse’. This model of the power relations within discursive fields has been 
employed to provide a rationale for the selection of official texts within the higher education field for 
analysis within this thesis. The analysis of the Handbook provides an example of an official text 
related to ‘technologies of self’. The Handbook describes a process that determines the official 
approval of higher education providers and as a consequence the identification of the ‘good’ 
institutional subject. QAA Academic Review describes ‘who’ can be a higher education provider. 
 
The Handbook text does not exist in isolation but also refers itself, to a range of other documents 
also available on the QAA website. These include previous and other concurrent handbooks that 
describe quality review and institutional audit processes, as well as the other documents collectively 
referred to as the ‘Academic Infrastructure’, listed above. The QAA website also includes quality 
reports for all reviews undertaken by the Agency as well as Agency policy statements, consultation 
documents, annual report, strategic plan and other reports. For the purposes of this analysis, the 
boundary of the object text is determined as that of the Handbook for Academic Review itself. 
However, as indicated above, several other QAA documents are explicitly referred to within the 
Handbook (for example Academic Infrastructure documents). Where this is the case, reference to 
these documents will be made in the context of the analysis but only with respect to their description 
within the Handbook. Any further ‘blurring’ of the boundary of the object text will be highlighted within 
the analysis. 
 
To summarise, the method of analysis in this chapter will produce a ‘constructive description’ 
including: 
 
1. The introduction to the location of the QAA Handbook for Academic Review within the higher 
education field (as discussed above). 
2. An overview of the authorial and audience voices constructed in my transaction with the 
Handbook (reconstructed in the reader’s transaction with this text) 
3. An analysis of how the Handbook is operating to recontextualise ‘higher education’ as quality 
assurance practice. 
4. The identification and analysis of oppositions and alliances within the Handbook to construct a 
specialised and localised mode of action – ‘modes of review’. 
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5. The recontexualisation of oppositions and alliances described in the analysis (items 1-4 above) 
in relation to modes of discursive objectification. 
6. An analysis of the dynamics of the distribution and exclusion of textual objects in relation to 
modes of discursive objectification, including the extent to which the text is operating in the 
commodified mode. 
 
The modes of review discursive space will be constructed directly from oppositions and alliances that 
emerge from my reading of the Handbook. This analysis will constitute an ‘elaborated description’ of 
the Handbook in that it will attempt to synthesise my reading of the text as empirical data with the 
specialised theory (discursive spaces etc) I have related to it and in doing so construct a new 
description of the text (see Brown and Dowling, 1998). In other words, this mode of action will be 
used to generate an elaborated description of how the text is operating to recontextualise higher 
education practice. This discursive space identifies four possible modes or ‘ideal types’. The aim is 
not to definitively locate texts in relation to each discursive space and a text may coherently be 
described in relation to more than one mode. For example, a text may constitute different authorial 
and audience relationships in different sections of a text. As Dowling (2004a, in press) has pointed 
out, ‘ideal types’ or modes within his ‘modes of authority action’ can be considered to relate to each 
other dynamically or as strategic moves between modes. This analysis (as my textual construction) 
will then be further recontextualised to attempt to produce a description of the extent to which the 
Handbook is operating to (re)produce and/or resist the idea of its commodification in relation to 
modes of discursive objectification. 
 
Authorial and audience voices within the Handbook 
In recontextualising higher education practice, the Handbook constructs authorial and audience 
‘voices’. For example, the Handbook makes explicit reference to ‘the Agency’ (the QAA) as the 
author of the Handbook determining its purpose, its audiences and its intended role in implementing 
the procedures described. Audiences include ’Reviewers’, those who conduct Reviews, and higher 
education providers, institutions that deliver government funded higher education. The ways in which 
such ‘voices’ are constructed within the Handbook create relational and strategic positions that are 
the focus of this part of the analysis. 
 
The QAA is explicitly identified as the authorial voice within the Handbook. The authorial voice is 
signified by the use of the term ‘the Agency’ in numerous instances (ninety one times in fact) 
throughout the text. For example on page one. 
 
The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (the Agency) sought comment as to 
how the first edition of the Handbook for academic review, 2000 could be improved and 
focussed amendments on the needs of FECs [Further Education Colleges], Review 
Coordinators, specialist reviewers, subject specialist review facilitators, academic staff and 
students. This second edition of the Handbook takes account of the suggestions for 
improvement (Handbook: p1) 
 
Usefully, in the context of this analysis, the above statement also identifies various types of authorial 
and audience voices, that the QAA describe as being relevant for providing comment on Handbook 
improvements. Whilst there are a number of potential authorial and/or audience voices cited within 
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the Handbook (the UK Government, HEFCE, employers, students, the public) several of these 
voices are to a significant degree ‘non-present’, or what Dowling has called ‘displaced’ (2001). In 
other words, whilst they are referred to, they are not directly addressed as an audience within the 
text and are not directly positioned as an authorial voice. Rather, as Dowling suggests 
 
This is a form of positioning action in which the authorial voice affiliates to the addressed 
audience voice either tacitly or explicitly. (Dowling: 2001, p11)  
 
In this instance the QAA, as the authorial voice, affiliates in differing ways, to different audiences’ 
voices. For example, references to the UK Government and HEFCE can be described as an attempt 
to legitimise the authority of the QAA to describe (to act as author) the process of Academic Review. 
Such reference is also employed to establish the QAA’s positional authority in relation to the 
institutions whose higher education provision is to be reviewed. References to the UK Government 
and HEFCE, as such, operate to establish the ‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu, 1998) of the QAA as a 
body ‘authorised’ to carry out Reviews of higher education. 
 
References to employers are constructed to position employers as representatives within the 
process of Review, either as potential peer Reviewers, or as participants in meetings concerning  
 
the involvement of employers in the evaluation of standards and quality…Meetings with 
employers enable the reviewers to establish employers' views on the programmes being 
considered and inform the reviewers' judgements on the curriculum on offer and their 
perceptions of their employees' (the students) learning experience. These meetings provide 
an opportunity not only to hear the direct views of those present, but also to establish more 
generally whether there are effective arrangements for employers' feedback and 
representation…The agenda should focus particularly on the relevance and usefulness of 
the curriculum and the knowledge and skills gained by students. The reviewers will be 
interested in establishing the extent to which the curriculum on offer of direct benefit to the 
employers' organisation or industry.  (Handbook: p45)  
 
In addition, the Handbook also explicitly states, in the section describing the ‘Agenda for meeting 
with employers’, that “A meeting with employers is not an essential component of the review method 
and only takes place if employers constitute an appropriate source of evidence” (Handbook: p45). 
The notion of ‘peer’ review that includes representatives from relevant employment sectors is an 
extension of the notion of ‘peer’ beyond that which might be associated with academic peer review. 
However, the section of the Handbook that describes “knowledge and skills of specialist reviewers” 
(Handbook: p 30) makes it clear that ”…in the case of industrially or professionally-based reviewers, 
familiarity with HE teaching and learning” will need to be demonstrated in order to meet QAA 
requirements for recognition as a Reviewer. As such, employment sector representatives can only 
act as Reviewers where they also meet non-employer specific criteria, identified by the QAA. So 
employers could be an intended audience, if they are training as Reviewers but their identification as 
such, is not dependent upon them being employers. The criteria described within the Handbook 
required for recognition as a Reviewer do not require any experience as an employer. Where 
employers have recognition within the description of the process of Review it is as a ‘source of 
evidence’ rather than as a potential ‘reader’ or audience. 
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Similarly, whilst the Handbook states that a focus on the students’ learning experience’ (Handbook: 
p2) is a key feature of Review, the Handbook does not address students as an audience. Rather, the 
views of students and mechanisms for obtaining their views are positioned as a key source of 
evidence in relation to judgements concerning standards and quality. In a sense, the method 
described within the Handbook is an explicit mechanism for objectifying ‘the student learning 
experience’ in order that ‘judgements’ about the quality of such experience can be made. For 
example, within the “Agenda for meetings with current and former students” (Handbook: p42) it is 
made clear that “reviewers always hold meetings with representative groups of current students” 
(Handbook: p42). These meetings are described as a ‘dialogue’ and an opportunity to hear the direct 
views of students. The Handbook explicitly states that these meetings are not limited by the 
‘indicative’ agenda provided. However, the construction of the ‘space’ for the ‘dialogue’ between 
Reviewers and students is highly constrained, by the subjectification of both, through the elaborated 
descriptions of their respective roles within the Review methodology. 
 
Meetings with students enable the reviewers to establish student views on the questions  
being considered, and inform the reviewers' judgements on the quality of the student 
learning experience…Throughout the meeting, students will be given opportunities to raise 
points not covered by the reviewers' agenda. The agenda which follows is indicative and the 
reviewers use it selectively and contextualise it so that questions are relevant and 
meaningful to the particular group of students.  (Handbook: Annex H, p42) 
 
The indicative agenda referred to above within the Handbook has a total of forty two questions 
categorised into six ‘aspects’ that correspond to the areas evaluated in the Self Evaluation Document 
which institutions are required to submit prior to review. Even if students are given the opportunity to 
raise points not covered in the indicative agenda, the highly prescriptive agenda seems likely to 
regulate ‘dialogue’. 
 
While ‘the public’ are positioned as an audience for the ‘Final Reports’, that are published on the 
QAA website they are not addressed as an audience within the Handbook text itself. However, the 
public and therefore open nature of the distribution of the Final Report may be significant in 
establishing the extent to which such practices constitute a commodification of higher education.  
I will be returning to this point later in the analysis. 
 
One significant change from the 2000 edition of the Handbook is that Academic Review from after 
2001 would only take place in Further Education Colleges (FECs) that delivered directly (HEFCE) 
funded higher education. After this time, Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) became subject to a 
different quality review method – that of Institutional Audit. As a consequence, directly funded FECs 
are constituted as an important audience within the text. In one sense, FECs can be considered as 
the prime audience. It is higher education provision within directly funded FECs that is the specific 
‘object’ of the Academic Review process within the Handbook.  
 
Review Coordinators, specialist reviewers and subject specialist review facilitators are all roles that 
are defined within the Handbook. Review Coordinators and specialist reviewers are appointed by the 
QAA, whereas subject specialist review facilitators are nominated by institutions under review but are 
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also required to be trained by the QAA. The requirements for all of these roles are described within 
the Handbook including levels and types of participation in processes such as meetings, reviewing of 
‘evidence’ and judgements. Review Coordinators and Specialist Reviewers are described in relation 
to detailed person specification sections in the Handbook. They are collectively referred to as 
‘reviewers’ in the section entitled ‘Guidance for review teams’ (Annex B, p18-23). This section is the 
clearest indication that the Handbook is designed as a pedagogic text for a reviewer audience, in 
addition to the institutions (in this case FECs) providing higher education, who are being reviewed. 
 
The Handbook not only constructs authorial and audience voices in relation to the QAA and ‘review 
teams’ respectively but also explicitly subjectifies each type of audience within the text. The context 
of ‘reading as a reviewer’ (or other defined role) is not only something engendered in the act of 
discursive engagement but is a predetermined self-identification, a characterisation that an individual 
is invited to fulfil in an explicit act of subjectification.  
 
Specialist reviewers are recruited by the Agency from individuals nominated by colleges or 
other organisations and individuals who reply to advertisements. Specialist reviewers are 
recruited and trained to ensure that they are capable of carrying out their duties effectively.  
(Handbook: Annex C, p28) 
 
However, in consideration of the quotation above, it may be that reviewers themselves may not be 
the primary or only audience. Perhaps the non-explicit audience constructed in the above Handbook 
excerpt is institutions to be reviewed, or academic staff within such institutions, who will be asked to 
engage with Review processes. Where the text states that “Specialist reviewers are recruited and 
trained to ensure that they are capable of carrying out their duties effectively” (Handbook: p28) it 
seems clear that the subjectification of ‘reviewers’ is at least targeted at an audience in addition to 
‘reviewers’ themselves. In other words the recognition and identification of ‘Reviewers’ as 
‘Reviewers’ by the QAA is positioned as a guarantee of ‘effectiveness’ for institutions. This 
‘effectiveness’ is ‘measured’ and evaluated by the QAA in relation to Reviewers’ capability to carry 
out quality assurance procedures designed by the QAA. The QAA maintains its authority to 
determine the criteria that establishes such ‘effectiveness’ and retains privileged access to the 
principles that generate such criteria. 
 
Within the Academic Review Handbook, the QAA, as the primary authorial voice, are constructed as 
the transmitter of privileged content, i.e. the Academic Review methodology and associated 
processes transmitted to apprenticed reviewers and institutions to be reviewed. In both cases, the 
“evaluation of performances are located with the transmitter” (Dowling: 1999, p2). As the intended 
readers are higher education professionals with specialist esoteric knowledge of higher education, 
this privileging constitutes a further specialisation within an existing esoteric domain, rather than a 
specialised practice as distinguished from the public domain. The specialised esoteric domain, in this 
case, is higher education quality assurance and in particular the specific model of the evaluation of 
the quality of higher education provision described as QAA Academic Review.  
 
In one sense, the potential readers of this work are equivalent, in that subject reviewers are ‘peer’ 
reviewers drawn from within the higher education community. However, the very different roles that 
are identified between those reviewing and those being reviewed uniquely position each type of 
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potential audience described in the Handbook. Reading as a Reviewer is not the same as reading as 
a ‘provider’: for example, within Annex B ’Aide-memoire for academic review’ (p16), two audiences 
are explicitly identified: firstly, ‘Guidance for colleges when preparing self-evaluations’ and secondly, 
‘Guidance for review teams’. Within the ‘guidance for colleges’ section, despite the statement that the 
aide-memoire “is not intended to be prescriptive or exhaustive” (Handbook: p16), colleges are 
warned that they  
 
should take care to ensure that their self-evaluation meets the needs of the review and 
answers the questions the reviewers are likely to pursue. (Handbook: p16) 
 
In other words, colleges should describe themselves and their higher education practice ‘as if’ they 
were under the gaze of Reviewers. The technology of self-evaluation deploys a ‘panoptic’ 
surveillance strategy to regulate the practice of self-description. 
 
Colleges are also told here that they will  
 
find it helpful to refer to the prompts and questions in the aide-memoire below. Colleges 
should also refer to the components of the Academic infrastructure such as the Code of 
Practice, the FHEQ [Framework for Higher education Qualifications] and relevant subject 
benchmarking statements, where appropriate” (Handbook: p16) 
 
Here colleges are clearly being given fairly strong advice as to how a self-evaluation document 
‘should’ be constructed in order to comply with the requirements of an Academic Review as 
described within the Handbook. The text makes it clear that both Review teams and the QAA have to 
formally agree that a self-evaluation document is ‘appropriately’ constructed to ‘meet the needs’ of 
Review. Where this is judged not to be the case, self-evaluation documents will be returned to the 
institution for amendment until they comply. Colleges are, as such, positioned as ‘apprentice’ in 
relation to the authorial voice of the QAA, in the context of a pedagogic process of instruction into the 
esoteric practice of quality review of higher education. 
 
At the same time, sections that explicitly identify Reviewers as the targeted audience also implicitly 
position colleges as an apprenticed audience. For example, in the section ‘Guidance for review 
teams’ there is additional implicitly strong ‘advice’ for colleges. This advice indicates what it is that 
Reviewers ‘should’ be able to ascertain or make ‘judgements’ about if a self-evaluation document, or 
other ‘evidence’, is appropriately presented (constructed). For example, 
 
The reviewers should be able to judge whether intended learning outcomes are clearly 
stated and are appropriate to the level of the awards meeting the requirements of external 
reference points. (Handbook: p18)  
 
The formulation ‘reviewers should be able to judge’ is repeated for two other ‘aspects’ of review, 
‘Assessment’ and ‘Achievement’. However, other aspects, such as ’Curriculum’, Teaching and 
Learning’ and ‘Learning Resources’ employ the formulation ’reviewers will be able to judge’ 
(emphasis not in original text). This may indicate a differing ‘level’ of implicit ‘advice’ to colleges 
about the way in which statements are made about ‘intended learning outcomes, ‘Assessment’ and 
 80 
‘Achievement’ to ensure that Reviewers are ‘able’ to make ‘judgements’, whereas, the formulation 
‘reviewers will be able to judge’ provides for less opportunity for authorial input thus objectifying the 
colleges’ provision to a greater extent. 
 
The above examples indicate some of the positioning strategies employed within the Handbook and 
illustrates some of the relative alliances and oppositions that are constructed in the context of 
differentiated authorial and audience voices. 
 
The recontextualisation of higher education as quality assurance practice 
The Handbook, as object text, is here described as a representation of institutionalised socio-cultural 
activity constituted by oppositions and alliances in the establishment of strategic positions such as 
that of author and audience. The activity that the Handbook is concerned with is the practice of 
higher education. The description of higher education practice within the Handbook is, it is argued 
here, a recontextualisation of higher education practice. It is argued that the Handbook employs an 
elaborated language of institutionalised higher education quality assurance practice, to facilitate the 
categorisation and classification of ‘higher education’ as legitimate and ‘officially approved’. For 
example, the Handbook explicitly identifies higher education ‘subjects’ (disciplines), that will be 
‘reviewed’ during the period of 2004 to 2006. The rationale for describing higher education practice, 
as categorised in relation to specific pre-determined ‘subjects’, is not made explicit within the text 
except by reference to subject benchmarking statements as part of ‘the Academic Infrastructure’. 
However, it is clear that the conception of ‘the Academic Infrastructure’ and the categorisation of 
higher education practices as constituting different ‘subjects’ imply the existence of bureaucratic 
boundaries that serve to classify higher education for the purposes of quality assurance practice. In 
other words, what higher education ‘is’, becomes determined by the mechanism that is employed to 
‘measure’ its quality, which is itself a recontextualisation of higher education.  
 
Reference is made, within the Handbook, to the ‘statutory responsibility’ of the Higher Education 
Funding Council for England (HEFCE) 
 
to ensure that provision is made for assessing the quality of the education it funds and 
[HEFCE] has a responsibility for reporting to government on standards and quality 
(Handbook p.1) 
 
The Handbook also states that the QAA is ‘contracted by HEFCE to carry out [quality] review work’. 
In other words, the QAA is positioned as the agency that enables HEFCE to fulfil (at least part of) its 
statutory responsibility. The Handbook states that one (of three) main purposes of quality reviews is  
 
to secure value from public investment through ensuring that all education for which funding 
is provided is of approved quality…and to enable judgements to inform HEFCE funding 
decisions. (Handbook p.1) 
 
This indicates at least three things: firstly, that the type of higher education practice that is being 
described, is that which is, at least partially, dependant upon government funding, secondly, that 
funding is dependent on the recognition of such higher education practice as officially approved and 
that such approval has legislative force, thirdly, that funded higher education practice, which 
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represents ‘value’, can be determined and measured. The Handbook is, in this sense, designed to 
both establish that which is ‘valuable’ in higher education practice and to establish a procedure for 
the measurement of identified instances, or ‘units of review’, of such practice. The handbook is, as 
such, designed to contribute to the achievement of a desired planned outcome.  
 
The mission of the Agency is to safeguard the public interest in sound standards of HE 
qualifications and to encourage continuous improvement in the management of the quality of 
HE. (Handbook: p1) 
 
The ‘judgements’ of ‘value’, defined as ‘academic standards’ and ‘the quality of learning 
opportunities’ within the Handbook, are described as arriving out of the evaluation of the extent to 
which aims are met and intended learning outcomes are achieved. The procedure described in the 
Handbook also requires that both ‘aims’ and ‘intended learning outcomes’ are explicit and 
‘appropriate’, to facilitate the making of quality review judgements. In other words, both aims and 
intended learning outcomes must be measurable. The quality review process described in the 
Handbook only recognises higher education that is itself described as a goal orientated practice with 
‘clear aims’ and explicit ‘intended learning outcomes’, the achievement of which can be measured. 
This means that higher education practices that are excluded by this kind of description do not 
constitute ‘higher education’, in the context of the Academic Review procedures detailed in the 
Handbook. It is of course possible that higher education could be recontextualised differently, for 
example, as a practice whose outcomes are non-determinable or perhaps only determinable in 
relation to highly localised practices etc.  
 
Given that it is possible to describe aspects of higher education practice that do not have stated aims 
and learning outcomes, it is clear that the Handbook recontextualises higher education practice in 
the process of the implementation of the Academic Review process it describes. The Handbook, as 
such, excludes some potential descriptions of higher education and in doing so, the methodology it 
describes, to this extent, determines that which is being measured by it. 
 
T H E  E S O T E R I C  D O M A I N  O F  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  Q U A L I T Y  A S S U R A N C E  P R A C T I C E  
Within the Handbook, amongst the ‘Qualities required in all reviewers’ section is the requirement to 
“demonstrate commitment to the principles of quality assurance of HE provision” (Handbook: p28) 
and “In addition, reviewers are expected to have a clear knowledge and understanding of the 
Agency’s academic review process and the Academic Infrastructure” (Handbook: p28). Reviewers 
are also expected to “have completed successfully the Agency’s training programme” (Handbook: 
p28). Blurring the boundaries of the object text to a degree, previous versions of the Handbook have 
also described it as a ‘key document for those taking part in the training programme (QAA Subject 
Review Handbook 1998). The Handbook can, as such, be described as a pedagogic text in relation 
to the apprenticeship of prospective Reviewers into the esoteric practice of Academic Review of 
higher education quality.  
 
Other potential audiences, such as ‘employers’ or ‘the public’, are not placed in a hierarchical 
relationship with the QAA. Such audiences are not subject to the authority of the QAA and as such, 
the Handbook is not operating within a regulatory or pedagogic context when addressing such 
audiences. However, to what extent can the QAA Academic Review Handbook be described as a 
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transmission text that explicitly facilitates Reviewers and also Colleges’ access to the principles that 
generate discourse within the esoteric domain of higher education quality? The Handbook does 
describe ‘the main purposes of reviews’ (Handbook: p1) and the ‘features of academic review’ 
(Handbook: p2), for example that ‘Academic review is based on self-evaluation’. However, whilst the 
Handbook requires a demonstrable commitment to the principles of higher education quality 
assurance it does not explicitly describe the principles upon which the practice itself (for example the 
emphasis on self-evaluation) is premised. The Handbook does not explain why quality review of 
higher education is based on self-evaluation; it rather just states that it is. Similarly, notions of 
‘academic standards’ and ‘the quality of learning opportunities’ are presented as givens. The reader 
is told what these terms mean in the context of QAA Academic Review but the reader is not given 
any insight as to the rationale or principles that might have generated the these particular 
descriptions. They are described in the Handbook as follows:  
 
 • reporting on academic standards in a subject is concerned with the appropriateness of the 
  intended learning outcomes set by the subject provider, in relation to relevant subject  
  benchmarking statements, qualification levels and the overall aims of the provision, the  
  effectiveness of curricular content and assessment arrangements, in relation to the intended 
  learning outcomes, and the achievement of these outcomes by the student; 
 
 • reporting on the quality of learning outcomes in a subject is concerned with the   
  effectiveness of the teaching, the academic support and the learning resources in promoting 
  student  learning, achievement and progression across the various programmes.   
  (Handbook: p1-2 - bold type in original) 
 
These two statements are rich with principles that are not made explicit and also rely heavily on the 
bureaucratic framework within which descriptions of higher education practice is positioned, what the 
QAA call the Academic Infrastructure. For example, the notion of academic subjects and the 
differentiated descriptions of these in ‘subject benchmarking statements’ and the emphasis on 
‘intended learning outcomes’ as an seemingly essential aspect of higher education practice are 
presented as incontrovertible. There is, at least, no indication that higher education might be 
described differently. As such, the requirement for Reviewers to commit to the ‘principles of quality 
assurance of HE provision’ is rather a commitment to the particular mechanisms, constructions and 
procedures of quality assurance practice as described within the Handbook. Here the QAA, as 
author of the procedures described in the Handbook, retain privileged access to the principles to 
which they require Reviewers to demonstrate commitment. As such, the handbook can be described 
as a pedagogic text, which regulates readers (in this instance Reviewers’) access to the principles 
that generate the esoteric domain of higher education quality assurance practice. 
 
The Handbook operates to apprentice reviewers and academic staff into the esoteric practice of 
Academic Review. Higher education itself can of course be described as an esoteric domain but 
higher education quality assurance can be described as a more specialised practice within the higher 
education field. The Academic Review Handbook recontextualises higher education practice as 
higher education quality assurance practice. This is achieved, not necessarily by associating it with 
descriptions of an activity drawn from the public domain, but by associations that are none the less 
familiar to a higher education practitioner audience. The esoteric domain of higher education practice 
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is recontextualised by its location in descriptions of higher education quality assurance practices. 
This recontextualisation employs references that are familiar to the audience, (reviewers and 
academic staff), positioned as apprenticed members of ‘the academic community’, or ‘peers’, by the 
text. For example, the very term ‘peer review’ is recruited from the discourse of academic production 
to describe higher education quality assurance processes.  
 
The use of the term ‘peer review’ aligns established practices in academic discourse (peer review of 
academic journals etc) with the further specialised esoteric practices of higher education quality 
assurance that reviewers and institutions under review, are being apprenticed in. There are of course 
further possible questions that can be considered concerning the actual operation of the peer review 
process itself: for example, the ways in which recognition as ‘a peer’, with power to regulate access 
to (academic journal) publication is determined but such considerations are not, for the moment, 
apposite. The point is rather to illustrate how the term ‘peer review’ is operating to regulate access to 
the esoteric domain of higher education quality assurance practice. This also indicates that the 
Handbook is not intended for a ‘public’ audience, as the reference to ‘peer review’ seems likely to 
resonate primarily with the notion of the ‘academic community’. On the other hand, it is worth noting 
that this particular version Handbook is related only to Reviews in Further Education Colleges 
(FECs) directly funded by HEFCE, whereas (to blur slightly the object text) the 2001 version included 
all higher education institutions.  
 
FECs are institutions that do not receive any HEFCE funding for academic research and where the 
contractual requirement for staff engagement with such research is likely to be, as a consequence, 
far less explicit if present at all. References to ‘peer review’ may not resonate as strongly or perhaps 
in the same way with academic staff audiences in FECs. It may be that academic staff that work in 
FECs are less likely to recognise themselves and their practice, by association with academic peer 
review processes. 
 
The following sections will comprise the analysis of oppositions and alliances that I identify in my 
reading of the Handbook text. The analysis will construct a discursive space that I will call modes of 
review which is designed to provide new perspectives (descriptions) concerning the relative strategic 
positionings, of subjectivities and objectivities, evidenced within the text. 
 
Modes of review 
 
O P P O S I T I O N S  A N D  A L L I A N C E S  C O N C E R N I N G  ‘ M O D E S  O F  R E V I E W ’  
The Handbook identifies ‘peer review’ as a key feature of ‘academic review’ 
 
… peer review: teams include current lecturers from HEIs and FECs and, wherever possible, 
for vocational subjects, reviewers from the relevant employment sector (Annex C provides 
details of the role and responsibility of reviewers). (Handbook: p2) 
 
Annex C tells us 
 
There are two types of academic reviewer used by the Agency: specialist reviewers, with 
current teaching experience in the discipline concerned, or experience of relevant 
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professional or occupational practice; Review Coordinators, who lead academic reviews and 
have extensive experience of quality assurance and programme approval of HE 
programmes, usually gained by working with such procedures in more than one discipline. 
(Handbook: p30) 
 
From these descriptions we can see that ‘reviewers’ (those who conduct academic reviews on behalf 
of the QAA) are positioned as ‘peers’.  However, it is clear that the category of ‘peer’ is a little elastic.  
One sense of the term ‘peer’, included in the extract above, indicates that individuals who have been 
recognised as current higher education practitioners carry out the quality review process.  However, 
this does not mean that academic reviews can be carried out by any higher education practitioner 
(“current lecturers from HEIs and FECs”).  Annex C identifies specific ‘qualities’, ‘knowledge’ and 
‘skills’ that are ‘required’.  In addition, Annex C identifies the specific requirements of the process of 
‘recruitment’ and ‘training’ necessary to the establishment of recognition as a QAA reviewer.  This 
recognition is, then, a differentiation or specialisation from the category of higher education 
practitioner.  It is a recontextualisation of the role of higher education practitioner employed to 
describe the role of a QAA reviewer. 
 
The identification of ‘peers’ implies the identification of and membership of, a group of individuals 
who can be described homogenously in some sense.  Amongst a potentially infinite range of such 
possible groupings is the categorisation by professional, or occupational role.  The group “current 
lecturers from HEIs and FECs…” (Handbook: p2) could, in theory, range from university professors 
to basic literacy teachers.  It could include PhD supervisors or facilitators of adult leisure education.  
The point is that this ‘peer group’ is very broad in relation to the type of practice that is potentially 
recognised as ‘inside’ the category.  However, the recognition of being a QAA reviewer seems 
contrastingly narrow. 
 
The Handbook tells the reader that there are two types of ‘academic reviewer’, ‘specialist reviewers’ 
and ‘Review Coordinators’. With regards to ‘specialist reviewers’ the reader is introduced to a further 
distinction of the category of ‘peers’.  ‘Specialist reviewers’, as well as being ‘current lecturers from 
HEIs and FECs”, are also identified as those “with current teaching experience in the discipline 
concerned”.  Here, the ‘discipline concerned’ is the academic subject (as defined by the QAA in 
subject benchmarking statements) within which the higher education provision that is being reviewed 
falls.  In other words, ‘specialist reviewers’ are identified as members of a specialised category of 
“current lecturers from HECs and FECs” “with current teaching experience” in a particular academic 
subject.  Lecturers who do not currently teach a specialised subject would, as such, not be 
recognised as specialist reviewers for that subject.  They would, presumably, not be recognised as 
peers (specialist peers?) in this sense and would fall outside this categorisation. 
 
However, there is another category of ‘specialist reviewer’ peer that does not require being a ‘current 
lecturer’ at all. Individuals who are recognised as having “experience of relevant professional or 
occupational practice” are identified as subject related ‘peers’.  This notion of ‘peer group’ draws a 
relationship between those who teach a specific academic subject within higher education institutions 
or further education colleges and those whose professional or occupational practice is seen as 
relevant to that subject.  This category of ‘reviewer’ may be outside the ‘lecturer peer group’ but 
inside the ‘practice relevant to a specific academic subject peer group’.  There could, for example be 
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a peer group of professional designers or lawyers, or accountants etc.  Of this group, some may 
apply to the QAA to become recognized as ‘specialist reviewers’.  Such recognition, presumably, 
establishes their identification as members of a further specialised peer group, determined by the 
QAA, which includes lecturers in an academic subject seen as relevant to a particular profession. 
 
Returning to the category of academic reviewer, the Handbook describes a second ‘type’, ‘Review 
Coordinators’.  Review Coordinators are not necessarily current lecturers in an identified academic 
subject.  They also do not necessarily have experience of professional practice relevant to an 
identified academic subject. As such, they seem to fall outside the peer group categories described 
so far.  Perhaps this is why the reader is told that peer review teams “include current lecturers from 
HECs and FECs” (Handbook: p2).  Whilst peer review teams ‘include’ current lecturers, they are not 
exclusively comprised of them and also include another category of ‘peer’ i.e. Review Coordinators. 
 
Review Coordinators, who lead academic reviews and have extensive experience of quality 
assurance and programme approval of HE programmes, usually gained by working with 
such procedures in more than one discipline. (Handbook: p28) 
 
Individuals, identified as ‘Review Coordinators’, could presumably be managers or consultants who 
have had “extensive experience of quality assurance” etc.  Whilst individuals within this category may 
have extensive experience of working within higher or further education institutions there seems to 
be no requirement for current teaching in any particular subject.  In fact, the description above seems 
to indicate a ‘usual’ requirement to have experience of quality assurance procedures across 
academic subjects (or disciplines).  In this sense, they are outside the notion of peer groups defined 
in relation to specific academic subjects.  If Review Coordinators are ‘peers’ then the group to which 
they belong includes all those with similar educational quality assurance experience.  The question 
might be, who else is inside this peer group? Are current lecturers and/or subject related 
professionals part of the peer group to which Review Coordinators, belong or not? The Handbook 
states that  
 
Review Coordinators are also recruited from individuals nominated by colleges, universities 
or other organisations, and from individuals who reply to advertisements.  They may be 
seconded or independent consultants.  It is expected that they possess extensive 
experience of HE and of the assurance of standards and quality. (Handbook: p30) 
 
The criteria of “extensive experience of HE” etc, describes how such individuals are identified, for 
example by reference to a Curriculum Vitae or ‘CV’.  However, it does not specifically identify the 
sense in which they represent a peer group relevant to the higher education provision being 
‘reviewed’.  Unless, that is, we broaden the category of the peer group to include all other categories 
that are described in the Handbook.  This would mean that current lecturers in HEIs or FECs, in any 
academic subject and/or professionals practicing in an occupation seen as relevant to any academic 
subject, as well as any individual with extensive experience of higher education quality assurance, 
would all be included as peers for the purpose of academic review.  This is certainly a rather broad 
and perhaps a rather meaningless description of a ‘peer group’, in that it is unclear what it is that is 
homogenous about the group.  Beyond, that is, being described as such within the Handbook. 
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The notion of ‘peer review’ alluded to within the Handbook seems to attempt to establish a range of 
positions from which individuals can, or cannot, be described as ‘peers’.  However, the description of 
QAA academic review as ‘peer review’ creates a (theoretically) clear opposition between individuals 
that are, potentially, described as ‘inside’ a peer group and those that are ‘outside’. 
 
There is another category of individual that is described in the Handbook that is explicitly excluded 
from membership of the review team.  The role of ‘subject review facilitator’ is clearly distinguished 
from that of the ‘academic reviewer team’. The relationship between these textual subjectivities 
constructed within the handbook is illustrated by the following extract. 
 
4  The Review Coordinator is responsible for the organisation and management of the  
 review. The subject provider is primarily responsible for ensuring that the review team 
 is provided with appropriate evidence to allow it to reach its judgements. The 
 facilitator's role is to ensure that the channels of communication between the two work 
 effectively. Discussions between the subject review facilitator and Review Coordinator 
 should ensure that the subject provider is aware of issues being addressed by the 
 reviewers and the evidence needed to clarify them. It would be helpful if colleges would 
 supply Review Coordinators with brief outlines of subject review facilitators' previous 
 experience and current roles.  
5  Throughout the course of a review, the subject review facilitator helps the reviewers to  
 come to a clear and accurate understanding of the structures, policies, priorities and  
 procedures of the institution, and the nature of the provision under scrutiny. S/he may 
 wish to bring additional information to the attention of the reviewers and may seek to 
 correct factual inaccuracy. It is for the reviewers, however, to decide how best to use 
 the information provided. The subject review facilitator is not a member of the team and 
 will not make judgments about the provision.  
6  The role requires the subject review facilitator to observe objectively, to communicate  
 clearly with the reviewers and the subject provider, to respect the protocols on 
 confidentiality outlined below, and to establish effective relationships with the Review 
 Coordinator and the team, as well as with the subject staff. Subject review facilitators 
 should refrain from acting as advocates for the subject provision under review. 
 However, they may legitimately:  
• assist the institution in understanding issues of concern to reviewers;  
• respond to requests for information and comment;  
• draw the reviewers' attention to matters that may have been overlooked;  
• identify the location of evidence;  
• provide advice on college matters. (Handbook: p48) 
 
This role seems to be a kind of mirror image of the Review Coordinator requiring “extensive 
knowledge and experience or working in HE in FECs (or HE) at a senior level” (Handbook p48). The 
role is also explicitly not related to an academic subject peer group as individuals should possess 
“qualifications and experience in a subject area other than that being reviewed” (Handbook p48).  
However, the main distinguishing factor in the description of the role seems to be that “The subject 
review facilitator is not a member of the team and will not make judgments about the provision” 
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(Handbook p48). The subject review facilitator is therefore outside the reviewer peer group as a 
consequence particularly of being excluded from making ‘judgments’. 
 
Within the context of QAA academic review the distinction or opposition between individuals who are 
empowered to make ‘judgments’ and those that are not establishes a hierarchical relationship 
between them. 
 
Individuals whose practice is being ‘reviewed’ are in some sense positioned as the ‘peers’ of those 
who are making ‘judgments’ about their practice.  However, only reviewer ‘peers’ are empowered to 
make such ‘judgments’.  Peers, who are not reviewers, are excluded from making judgments that 
establish the status of the higher education practice that is being reviewed. 
 
If we consider the two sets of oppositions that have been described in relation to the notion of ‘peer 
group’ membership and those in relation to authority status, we can consider four modes of review as 
seen in Figure 8 below. 
 
 
Authority relation to peer group Relation to peer group  
Non hierarchical Hierarchical 
Outsider Facilitation/therapy Inspection 
Insider Peer exchange Peer review 
 
F I G U R E  8 :  M O D E S  O F  R E V I E W  
 
D E S C R I B I N G  M O D E S  O F  R E V I E W   
The ‘facilitation/therapy mode of review describes the context of individuals outside an established 
peer group engaging with such a group (and/or individual member of a group) from a non-
judgmental, non-hierarchical non-authority status position.  The subject review facilitator role 
described in the Handbook  
 
requires the subject review facilitator to observe objectively, to communicate clearly with the 
reviewers and subject provider, to respect the protocols on confidentiality…and to establish 
effective relationships with the Review Coordinator and the team, as well as with the subject 
staff.  Subject review facilitators should refrain from acting as advocates for the subject 
provisions under review. (Handbook: p49) 
 
As such facilitators do not make interventions in the context of academic review, they do not make 
‘judgments’ and they are positioned outside the peer group as ‘objective’ observers. 
 
The mode of ‘peer exchange’ represents the non-judgmental, engagement of individuals recognised 
as ‘peers’.  No individual member of a peer group has authority to make ‘judgments’ about the 
members practice.  The engagement between peers is one of non-hierarchical exchange, perhaps 
akin to what Dowling has called ‘the myth of the academic community’ (Dowling, 2004). 
 
This mode is perhaps alluded to in the Handbook, as a key feature of academic review, described as  
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a process conducted in an atmosphere of mutual trust, the reviewers do not normally expect 
to find areas for improvement that the college has not identified in the self-evaluation 
(Handbook: p3) 
 
However, given the hierarchical status of reviewers, the ‘mutuality’ described is not one of equal 
exchange amongst peers.  The reader of the Handbook may be left wondering what the implications 
of not acquiescing to ‘an atmosphere of mutual trust’, or review finding areas for improvement not in 
the self-evaluation, might be. The mode of ‘peer exchange’ is also alluded to in Annex C of the 
Handbook, which describes the role of reviewers. 
 
9  The Agency not only tries to ensure that the particular experience of individual   
  reviewers is relevant to the reviews they undertake, but that, over time, each reviewer 
  works in a variety of teams scrutinising programmes in their specialism in a range of 
  colleges. There are significant benefits, both to the individuals and their colleges of  
  becoming a specialist reviewer. Participants evaluate the initial reviewer training as an 
  excellent opportunity for professional development. Current and former reviewers have 
  commented upon the opportunity to learn from review visits and peer reviewers as  
  invaluable to their own practice. They have also identified the sharing of dialogue with 
  peers from other colleges as being of great benefit. (Handbook: p29) 
 
The ‘opportunities to learn from peer review visits and peer reviewers’ and the ‘dialogue with peers’, 
sounds like a non-hierarchical engagement, from which reviewers have benefited.  The ‘peers’ seem 
to be other reviewers in the first instance and ‘non-reviewer peers’ from other colleges in the second.  
However, the ‘dialogue’ with non-reviewer peers is, at least potentially, hierarchical, in that any such 
dialogue could contribute to a reviewer judgment.  As such, the mode in the latter case may be more 
appropriately described as ‘peer review’. The Handbook indicates that 
 
8  The key purpose of acting as a specialist reviewer is to contribute to the maintenance 
  and enhancement of standards in HE by reporting to the Agency on the standards and 
  quality of the academic programmes scrutinised during academic reviews.  
 (Handbook: p29) 
 
In this context the interaction between reviewers and ‘peers’ (whose practice is being reviewed) is 
pedagogic, judgmental and hierarchical.  Whilst reviewers are described as ‘peers’ (and as such 
‘insiders’) their pedagogic role in reporting on, and enhancing, standards establishes a hierarchical 
relation with non-reviewer ‘peers’. This is the mode described above as ‘peer review’. 
 
The last mode presented by the model above is that of ‘outsider’ review in the context of a 
hierarchical relation.  Here, those that are not established as peers have the authority to make 
judgments.  This mode is here described as the ‘inspection’ mode of review.  The ‘objectivity’ of the 
facilitator is maintained by not being a member of the peer group whose practice is under review.  
However, in addition to this ‘objectivity’, the authority to make judgments establishes a hierarchical 
relation between those being ‘inspected’ and those ‘inspecting’. The role of Review Coordinator 
could to some extent, be described as demonstrating this mode of review.  Review Coordinators are 
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not required to be ‘subject specialists’ and are not, as such, members of subject related peer groups.  
As indicated above, if Review Coordinators are ‘peers’ it seems rather unclear to which peer group 
they belong.  However, Review Coordinators’ major roles are described as “managing reviews and 
writing reports” (Handbook: p30). 
 
18  All academic reviews consist of four main activities:  
• preparation for review;  
• visits to the subject provider;  
• analysis of documentary evidence;  
• report writing.  
Each Review Coordinator is responsible for maintaining an overview of the range and 
balance of these activities, and for helping the specialist reviewers to apportion their 
time effectively. The achievement of an appropriate balance between the various 
activities requires planning in advance of, and coordination throughout, the review. 
Above all, it is essential that it enables the reviewers to develop a robust evidence base 
on which to make judgments. (Handbook: p31) 
 
On the one hand, Review Coordinators have the authority to write the Final (judgment) Report with 
editorial responsibilities for reviewer judgment statements.  On the other hand, Review Coordinators 
manage the process and do not themselves, in theory, make judgments.  However, there is a clear 
hierarchy in that the Review Coordinator manages the reviewers who have the authority to make 
review judgments. As such, Review Coordinators, as described in the Handbook, would seem, at 
least to some extent, to demonstrate an ‘inspection mode’ of review. 
 
The following section will attempt to analyse the extent to which the recontextualisation of higher 
education practice through it description in the handbook, as a discursively constructed textual 
object, constitutes a commodified mode of discursive objectification. 
 
Modes of discursive objectification and the Handbook 
Chapter three described modes of discursive objectification, these are again summarised in the table 
below (previously listed as Figure 6). 
 
Discursive exchange Objectification 
 Open Closed 
Singular Aesthetic Iconic/symbolic 
Homogeneous Commodified Institutional 
 
Within the Handbook ‘higher education’ is described and as such constructed, as a textual ‘object’. 
The Handbook constructs this (higher education) object as a thing, the quality of which, can be 
determined by Reviewers judgements, relating to ‘evidence’ gathered in the context of the 
bureaucratic procedures of Academic Review. 
 
Higher education is not described, within the Handbook, as that which is intrinsically valuable, as its 
value is explicitly related to the public investment. To this extent, the Handbook positions higher 
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education as that which is exchangeable for public investment. The ultimate ’authority’ in the 
construction of this ‘object’ that is referred to within the Handbook is that  
 
HEFCE has a statutory responsibility to ensure that provision is made for assessing the 
quality of the education it funds and has a responsibility for reporting to government on 
standards and quality (Handbook p.1) 
 
Within the Handbook, Academic Review, as the method designed to measure the quality of higher 
education, is explicitly focussed on ‘the students learning experience’. It is concerned with the 
‘appropriateness’ of stated aims and the intended learning outcomes of higher education courses. It 
is also concerned with the ‘effectiveness’ of curricular content, assessment arrangements, teaching, 
academic support and learning resources in providing opportunities for achieving intended learning 
outcomes. The description of the mechanisms to be employed to measure the quality of higher 
education, in the context of Academic Review, serves to objectify ‘higher education’. The methods 
used to measure ‘higher education’ determine the nature of the object measured. Here, the idea of 
the commodification of higher education can be described by reference to the modes of its 
objectification within the Handbook, indicated within the discursive space above. 
 
Within the Handbook, ‘higher education’ could be read as that which is positioned as ‘singular’. That 
is, that which is uniquely, individually or perhaps ‘charismatically’ authored (in Dowling’s sense) by 
each individual institution, or practitioner, or participant. From an institutional perspective one of the 
key features of Academic Review is ‘self evaluation’. Institutions providing higher education can 
(indeed have to) set their own aims and intended learning outcomes for higher education courses. 
The ‘aide-memoire for academic review’ states that ‘it is not intended to be exhaustive or 
prescriptive’ (Handbook: p16). This seems to indicate a non-regulated and ‘open’ description of 
higher education practice. On this reading, ‘higher education’ is whatever each individual institution 
describes it as. The Academic Review process is not seeking compliance or conformity but rather a 
self-critical approach to the evaluation of whatever it is that each institution wishes to describe as 
higher education. It is interesting to note that at the point in the text where the notion of “the 
appropriateness of the intended learning outcomes in relation to the overall aims of the provision” 
(Handbook: p18) is introduced in the ‘aide-mémoire’, the text switches the overt target audience, 
from ‘Guidance for Colleges when preparing self-evaluations’, to ‘Guidance for review teams’. It is at 
this point that it is made clear that Reviewers will be considering  
 
the extent to which they  [aims and intended learning outcomes] are aligned with external 
reference points, including the FHEQ [Framework for Higher Education 
Qualifications]…[and]…are aligned with and informed by, relevant subject benchmarking 
statements… (Handbook: p18) 
 
On the one hand, the QAA are not instructing institutions to ensure that the way they describe higher 
education complies with the ‘Academic Infrastructure’. On the other hand, the Handbook text, while 
directly addressing review teams, makes it very clear that Reviewers will be making judgements the 
result of which will be determined by the extent to which aims and intended learning outcomes are 
‘aligned with’, or ‘informed by’, pre-determined bureaucratic descriptions of higher education. This 
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would seem to signify a tension, or at least a dynamic between the guidance given to colleges and 
the guidance given to Reviewers. 
 
Higher education ‘is’ (within the context of the Handbook), something that can be described 
differentially in relation to its associated quality as evidenced in differing instances of its provision. At 
least in one sense, the notion of measuring (‘reviewing’, ‘making judgements about’) the quality of 
higher education provision implies that it is possible to draw comparisons between different things 
that can, although different, be comparably described. The Handbook does not for example; offer the 
review method described as an appropriate way to measure the quality of education in schools or 
other educational contexts. The ‘object’ under its gaze is clearly described as that which is directly 
funded by HEFCE and delivered by FECs.  
 
This Handbook describes the method and procedures for carrying out the review of directly 
funded HE provision in FECs in England (Handbook: p1) 
 
The existence and identification of ‘higher education’ as a comparable thing (or object) that exists 
within different institutions, is that which facilitates the comparability of various instances of higher 
education provision in the context of Academic Review. This identification of individual instances of 
‘higher education’ is facilitated, through the descriptions of higher education in the Handbook and 
elsewhere within the Academic Infrastructure’, as well as in judgements in Final Report documents 
that determine the ‘approved’ (or otherwise) status of that which it describes. Within the Handbook 
higher education ‘is’, for example, that which can be described in terms of aims and intended 
learning outcomes. Higher education that is not described in this way cannot be ‘Reviewed’ and is 
excluded from the description, or identification, of higher education and is not therefore recognised 
as such. Similarly, higher education that is not described in relation to ‘academic subjects’ available 
as subject benchmarking documents within the ‘Academic Infrastructure’, also cannot gain 
recognition. However, the descriptions of ‘higher education’ within the Handbook and the Academic 
Infrastructure are not positioned as a ‘singularisation’ or an identification of unique instances of 
higher education, rather as a homogeneous description of something (higher education) to facilitate 
its comparable measurement.  
 
Final (judgement) Reports are, however, clearly singularised descriptions of higher education as they 
represent formal recognition of an individual institution’s higher education provision in identified 
subjects as of ‘approved’ (or otherwise) status. The form of exchange described in the Handbook in 
the context of Final Report production is ‘closed’, regulated and euphemistic. It is closed, in one 
sense, in that only those who are recognised as ‘Reviewers’ can make ‘judgements’, providers are 
explicitly excluded from the ‘judgment meetings’ at which judgments are made. In addition, as 
indicated above, ‘providers are only given the opportunity to comment upon ‘matters of factual 
accuracy’ and not on Reviewers judgments. As such, the process described in relation to Final 
Report production is not one of ‘open exchange’ but rather one in which one type of participant 
(those who are formally recognised as Reviewers) regulates, or controls exchange. It could perhaps 
be argued that the exchange is ‘explicit’, in that the process is openly described within the Handbook, 
although, as indicated above, the Handbook does not explicitly exchange status for compliance. 
Rather, the Handbook explicitly states that the purpose of Academic review is to  
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secure value from public investment through ensuring that all education for which funding is 
provided is of approved quality…to enable judgements to inform funding decisions. 
(Handbook: p1) 
 
In this sense, the nature of the exchange described within the Handbook, only euphemistically 
alludes to status or indeed compliance. For example, the ‘rate of exchange’ between status and 
compliance is alluded to in references to the provision of “effective and accessible public information 
on the quality of HE” (Handbook: p1).  
 
In the context of the Handbook therefore, ‘higher education’, where it is funded by HEFCE as a 
governmental body, is not a thing, the exchange of which is entirely open. It is rather positioned as a 
thing that is regulated and at least partially governed by a euphemistic ‘closed’ exchange between 
the (UK) Government and providing institutions. The Handbook describes a process whereby higher 
education providers are required to define their specific institutional (subject departmental) higher 
education practice in accordance with a pre-determined and highly structured framework. In addition 
to the Handbook itself, in which the ‘advice’ concerning appropriate aims and intended learning 
outcomes etc., there is explicit reference to other texts collectively described as the ‘Academic 
Infrastructure’. This provides, according to the Handbook, ‘nationally agreed reference points’ 
developed “in consultation with providers of HE” (Handbook: p11) 
 
the reference points are provided to assist reviewers in determining whether provision is 
meeting the standards expected by the academic community generally, for awards of a 
particular type and level (Handbook: p.7) 
 
The phrase ‘the standards expected by the academic community generally’ is interesting. It seems to 
associate higher education with that which is related to the regulated ‘standards’ (closed exchange), 
which are ‘expected’ (presumably because they are ‘nationally agreed’) by a homogeneous 
conception of ‘the academic community’. This description identifies higher education as constructed 
through an ‘institutional’ mode of discursive objectification. 
 
It is perhaps the ‘Academic Infrastructure’ itself (described in the Handbook) in this instance, which is 
singularised and sacrilised through an iconic/symbolic mode of discursive objectification. As the 
‘consecrated’ source of ‘nationally agreed reference points’ that establishes the ‘standards’ of higher 
education, the ‘Academic Infrastructure’ is positioned as the benchmark of symbolic value. It is the 
canon, in relation to which other higher education practice will be judged, or perhaps recognised. 
 
The Handbook makes explicit reference to one of its main purposes as  
 
to provide, through the publication of reports, effective and accessible public information on 
the quality of HE. (Handbook: p.1) 
 
In addition the Handbook describes arrangements for Teaching Quality Information (TQI) (p.12) on a 
publicly accessible website, where reports on the quality of higher education provision are available 
in addition to the QAA’s own website. The described intention to publish these reports for a public 
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audience, is described as being designed “to encourage improvements in the quality of education…” 
(Handbook: p1) 
 
It is possible that this ‘main purpose’ of the review process, although not further elaborated within the 
text, alludes to the assumption that ‘the quality of education’ will be improved by encouraging public 
choice in relation to higher education providers. Perhaps it might be intended that standardised 
(homogeneous) information, that is openly available, might create a competitive incentive towards 
the differentiated public recognition of the quality of higher education provision. Here, potentially at 
least, the idea of public choice facilitates ‘open exchange’, through the comparability of ‘higher 
education’ provided by different institutions and as such, constructs higher education as a 
commodified discursive object. However, this relation is only present within the Handbook by 
implication. It is left ambiguous and non-explicit serving to exclude audiences from access to a 
possible strategic objectification by maintaining a euphemistic or closed exchange. 
 
However, the product of the quality review process as described in the Handbook is a public report 
describing the quality of higher education provision in a particular subject at a particular institution. 
This is a recontextualisation of higher education practice within an individual institution. These 
reports are produced within a standardised, regularised format, which provides a means of 
establishing an explicit statement of ‘the quality’ and ‘the value’ of identified practice comparable with 
other higher education available in other institutions. This could be described as a commodifying 
move opening exchange practice, in the context of a homogenised description of higher education.  
 
There is one explicit reference to ‘the academic community’ within the text (p7) as indicated above. 
The text does not make clear what it is constituting as the ‘the academic community’ or indeed what 
might be meant by ‘the academic community generally’. It certainly seems likely to be a fairly 
inclusive idea if it is meant to describe all those who are in any way engaged with the practice of 
higher education. As has been indicated above, if this is the case then it may be difficult to envisage 
what it is that they have in common. It is possible that the idea of ‘the academic community’ could 
potentially allude to open and explicit discursive exchange between academic peers as a form of 
what Dowling might call ‘liberal’ authority action. In other words, where no hierarchy of authority is 
established between the different discursive products of academics. If higher education discursive 
practices (or perhaps products) are homogeneously described as the open exchange of equally 
comparable ideas, then this could represent a commodified objectification. Whilst this may seem 
counterintuitive to some, it is the case that the marketability of higher education discursive products 
requires a means of establishing their comparability. However, it is also the case that academic 
discursive exchange can also be regulated by institutional descriptions of higher education. The 
allusion to ‘the academic community’ within the Handbook is recruited as the non-present author of 
the ‘expected standards’ of ‘higher education’. The reference to ‘the academic community’ within the 
Handbook is here being used as a proxy for the highly specialised descriptions of higher education 
published by the QAA, not homogeneous open discursive exchange. 
 
Figure 9 below maps the distribution of the various forms of description of higher education within the 
Handbook text that constitute the dynamic strategic relations between modes of discursive 
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F I G U R E  9 :  T H E  D Y N A M I C  D I S T R I B U T I O N  O F  D I S C U R S I V E  O B J E C T S  I N   
T H E  H A N D B O O K  F O R  A C A D E M I C  R E V I E W  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to construct an elaborated description of the QAA Academic Review 
Handbook as an empirical source relevant to questions concerning the extent to which it can be 
described as an instance of the (re)production and/or resistance of the idea of the commodification of 
higher education. The methodology employed has employed discursive spaces concerning modes of 
review and discursive objectification as mechanisms for generating coherent and comprehensive 
descriptions of how the text is operating to strategically recontextualise higher education practice. 
The analysis has attempted to describe how strategic position takings constitute subjectivities and 
objectivities in dynamic relation to each other constructing a discursively complex utterance. This 




From this perspective, the Handbook can be described as significantly resisting the commodified 
mode as a consequence of the closed nature of the regulated exchange it instances in most cases. 
The significantly bureaucratic nature of the discursive objectification of higher education described 
within the Handbook text seems to be more coherently described as an instance of ‘institutional’ 
objectification, although, it does seem clear that the nature of the exchange, described within the 
Handbook, is concerned with ‘iconic/symbolic’ objectification, as singularised instances of that which 
is published in Final Reports. Descriptions within the Handbook that can be associated with 
‘aesthetic’ objectification, seem limited to allusions to the process of academic production in the use 
of the term ‘peer review’. If academic production constitutes ‘aesthetic’ objectivities, then the 
recognition that is established through peer review processes provides an ‘iconic/symbolic’ 
objectification of academic products. It is this model that seems to be alluded to within the Handbook, 
where individual higher education providers are positioned as authors of singularised descriptions of 
higher education, in the context of open exchange. Here, the Academic Review methodology 
described within the Handbook would only represent a means of formally recognising each singular 
instance. However, as has been argued above, the strongly institutionalised structuring of all 
potential ‘individual’ descriptions of higher education ‘by’ providers in self-evaluation documents 
strongly regulates that which can be described as higher education. As an aside, this may of course 
also be equally true of peer review process in other contexts. 
 
Lastly, the commodified mode only seems to be (re)produced in relation to the explicit reference to 
‘value from public investment’. However, the Handbook, as a highly elaborated description of the 
mechanisms for establishing such value, does not seem to constitute an instance of open exchange 
and may not therefore, be coherently described as an instance of the commodified objectification of 
higher education. Similarly, the references to ‘public and objective information’ (allied with the 
Teaching Quality Information initiative in the Handbook) do not, in themselves, constitute an open 
exchange. By way of example, and extending the object text to include previous Review Handbooks, 
the methodology for describing (or ranking) individual institutions’ higher education provision has 
moved away from the system of numerical ‘scoring’ out of 24
2
 to a textual system. This system 
results in judgements of ‘confidence’, ‘limited confidence’ and ‘no confidence’ in academic standards, 
and ‘commendable’, ‘approved’ or ‘failing’ judgements in the quality of learning opportunities. Whilst 
the QAA may argue that this development is a more appropriate means to describe individual 
instances of higher education quality, it is also a somewhat less explicit mechanism for ranking the 
‘value’ of higher education. Judgements of ‘confidence’, ‘limited confidence’ etc are euphemistic 
descriptions of value that are less explicitly exchangeable or comparable than numerical values. This 
could, as such, be described as a move away from a commodified mode of objectification towards a 
more ‘iconic/symbolic’ or perhaps ‘institutional’ mode. 
 
The analysis of the Handbook describing modes of discursive objectification seems to be a 
productive mechanism for considering the resistance and/or (re)production of the idea of the 
commodification of higher education. The constructive approach adopted here not only provides a 
more elaborated description beyond a one dimensional binary opposition (for example, use-
value/exchange-value) but also facilitates a description of the dynamic structuring of discursive 
objectivities as they are (re)produced within texts.  
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L O C A T I N G  T H E  W H I T E  P A P E R  I N  T H E  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  F I E L D  
The object text for analysis in this chapter is the UK Government White Paper, The Future of Higher 
Education (DfES: 2003). The White Paper describes existing ’strengths’ of higher education but also 
identifies ‘risks and challenges’ that need to be met to avoid decline. It proposes higher education 
reforms to “renew and expand our higher education system for the next generation” (DfES: 2003, 
p3). The proposals described within the White Paper are wide-ranging and are planned to be 
implemented over a four-year period between 2003 and 2007. They include; building on perceived 
strengths in ‘world class research’; encouraging universities to “play a bigger role in creating jobs and 
prosperity”; rewarding excellent teaching; expanding higher education to meet identified national 
needs; ensuring that access to higher education is fair; reforming higher education funding to enable 
universities to have greater control of a variety of funding streams, including the introduction of 
variable tuition fees. As a White Paper, the text is designed to introduce specific proposals for new 
legislation and to persuade parliament of the merit of such proposals.  
 
A N  O V E R V I E W  O F  T H E  M E T H O D  O F  A N A L Y S I S   
In describing the higher education discursive field, chapter two described Foucaultian ‘technologies 
of truth’ following Simola et al (1998) which included ‘technologies of self’, ‘technologies of 
government’ and ‘technologies of discourse’. This chapter will focused on the analysis of The Future 
of Higher Education White Paper as an example of a text related to ‘technologies of government’. 
The White Paper describes an official rationale for governmental action and change in the field of 
higher education. The White Paper describes ‘why’ the Government is right to implement change in 
higher education provision. The text employs an elaborated language of governmental practice to 
construct ‘higher education’. It is constructed as that which is required for the achievement of 
rationally planned national objectives such as economic prosperity and social cohesion.  
 
I argue that one of the significant ways in which, the White Paper operates to construct higher 
education as ‘governmental practice’ is to create oppositions and alliances between specific ‘authors’ 
and ‘audiences’ such as the Department of Education and Skills and Higher Education Institutions. In 
other words, the specific nature of the description of higher education (re)produced within the White 
Paper, is determined by what is included and what is excluded in the construction of such 
oppositions and alliances. I will not be arguing that the description of higher education within the 
White Paper is right or wrong but I will rather seeking to generate a description of ‘how’ it is operating 
within the higher education field. 
 
As a consequence of the identification of oppositions and alliances within the White Paper, I will 
construct a discursive space from oppositions concerning ‘modes of higher education participation. I 
will not seek to establish concrete instances of each mode but will rather be concerned with the 
dynamic relations between modes. The relational discursive space constructed however, will 
comprehensively contain all possible variables in consideration of the oppositions used to construct 
the space. In this instance the oppositions identified within the text will be firstly, ‘unregulated’ and 
‘regulated’
3
 access to higher education and secondly, categories of participants that are ‘open’ or 
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‘closed’. I will then recontextualise this analysis and the oppositions and alliances identified as a 
consequence of it, in relation to the discursive space, previously described in chapter three, that is 
concerned with modes of discursive objectification. This space is constructed by considering the 
dynamic relations between two oppositions; singular/homogeneous objectification and open/closed 
discursive exchange. As one of the modes of discursive objectification described is the ‘commodified 
mode’ this space can be employed to describe how and the extent to which, the object text is 
operating in this mode. In other words, I argue that the analysis of the specific description of higher 
education within the White Paper can be employed to construct a relatively coherent description of 
the extent to which the text operates to (re)produce or resist the idea of the commodification of 
higher education. 
 
To summarise, the method of analysis in this chapter will produce a ‘constructive description’ 
including: 
 
1. The introduction to the location of the White Paper within the higher education field  
2. An overview of the authorial and audience voices constructed in my transaction with the White 
Paper (reconstructed in the reader’s transaction with this text) 
3. An analysis of how the White Paper is operating to recontextualise ‘higher education practice’ as 
governmental practice. 
4. The identification and analysis of oppositions and alliances within the White Paper to construct a 
specialised and localised mode of action – modes of higher education participation. 
5. The recontexualisation of oppositions and alliances described in the analysis (items 1-4 above) 
in relation to modes of discursive objectification. 
6. An analysis of the dynamics of the distribution and exclusion of textual objects in relation to 
modes of discursive objectification, including the extent to which the text is operating in the 
commodified mode. 
 
The modes of higher education participation discursive space will be constructed directly from 
oppositions and alliances that emerge from my reading of the White Paper. This mode of action will 
be used to generate an ‘elaborated description’ (see Brown and Dowling: 1998) of how the text is 
operating to recontextualise higher education practice. This will then be further recontextualised to 
attempt to produce a description of the extent to which the White Paper is operating to (re)produce 
and/or resist the idea of its commodification in relation to modes of discursive objectification. 
 
Authorial and audience voices in the White Paper 
The Future of Higher Education White Paper (as object text) is here described as an instance of 
socio-cultural activity that operates to construct oppositions and alliances including those of author 
and audience. This could also be read as an individualising practice. The establishment of who is 
(and who is not) authorised to speak in the production of a description of ‘the future of higher 
education’ is, in itself, a construction that determines the shape of the higher education object being 
(re)produced within the text. The bureaucratic and symbolic context of a UK Government White 
Paper position this text in relation to other Command Papers, which include established textual forms 
and governmental practices that serve to claim authority. The fact that such texts are explicitly 
described as being ‘by Command of Her Majesty’ provides the ultimate governmental authority from 
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the (symbolic) head of state. This however, does not position ‘Her Majesty’ as an authorial voice but 
rather explicitly affiliates the UK Government with ‘Her Majesty’ to establish the authority vested in it 
by the Head of State, to describe matters of state. In this case, a formal description of higher 
education policy. The UK Government is, however, clearly positioned as the prime authorial voice. 
 
This White Paper declares our intention to take the tough decisions on higher education, to 
deal with student finance for the long term, to open up access to our universities, and to 
allow them to compete with the best. We seek a partnership between students, government, 
business and the universities to renew and expand our higher education system for the next 
generation. (DfES: 2003, p3) 
 
Here the use of the words ‘our intention’ signifies both collective ownership of the description of 
higher education being presented by the UK Government as well as an ability and willingness to act 
to bring about change. However, the text also strategically positions the Government as a partner 
with students, business and the universities, perhaps inviting a reading that sees each partner as 
being affiliated with the project of reconstructing higher education. This can be read as an attempt to 
reinforce the Government’s explicit and established symbolic and governmental authority by 
promoting the idea that the proposals being presented will construct a space for those listed as 
partners in the enterprise to speak.  
 
Whilst the text identifies the DfES as the producer of the White Paper, it is the UK Government that is 
positioned as the prime authorial voice, the body which is authorised to speak about what higher 
education ‘is’, what it ‘should’ or ‘must be’. For example,  
 
Higher education must expand to meet rising skill needs. (DfES: 2003, p4) 
 
Higher education should be a choice open to everyone with the potential to benefit – 
including older people in the workforce who want to update their skills. (DfES: 2003, p17) 
 
The Government is also positioned as the body that has the authority to act to “take the tough 
decisions on higher education” (DfES: 2003, p3). It must be noted however, that some of these 
instances, ‘we must’, ‘we need’, ‘we should’, etc are employed to both signify a statement of 
Government policy and also to attempt to broaden the collective noun to include, and to affiliate the 
intended audience(s) identified by the text, with the policy being promoted. For example, 
 
We must take this opportunity to lay the foundations for the reforms, which will transform the 
future of the sector. (DfES: 2003, p21) 
 
To some extent, the audience for the White Paper is determined by the established textual form of 
this kind of Command paper. ‘The Future of Higher Education’ (similarly with other White Papers) 
indicates on its title page that it is “presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State…” (DfES: 
2003). As such Parliament, as a socially and culturally constituted body, is identified as a specific 
audience by the text. By extension, it is also clear that Members of Parliament are (collectively and 
individually) also positioned as audience within the text. The White Paper also specifically identifies, 
in its ’Scope’ section at the front of the document, that 
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It sets out a vision for all Higher Education in England, including in Universities, University 
Colleges, Colleges of Higher Education, Colleges of Further Education, and other 
institutions. (DfES: 2003, frontispiece) 
 
The text also describes how the Government is seeking a ‘partnership’ to implement the proposed 
reforms. 
 
We [the Government] seek a partnership between students, government, business and the 
universities to renew and expand our higher education system for the next generation. 
(DfES: 2003, p3) 
 
Much later in the document the White Paper describes a range of other organisations as key 
partners to which the proposals are addressed. 
 
…we will hold regional workshops involving universities and colleges, key partners such as 
HEFCE, the LSC and the Teacher Training Agency, and other bodies such as Universities 
UK, the Standing Conference of Principals and the NUS. We shall also invite a wide range of 
other key partners, such as Connexions personal advisers (DfES: 2003, p94) 
 
The use of the words ‘partners’ or ‘partnership’ in the above examples can be read to signify the 
potential for all those identified as partners to be afforded a voice in determining how higher 
education is reformed, or perhaps to share in the implementation of proposals. The majority of these 
‘partners’ have social and cultural identities outside their employment within the White Paper, that 
constitute symbolic authorities. The positioning of these audience voices as partners operates to 
align these authorities with the description of higher education being promoted within the text. In 
other words, the invitation for an audience, that is identified as a (potential) partner in the enterprise 
to reform higher education as described in the White Paper, is, itself, part of the description of higher 
education being proposed. Here it is less that an audience voice is being identified and more that a 
specific description of higher education, as that which includes partnerships with the identified 
groups, is being constructed. 
 
It might be argued that this is not the case where the identified audience actually has a voice. For 
example, the White Paper proposes that students contribute to an ‘Annual Student Survey’ on the 
quality of learning and teaching in higher education. The Government describes their plans to drive 
up the quality of teaching and enhance student choice by conducting this survey. 
 
Student choice will increasingly work to drive up quality, supported by much better 
information. A comprehensive survey of student views, as well as published external 
examiners reports and other information about teaching standards, will be pulled together in 
an easy-to-use Guide to Universities, overseen by the National Union of Students.  
(DfES: 2003, p46) 
 
‘Students’ may be able to act as authors in the context of the planned survey scheme, by providing 
individual evaluations of the quality of the teaching they have received. This potential authorship 
however, does not affect the positioning of this category of audience within the text. Such student 
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responses would in any case be produced in response to descriptions of ‘higher education’ that 
include principles that they have not themselves constructed. The description of ‘students’ within the 
White Paper is aligned with the idea that student choice will drive up quality in higher education. A 
subjectivity is constructed called ‘students’ and they are described as those whose choices operate 
to raise the quality of higher education. Similarly higher education is constructed as that which can 
be raised in quality though the operation of student choice. Here the construction of the audience 
voice (students) is determined by the reciprocal construction of a specific description of higher 
education. As such, this category of audience is subjectified by the construction of a specific higher 
education ‘object’ within the text. 
 
“ Y O U R  O P P O R T U N I T Y  T O  T E L L  U S  W H A T  Y O U  T H I N K ”  
The White Paper explicitly identifies a range of audiences in a section entitled ‘Your opportunity to 
tell us what to think’. This section outlines the ways in which identified audiences can get access to 
the document and describes an opportunity for these audiences to comment on the Government 
proposals. 
 
After the launch of the document there will be a period for comment, in which the 
Government will be engaging in a wide-ranging dialogue with those who provide higher 
education and those who benefit from it. (DfES: 2003, p93) 
 
It is clear that there are two categories of audience outside the requirements of the formal 
parliamentary procedures associated with a White Paper. The description of an audience category 
as ‘those who benefit from’ higher education positions all those who engage with higher education as 
benefiting from it. In other words, higher education is described as that which if engaged with, will 
provide benefit. The audience category oppositions here would be ‘those who do not provide higher 
education’ and ‘those who do not benefit from it’. There is no category of audience described within 
the text that constitutes ‘those who have engaged with higher education but have not benefited from 
it’; this category of audience is excluded from (by) the text. This is in fact a central plank of the 
proposal being promoted to legitimise the reform of tuition fees for higher education described within 
the White Paper. Higher education is described in the text as something for which it is legitimate to 
charge fees to those who are identified as having benefited from it. These descriptions of ‘higher 
education’ have operated to construct a category of subjectivity (those who benefit from higher 
education) that is explicitly positioned as an audience by the text. 
 
The White Paper also identifies wider categories of audience for the proposals - ‘young people’ and 
‘parents’. 
 
We have published alongside the strategy document an information leaflet, intended 
primarily for students, potential students and their families, which summarises the main 
proposals…We want to reach as many young people as possible. We will make copies of 
both documents available to schools and colleges, as well as placing the full document and 
the information leaflet for young people on the Young People’s Website 
(www.dfes.gov.uk/youngpeople)…We want parents to join in the debate too and are 
encouraging this by using the Parents’ Website (www.dfes.gov.uk/parents), where parents 
will find the full document and the summary version. (DfES: 2003, p94) 
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This description excludes students who are not young people as an audience. This is perhaps a 
strange exclusion given the descriptions of higher education expansion, ‘widening participation’ and 
‘lifelong learning’ in higher education within the text. Similarly, the identification of students’ or 
potential students’ families as an audience for the text, seems to exclude other families that do not 
include students or potential students. Clearly if you are not involved in parliamentary processes or in 
one of the higher education provider related organisations and are not either a ‘young person’ or 
‘parent’ you are not positioned as an audience by the White Paper text. ‘The Future of Higher 
Education’ White Paper, in describing the various audiences with which the Government explicitly 
wishes to engage in dialogue with concerning its proposals, constructs higher education in such a 
way as to exclude a range of audience voices. On this reading, the future of higher education is 
largely a matter for Government, for higher education providers and for young people, who either are 
students or are potential students, and their parents. Even business, which is described as being 
sought as a partner in the Foreword section of the text, is not included in the description of audiences 
who are invited to engage in dialogue during the ‘period for comment’. It is not clear if this is a 
strategically deployed construction within the text or an inherent contradiction in the proposals for 
higher education reform being proposed. In either case, it can be described as having strategic 
significance in the recontextualisation of higher education. 
 
The recontextualisation of higher education as governmental practice 
This section will attempt to provide an overview of some of the ways in which the White paper 
recontextualises higher education practices as governmental practice. The socio-cultural activity that 
the White Paper is concerned with is the practice of higher education. As indicated above, the 
construction of authorial and audience voices (for example) within the White Paper is bound up in the 
construction of higher education as a textual object. I argue that the White Paper employs an 
elaborated language of governmental and parliamentary practice to construct a description of higher 
education practice as rationally planned strategic governmental policy. I argue that this text is 
‘governmental’ in that it operates ‘to structure the field of action for others’ (Simola et al 1998). The 
text can be read as an instance of disciplining practice that demarcates what is included and what is 
excluded in the description of higher education practice with the full force and sanction of the State.  
 
The White Paper as such describes intended actions to change, or ‘reform’ the practice of higher 
education in the UK. In order to chart the journey to the future (of higher education) the text seeks to 
establish the current state of play (in 2003). The text first describes higher education ‘as it is’ from the 
Government’s perspective. In doing this, the text inevitably includes some potential descriptions of 
higher education and excludes others. Similarly, in describing what higher education ‘is’ the text 
either explicitly or implicitly describes what it is not, constructing the oppositions that form the basis 
of the specific description produced. For example, the chapter entitled ‘The need for reform’ the 
White Paper opens with a statement of the values being associated with higher education. 
 
 Values 
1.1 Higher education is a great national asset. Its contribution to the economic and social 
well-being of the nation is of vital importance. 
1.2 Its research pushes back the frontiers of human knowledge and is the foundation of 
human progress. Its teaching educates and skills the nation for a knowledge-dominated age. 
It gives graduates both personal and intellectual fulfilment. Working with business, it powers 
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the economy, and its graduates are crucial to the public services. And wide access to higher 
education makes for a more enlightened and socially just society. 
1.3 In a fast-changing and increasingly competitive world, the role of higher education in 
equipping the labour force with appropriate and relevant skills, in stimulating innovation and 
supporting productivity and in enriching the quality of life is central. The benefits of an 
excellent higher education system are far-reaching; the risk of decline is one that we cannot 
accept. (DfES: 2003, p10) 
 
This excerpt represents a description of higher education recontextualised as governmental practice 
and will be the main focus of the analysis for this section. The aim here is not to say that the 
description presented within the White Paper is wrong or that higher education can be described 
differently, rather, the point is that the inclusions and exclusions of possible descriptions of higher 
education have strategic significance in recontextualising higher education practice as governmental 
practice.  
 
If we consider the ‘values’ excerpt above the use of the word ‘asset’ (in 1.1) can be read to signify 
firstly, ‘something that is useful and contributes to the success of something’ (MSN Encarta 2008). 
So higher education can be read as being described as useful to the success of ‘the nation’, ‘the 
economy’ and ‘social well-being’. Secondly, an asset can be ‘a property to which a value can be 
assigned’ (MSN Encarta 2008). So higher education can be read as being described as the property 
of the nation to which value can be assigned.  
 
In the White Paper excerpt above we are told that higher education is ‘of vital importance’ and its 
‘vitalness’ and ‘importance’ are then indicated by a list of attributes that are associated with it. These 
include a rather modernist claim about how higher education research ‘is the foundation of human 
progress’. We would of course only need to refer to the work of Lyotard (1984) to establish that there 
are other ways to describe the production of knowledge that this particular ‘grand narrative’ excludes. 
It could however be read as aligning with similarly modernist approaches to rational planning to bring 
about future change inherent in governmental practice. 
 
The Government is positioned by the text as having the authority to use this valuable ‘asset’ in the 
interests of the nation as a consequence of the power invested in it through its recognition as the 
elected Government, subject to approval through established judicial and Parliamentary procures. 
The White Paper, as a Government policy document, is marketing its proposals in advance of the 
commencement of formal legislative procedures. 
 
In 2003–04 the Government will be introducing legislation to underpin the proposals in the 
Strategy Document. (DfES: 2003, p94) 
 
In addition to the authority of the Government to bring forward legislative proposals to Parliament the 
text also makes it clear that 
 
the Government will continue to pay most of the cost involved in studying for a degree 




The Government is reversing years of under-investment with an increase in funding for 
higher education averaging more than 6 per cent – over and above inflation – for the next 
three years. (DfES: 2003, p5) 
 
In this context the UK Government is describing higher education as something that it has control 
over and has the authority to fund and determine the future of. This of course implicitly excludes the 
description of higher education as a socio-cultural practice, the future of which cannot be controlled, 
or might occur outside the scope of Government funding. It also excludes those aspects of the 
practice that are not subject (or not wholly subject) to planned changes in legislation. There is as 
such, a non-explicit presumption underpinning the text that the future of higher education, and its 
impacts upon the economy and the social well being of the nation, can (and should) be planned.  
 
The alignment between higher education and its role in educating and skilling the nation for a 
‘knowledge-dominated age’ could be read as associating knowledge production with the national 
economy. For example, the Foreword by Charles Clarke states that 
 
we have to make better progress in harnessing knowledge to wealth creation.  
(DfES: 2003, p2) 
 
In fact this is identified as the second of three main ‘areas where our universities have to improve’ 
(DfES: 2003, p2). The term ‘knowledge economy’ within the text, both of which relate higher 
education to the development of a skilled workforce. The term ‘knowledge transfer’ is related to 
associations between higher education and business innovation. The term, ‘knowledge exchange’ is 
associated, in the text, with a proposal to fund higher education institutions to support the transfer of 
technologies and knowledge to the business sector. These descriptions align higher education and 
the production of knowledge with economic production or ‘wealth creation’. They also describe 
knowledge (at least the form of it associated with higher education) as something that can be 
‘transferred’ to, or ‘exchanged’ with, the business sector. There are of course other principled 
descriptions of the value of higher education (see chapter one) that would be in opposition to this 
description. This form of description could also read as euphemistic, in that it avoids other possible 
more explicit descriptions, such as selling higher education products or services to business. 
 
The ‘values’ text above also states that higher education ‘gives graduates both personal and 
intellectual fulfillment’. Here, the value described is associated with ‘graduates’, ie those who have 
successfully graduated from higher education courses (traditionally limited to those who have been 
awarded degrees rather than other higher education qualifications). It is, however, unclear how the 
claim for personal and intellectual fulfillment is established or indeed what such a thing might be. It is 
at least arguable that some graduates may not feel they have achieved personal and intellectual 
fulfillment but this possibility seems to be excluded by the text. 
 
Higher education is also described as being valuable because it ‘powers the economy’ and this 
seems to allude to a necessary relationship between higher education and national economic 
activity. Alternatively, this statement could be read as alluding to a benefit that higher education 
brings to the economy of the UK. The White Paper does reference evidence that  
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Universities also make a substantial contribution to the strength of the national economy. 
In 1999–2000 they generated directly and indirectly over £34.8 billion of output and over 
562,000 full time equivalent jobs throughout the economy. This is equivalent to 2.7 per cent 
of the UK workforce in employment. For every 100 jobs within the HEIs themselves, a 
further 89 were generated through knock-on effects throughout the economy; and for every 
£1 million of economic output from higher education, a further £1.5 million is generated in 
other sectors of the economy. (DfES: 2003, p10) 
 
(As an aside, the evidence referred to is from Universities UK, a powerful University representative 
lobby group with an interest in maximising funding for higher education). However, this does not 
necessarily mean that a national economy could not run or ‘be powered’ through other means. The 
implied causal relationship between higher education and a strong economy is offered, to this 
degree, as a given, and other descriptions are, as such, excluded. 
 
The White Paper also states, in the ‘values’ excerpt, that ‘wide access to higher education makes for 
a more enlightened and socially just society’. The text later describes this as a ‘fundamental 
principle’. 
 
The Government’s commitment to fair access will not waver. All those who have the 
potential to benefit from higher education should have the opportunity to do so. This is a 
fundamental principle which lies at the heart of building a more socially just society, because 
education is the best and most reliable route out of poverty and disadvantage.  
(DfES: 2003, p68) 
 
This is in fact the only instance of the term ‘fundamental principle’ within the text and the terms 
‘social justice’ and ‘just society’ are only instanced on two occasions each, including those 
referenced above. It seems that the identification of something as a fundamental principle signifies 
that no further justification, evidence or discussion of the matter is required. The text does not 
describe the nature of the relationship between widening access and social justice beyond stating 
that it is the most reliable route out of poverty and disadvantage. It is clearly possible that higher 
education is not aligned with a principle of social justice, it could for example be accessible only to 
those who are willing and able to pay for it. It is also possible to describe higher education without 
reference to a role for providing a route out of poverty and disadvantage but such descriptions are 
excluded. The text also does not indicate how wider access to higher education necessarily makes 
for a more ‘enlightened’ society, or specifically what might be meant by this, as the only instance of 
this term being used is within the above ‘values’ excerpt. 
 
The above ‘values’ excerpt’s last point represents a form of values summary that relates to the other 
values discussed above and indicates that higher education is valuable because it equips the labour 
force, stimulates innovation (in business) and supports (economic) productivity. As indicated above 
this description excludes other alternative descriptions that are oppositional to such values. However, 
higher education is also described as valuable in ‘enriching the quality of life’, which serves to 
exclude all descriptions of it doing otherwise and is arguably, so broad as to operate largely as a 
rhetorical device. Who could argue with proposed action to enhance the quality of life? These higher 
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education values are offered to the reader as constituting ‘benefits that are far-reaching’, the kind of 
benefits that ‘we’ (the Government or perhaps the nation) cannot risk declining. Here higher 
education is positioned as something that requires Government action in order to maintain and 
enhance the associated benefits that are described within the text. Higher education is that which the 
Government proposes to take action upon, its specific description as such within the White Paper, 
recontextualises higher education practice as governmental practice.  
 
The expansion of higher education participation 
The White Paper identifies the expansion of higher education provision as the first of three 
challenges for universities. The Foreword by Charles Clarke describes the perceived relationship 
between expansion and the need to widen participation in higher education. 
 
Firstly, the expansion of higher education has not yet extended to the talented and best from 
all backgrounds. In Britain today too many of those born into less advantaged families still 
see a university place as being beyond their reach, whatever their ability. (DfES: 2003, p2) 
 
In constructing the case for the proposal to expand the provision of higher education, the White 
Paper puts forward two main arguments. Firstly, that the nation needs to expand higher education 
provision to compete successfully in a global economy, to enhance national productivity by raising 
the skills levels of the workforce. It is proposed that this expanded provision should not represent 
‘more of the same’ or be based on traditional models of higher education provision, such as the 
three-year honours degree. Rather, it should be specifically (re)designed to meet the needs of those 
people that are currently ‘under-represented’ in higher education, including those who are in work. 
Secondly, it is argued that higher education is a very significant determinant in relation to individual 
opportunity including opportunities for employment, higher earning and promotion. This second point 
is underpinned by descriptions of how enhanced access to higher education (based on entitlement 
through merit) produces more cohesive communities and engaged citizens. In addition, ‘fair access’ 
to higher education is described as a fundamental principle of social justice that the Government will 
not waver from (see above excerpt, DfES: 2003, p68). Higher education expansion to widen and 
change patterns of participation is then, a key cross cutting theme that runs through the strategy the 
White Paper is proposing.  
 
The following sections will attempt to identify the oppositions instanced in the White Paper related to 
higher education participation to construct a comprehensive discursive space. This space will then 
be employed to construct descriptions of the dynamic relations between the modes of higher 
education participation operating within the text. 
 
T H E  ‘ E C O N O M I C ’  A N D  ‘ I N D I V I D U A L ’  C A S E  F O R  E X P A N D I N G  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  
The economic benefits related to the expansion of higher education are described in chapter five of 
the White Paper, entitled ‘expanding higher education to meet our needs’. 
 
5.1 Society is changing. Our economy is becoming ever more knowledge-based – we are 
increasingly making our living through selling high-value services, rather than physical 
goods. These trends demand a more highly-skilled workforce… 
5.3 A comprehensive review of the academic literature suggests that there is compelling 
 106 
evidence that education increases productivity, and moreover that higher education is the 
most important phase of education for economic growth in developed countries, with 
increases in HE found to be positively and significantly related to per capita income growth. 
The review also found that education is highly likely to give rise to further indirect effects on 
growth, by stimulating more effective use of resources, and more physical capital investment 
and technology adoption. 
5.4 Higher education qualifications are more than a signal to the labour market – they bring 
real skills benefits which employers are prepared to pay a significant premium for.  
(DfES: 2003, p58) 
 
 In addition, the individual benefits are also described. 
 
5.5 For the individual, the economic benefits of higher education are well-documented – 
quite apart from the opportunity for personal and intellectual fulfilment. Graduates and those 
who have ‘sub-degree’ qualifications earn, on average, around 50 per cent more than non-
graduates. Graduates are half as likely to be unemployed, and as a group they have 
enjoyed double the number of job promotions over the last five years, compared to non-
graduates. Higher education also brings social benefits – there is strong evidence that 
suggests that graduates are likely to be more engaged citizens. For instance, one Home 
Office report found a strong positive correlation between the cohesiveness of local 
communities and participation in higher education. 
5.6 Even though the number of graduates has risen significantly over the last twenty years, 
the gap between graduate and average earnings hasn’t narrowed at all. If anything, it has 
increased. And the returns to HE are higher in the UK than in any other OECD country – in 
fact, the OECD’s report describes the UK as being “in a group of its own”. So there are real 
jobs available and no reason to believe that higher education will lose its value as more 
young people are educated to higher levels – especially if the main part of the increase 
comes in new and employer-responsive types of degree. (DfES: 2003, p59) 
 
The distinction between  ‘economic’ and ‘individual’ benefits establishes a clear opposition within the 
text. Economic benefits are positioned as those that serve the interests of the national economy in 
terms of increased economic production, growth and so on. The use of the term ‘we’, in the above 
excerpt, is used to signify the nation as a collective whole (or at least those in it who are ‘making a 
living’) rather than ‘we the Government’ as a singularised entity. The text also positions ‘a highly 
skilled workforce’ as a resource available to the national economy that is of potential collective 
benefit. The reference to ‘higher education qualifications’ is interesting, in that an opposition is drawn 
between qualifications being described as ‘a signal to the labour market’ and where they ‘bring real 
skills benefits’, for which we are told employers are willing to pay. This implies that a price for these 
benefits can be explicitly determined in order for employers to be able to pay for them, presumably 
through the operation of the employment market. This seems to indicate that where qualifications are 
only a ‘signal’ they may not bring ‘real’ benefits and as a consequence may not be allocated a price. 
The perceived ‘reality’ of a benefit seems here to be determined by the allocation of a price and the 
willingness of a purchaser to consume. Similarly, the characterisation of the ‘knowledge-based’ 
economy is related to the proposition that “we are increasingly making our living through selling high-
value services, rather than physical goods” (DfES: 2003, p58). This creates a clear opposition 
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between such services and physical goods but also positions ‘us’ as selling one or the other. By 
implication higher education is also positioned as a high value service that is sold, as it is presumably 
not a physical product or good. 
 
In the White Paper excerpt above (5.5 and 5.6) the ‘individual’ economic benefits of higher education 
expansion are distinguished from those relating to ‘personal and intellectual fulfillment’ and the text 
does not offer a means of allocating a measure of value of the latter. However, the individual 
economic benefits are described in relation to a range of quantifiable measures including favourable 
graduate earnings, employment prospects (‘real’ jobs) and promotions. The individual economic 
benefits of higher education are also presented as not being subject to a decrease in value as a 
consequence of higher participation. This description signifies that higher education provides 
individual benefits but that these benefits are non-rivalrous. In other words, one person’s 
consumption does not diminish another’s ability to benefit. The text refers to evidence that wage 
differentials for graduates have been maintained despite previous expansion in participation. This 
excerpt does not explicitly relate this description of higher education benefits to the resources 
required to provide it. This constructs a non-explicit opposition, in that, whilst the economic benefits 
are consistently quantified, this is not directly related to the costs or who should meet them. 
However, we are provided with a partial answer in the form of the alliance between the continued 
non-rivalrousness of higher education and the provision of ‘employer responsive types of degrees’. 
The text states that ‘employers are prepared to pay a significant premium for’ such qualifications. As 
such, the text may by implication be signifying that employers are willing to meet the costs of higher 
education expansion, if the qualifications provided are ’ employer responsive’ enough. 
 
As indicated above, ‘personal and intellectual fulfilment’ is described as an ‘individual’ benefit 
available to those who engage with higher education. Personal and intellectual fulfilment would seem 
to be an individualised categorisation although the text does not seek to employ this benefit to 
legitimise higher education expansion on any principled grounds.  
 
It is possible for someone to ‘benefit’ from a higher education experience in terms of personal and 
intellectual fulfilment, without necessarily completing a course and achieving a qualification. In 
addition, non-certificated courses equivalent to higher-level qualifications, with no completion 
requirement may be of great benefit to those who participate in them. However, potential participants 
who might benefit in these ways are excluded by the text. 
 
S O C I A L  B E N E F I T S  O F  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  
The White Paper states that “higher education also brings social benefits” (DfES: 2003, p59), this 
statement is confusingly included under the heading of ‘individual’ benefits. Whilst it is conceivable 
that living in an educated society might bring benefits to individuals, the White Paper does not make 
it explicit what ‘individual’ social benefits might be. Rather, the text refers to  
 
evidence that suggests that graduates are likely to be more engaged citizens…[and]…a 
strong positive correlation between the cohesiveness of local communities and participation 




We could just as well ask are ‘engaged citizens’ more likely to be ‘graduates’? It may be that being a 
more engaged citizen is a benefit to an individual who is one, but the text does not make explicit 
what kind of benefit this might be. It is of course also entirely possible that an individual might not 
perceive being ‘an engaged citizen’ as a benefit at all. Similarly, the individual benefit of contributing 
to the cohesiveness of local communities is not made explicit. These social benefits seem to be mis-
described as ‘individual’ within the text. As indicated above, this may be as a consequence of a 
closing of the discursive space for collective benefits that are not also economic in nature. However, 
there is no explicit description of the principles that might legitimise expanding higher education to 
achieve these benefits. The descriptions of ‘more engaged citizens’ and ‘cohesive local communities’ 
seem to be operating as principles in their own right in that they are positioned as a good thing for 
which no further explanation is required. The non-explicit principle underpinning such descriptions 
could perhaps be that participative democracy is a collective and individual good in itself but this 
would require a reading beyond the boundaries of the White Paper text. 
 
T H E  P R I N C I P L E S  O F  F A I R  A C C E S S  A N D  P A R T I C I P A T I O N  I N  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  
The Secretary of State’s Foreword to the White Paper introduces the idea that 
 
the expansion of higher education has not yet extended to the talented and best from all 
backgrounds. (DfES: 2003, p2) 
 
Chapter three of the White Paper, ‘the need for reform’, goes on to provide a principled rationale for 
widening and expanding higher education participation. 
 
Universities are a vital gateway to opportunity and fulfilment for young people, so it is crucial 
that they continue to make real and sustained improvements in access [bold in the original 
text]. The social class gap among those entering higher education is unacceptably wide. 
Those from the top three social classes are almost three times as likely to enter higher 
education as those from the bottom three…This state of affairs cannot be tolerated in a 
civilised society. It wastes our national talent; and it is inherently socially unjust.  
(DfES: 2003, p17) 
 
Similarly, chapter six, ‘fair access’, aligns the provision of higher education with social justice 
principles. 
 
Education must be a force for opportunity and social justice, not for the entrenchment of 
privilege. We must make certain that the opportunities that higher education brings are 
available to all those who have the potential to benefit from them, regardless of their 
background. This is not just about preventing active discrimination; it is about working 
actively to make sure that potential is recognised and fostered wherever it is found.  
(DfES: 2003, p67) 
 
It is clear, if we consider these references, that the text is constructing an alliance between principles 
of social justice, described in terms of meritocratic entitlement to higher education, and the case for 
expanding and widening access and participation in higher education. The proposal seems here to 
be predicated upon the idea that those who represent ‘the talented and the best’, or those who are 
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recognised as having ‘the potential to benefit’ should have the opportunity to access higher 
education, irrespective of their social background. Furthermore, according to the text where this is 
not the case society can be described as ‘uncivilised and unjust’. It could of course be argued that it 
might be the processes associated with recognising ‘the talented and the best’ that have led to a lack 
of higher education participation by those from ‘less advantaged families’, rather than the lack of 
available places. It may also be the case that ‘the talented and the best’ might not represent the 
same category as ‘all those who have the potential to benefit’. The recognition of ‘the talented and 
the best’ could very easily be read as an elitist model of participation, despite its association with the 
phrase ‘from all backgrounds’. The recognition of ‘the potential to benefit’ however, seems to be a 
more inclusive and open model of participation. It is also a little unclear from the excerpt above if the 
issue of ‘wasted talent’ is one of moral duty to employ the talents of the nation frugally or more of 
economic expediency, or perhaps both. 
 
The White Paper, as a precursor to legislation, explicitly proposes the introduction of regulation to 
reform higher education participation toward its expansion. Indeed, in proposing higher education 
reform the text also describes the rationale for change. The case for the introduction of regulation is 
related to both collective and individual economic benefits as well as a more or less explicitly 
principled rationale. However, as a consequence the text also constructs an implicit opposition in the 
form of higher education that is unregulated. Similarly, descriptions of categories of higher education 
participants within the text can either be ‘closed’ by including some and excluding others (for 
example ‘the talented and best’), or open. 
 
The following section will describe a relational discursive space that is constructed from the 
open/closed categories of participants and unregulated/regulated access binary variables. This 
analysis will attempt to describe the dynamic relations instanced within the text in the construction of 
‘higher education participation’ as a discursive object. 
 
Modes of higher education participation 
The terms ‘elite’, ‘mass’ and ‘universal’ have a discursive history in relation to higher education 
participation that should be acknowledged. Martin Trow used these terms in 1973 to describe the 
‘democratisation’ of higher education participation from elite, though mass, to universal systems in 
the United States. More recently Peter Scott  (1995, 2005) has also used these terms to discuss 
mass higher education in the context of the UK. He sums up Trow’s definitions as follows: 
 
In a nutshell he argued that higher education systems that enrolled up to 15 per cent of the 
age group were best described as elite systems; systems that enrolled between 15 and 40 
per cent of the age group were mass systems; and those that enrolled more than 40 per 
cent were universal systems. (Scott: 2005, p2) 
 
Scott argues that Trow’s description of a neat linear progression (from elite to universal) is not 
representative of the UK higher education system. He argues that Trow’s conception is bound up in 
the particular circumstances of the development of the US State of California’s higher education 
system and that the UK system has been particularly resistant to adopting a ‘mass’ ethos irrespective 
of the rising participation figures. He also argues that the linear distinctions between the categories of 
elite, mass and universal are no longer useful as a consequence of the inherent and evolving 
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diversity of institutional and governmental structures related to higher education participation. 
However, Scott does think that the term ‘mass higher education’ has a useful function in higher 
education discourse as long as it is acknowledged that it does not demarcate a precise empirical 
boundary but describes the relationships between changing conceptions of higher education 
practice. 
 
I continue to believe that ‘mass higher education’ is still a potent term – but today it has 
different meanings. It has to be interpreted in the context of ‘markets’ rather than of 
‘planning’ – not necessarily ‘markets’ in a private-sector sense but in the sense of much 
more flexible structures and open environments. (Scott: 2005, p11) 
 
However, within the discursive space I will construct below I will reject the term ‘elite’ and retain the 
terms ‘mass’ and ‘universal’. I will replace the term ‘elite’ with ‘selected’. The rationale for this will be 
explained below. Whilst my use of the terms ‘mass’ and ‘universal’ is deployed in the context of their 
previous use as discussed above, the way that I shall be employing them is not defined or restricted 
by these previous definitions. Rather, each term will be described specifically in relation to the 
oppositions that I have identified as emerging from the White Paper text. It is also important to note 
that these modes of higher education participation are not conceived as constituting concrete 
empirical distinctions. Rather, they constitute conceptual categories that are designed to be useful in 
the production of descriptions of the dynamic relations between the various ways that ‘higher 
education participation’ is strategically positioned within the text. 
 
O P P O S I T I O N S  A N D  A L L I A N C E S  C O N C E R N I N G  ‘ H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  P A R T I C I P A T I O N ’  
Where access to higher education is ‘regulated’ the authority to determine the principles governing 
such access is institutionalised. For example, higher education institutions, as qualification awarding 
bodies, have the statutory authority to determine the principles that regulate access to higher 
education. The White Paper as an instance of governmental action describes the mechanisms by 
which it proposes to bring about rationally planned change or ‘reform’ to such regulation. These 
mechanisms include changes to institutional funding arrangements, legal requirements to conform to 
governmental regulatory bodies and financial incentives to develop and promote ‘best practice’. The 
principles that legitimise such governmental action are more or less explicitly or euphemistically 
described within the text. This can be contrasted with descriptions of higher education access as 
‘unregulated’ which require no institutionalised authority claim to exclude access to potential 
participants. However, unregulated access to higher education might not imply unrestricted access, 
as it is possible, in theory, for access to higher education to be available through an open market. In 
such a case unregulated access might still be restricted to those who can pay. 
 
The descriptions of potential higher education participants can also be more or less ‘closed’. The 
closing of the category of participants here refers to descriptions that are aligned with individualising 
practices. By this I mean those practices that distinguish and singularise in relation to a broader 
collective category. The White Paper refers to ways in which “universities can best ensure that they 
choose the most talented applicants” (DfES: 2003, p72). The categorisation of ‘the most talented’ 
applicants is a discursive move to close the category of higher education participants. To take 
another example, the description of “the brightest and best young people” (DfES: 2003, p14) would 
be an individualising categorisation in relation to the category of ‘young people’. ‘Young people’ are 
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described in association with their relative participation in higher education as a collective group 
within the White Paper and this represents a more open categorisation. Where the text describes 
ways in which institutions might identify and recognise ‘the brightest and the best’ such practices 
would be individualising. However, the category of ‘young people’ is of course itself individualised in 
relation to the broader category of ‘all people’, defined no doubt by the official description of when we 
stop being ‘young’. The text however, does not make this explicit.  
 
The discursive space described above (Figure 10 below) is constructed by relating two sets of 
oppositions or binary variables - unregulated/regulated
4
 access to higher education and closed/open 
categorisations of participants. Four possible modes of action emerge from this space - selective, 
mass, universal and what I call bespoke participation. The selective mode is here used to describe 
higher education participation where access is formally regulated and related to a closed 
categorisation of participants. The term selective is preferred to the term ‘elite’ as it is possible for a 
category of participants to be closed, where access is regulated, without the selected group of 
participants being ‘elite’ as it is usually understood. For example, the process of selecting children 
with special needs (a closed category) for a special needs school could be regulated but the selected 
group seems unlikely to be described as ‘elite’. The mass mode describes higher education 
participation where access is also regulated but where descriptions are related to a more open 
categorisation of participants. The universal mode describes the open categorisation of participants 
in the context of unregulated access and lastly, the bespoke mode describes the unregulated access 
of a closed categorisation of participants. The modes described above are summarised in Figure 10 
below. 
 
Form of access Category of participants 
Unregulated Regulated 
Closed Bespoke Selective 
Open Universal Mass 
 
F I G U R E  1 0 :  M O D E S  O F  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  P A R T I C I P A T I O N  
 
The following section will attempt to relate each mode to descriptions of higher education 
participation within the White Paper. 
 
Modes of participation and the White Paper 
 
T H E  S E L E C T I V E  M O D E  O F  P A R T I C I P A T I O N   
The White Paper makes explicit reference to the move away from an elite system to one of higher 
participation.  
 
Our system has successfully transformed itself from an elite system – in which, in 1962, 
only around 6 per cent those under 21 participated – to one where in England around 
43 per cent of those aged between 18 and 30 go to university. Despite the rise in the 
numbers participating in higher education, the average salary premium has not declined 
over time and remains the highest in the OECD. It is not the case that ‘more means worse’. 
(DfES: 2003, p12) 
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Here, a previously elite system is contrasted with one that has significantly higher participation rates, 
and the measure used to legitimise this change is economic and collective (average salary premium) 
as opposed to any principled position. In fact, where principles are referred to in the text in relation to 
elite systems the comparison is pejorative and explicitly excluded by the text. For example, the text 
(previously quoted above, DfES: 2003, p67) specifically refers to education as not being ‘for the 
entrenchment of privilege’.  
 
Other references within the text (partially quoted above) refer explicitly to the need to provide higher 
education opportunities for those who are ‘the most talented’, for example, 
 
UUK [Universities UK] published a report earlier this month (“Fair Enough”) which explores 
how universities can best ensure that they choose the most talented applicants, using a 
wide range of information and looking beyond raw qualifications. (DfES: 2003, p72) 
 
As mentioned above, the White Paper does not make it clear if there is a difference between the 
identification of ‘the most talented’ and recognising those with the ‘potential to benefit’ from higher 
education. The text states that 
 
All those who have the potential to benefit from higher education should have the 
opportunity to do so. This is a fundamental principle which lies at the heart of building a 
more socially just society, because education is the best and most reliable route out of 
poverty and disadvantage. (DfES: 2003, p68) 
 
It is however, possible that an applicant is recognised as having the potential to benefit from higher 
education but might not be recognised as ‘the talented and the best’ (DfES: 2003, p2), ‘the brightest 
and best’ (DfES: 2003, p33), or ‘the most talented’ (DfES: 2003, p72). This could be read as implicitly 
identifying three categories of potential participant in higher education.  
 
1. those identified as being the ‘talented and best’, ‘brightest and best’ or ‘most talented’ 
2. those who are recognised as having the ‘potential to benefit’ 
3. those whose ‘non-recognition’ as either 1 or 2 is as a consequence of being identified as such, 
perhaps through an examination system.  
 
We might add a fourth category.  
4. those whose ‘non-recognition’ as either 1 or 2 is as a consequence of non-participation in either 
the examination or application processes. 
 
The first category identifies a smaller group distinguished from a larger group (for example all those 
who apply to access a higher education programme) as a consequence of their recognition as being 
‘more talented’ or ‘better’ than others who are identified as being ‘less talented’. This description 
excludes the possibility that all members of the larger group are recognised as ‘the talented and best’ 
as it implies a normative categorisation. Everyone cannot be identified as being ‘the talented and the 
best’. This is a description of a strongly individualised and exclusive group, a closed categorisation of 
participants. However, the text makes clear that ‘the talented and the best’ should be selected from 
all, not just from privileged, backgrounds. The selection of an exclusive group is legitimised by 
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providing the opportunity to be selected to all. The opportunity to be selected, in accordance with 
university admission procedures and requirements, is providing regulated access to higher 
education. The text describes efforts that are being (or should be) made to ensure that the selection 
processes are ‘fair’. Fairness can here be read as equality of opportunity, underpinned by principles 
of social justice, placed in opposition to the idea of ‘the entrenchment of privilege’. In this example, 
the site of the principled legitimation of elite selection is associated with opportunity for those from ‘all 
backgrounds’. Here, the selection of an elite group is ‘fair’, if it is based on the identification of ‘talent’, 
not background. The recognition of talent is governed by higher education institutions, which are 
authorised to do so, by the Government. The alignment of regulated access with principles of 
fairness or equality of opportunity is deployed to legitimise the closing of the category of higher 
education participants. 
 
T H E  M A S S  M O D E  O F  P A R T I C I P A T I O N  
The second category of participants also distinguishes one group, those who are recognised as 
having the potential to benefit from higher education, from another (those who are not). However, 
this second category could (at least in theory) include all potential participants, as we might all have 
the potential to benefit from higher education. The categorisation of higher education participants as 
“all those who have the potential to benefit” (DfES: 2003, p22, 67,68), places the emphasis on 
identifying those who posses such potential from an inclusive, and to this degree, more open 
standpoint. Whereas the categorisation of participants as ‘the talented and the best’ leaves the 
category of participant background open, ‘potential to benefit’ leaves the categorisation of the 
participant open. However, the authority to identify individuals as having, or as not having, such 
potential, remains with higher education institutions. Access to higher education remains regulated, 
despite the open categorisation of participants. To this extent, references within the text to 
opportunities for ‘all those who have the potential to benefit from higher education’ can be described 
as instances of ‘mass’ participation mode.  
 
However, it could be argued that the processes that are employed to identify ‘the talented and best’ 
might be very similar, if not the same, as those used to identify those with the ‘potential to benefit’. 
 
There is no simple means of achieving wider access. Success in opening up higher 
education to all who have the potential to benefit from it depends on building aspirations and 
attainment throughout all stages of education. Higher education institutions need to be 
supported in their efforts to reach out to students from non-traditional backgrounds, and 
provide them with the right pastoral and teaching support; young people and their families 
need to be encouraged to raise their aspirations and achieve more of their potential in 
examinations prior to entry to higher education; and finally, there must be an effective and 
fair system of student support that takes into account the different circumstances of an 
increasingly varied student population. (DfES: 2003, p68) 
 
The emphasis in this excerpt seems to be that those who have the potential to benefit from higher 
education need to raise their aspirations and attainment so that they can be recognised as having 
such potential. For their part, higher education institutions are described as needing support to ‘reach 
out to students from non-traditional backgrounds’. The potential to benefit is to be demonstrated 
through ‘examinations prior to entry’, which is the traditional means of gaining entry to higher 
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education courses. The individualising practices (examinations etc) that are associated within the 
text as a means of identifying those with the potential to benefit may be the same as those described 
in association with identifying an elite, such as the talented and best. The processes associated with 
recognising an applicant as having the potential to benefit are as individualising as those associated 
with identifying an elite.  
 
This indicates that the text may be operating to elide the opposition between elite and mass modes 
of higher education participation. This serves on the one hand to reinforce the maintenance of the 
authority of higher education institutions to regulate access whilst signaling an opening up of the 
category of potential participant. It is possible that different categorisations of participants are 
constructed for different audiences. The selection of ‘the talented and best’ aligns the Government 
proposals to expand higher education with audiences who might favour the retention of more elitist 
approaches to regulating access, whereas, the selection of those with ‘potential to benefit’ might 
favour more egalitarian approaches. The text operates to elide the differences in categorisation and 
to obfuscate the similarities of selection practices employed for both. In doing this the descriptions of 
proposals to reform higher education participation have a higher potential for establishing alliances 
with a wider range of audience, which is after all the overarching purpose of a White Paper. 
 
T H E  U N I V E R S A L  M O D E  O F  P A R T I C I P A T I O N   
The categorisation of participants as ‘the talented and best from all backgrounds’ or as ‘all those who 
have the potential to benefit’, both imply the regulation of access to higher education. Unregulated 
modes transfer the authority to regulate access from institutions to participants. If access to higher 
education were unregulated, participants who are identified as not being the ‘talented and best’ or as 
not having ‘the potential to benefit’ would not necessarily be excluded. It is not being explicitly 
proposed by the text that universities exclude those who are not recognised through admissions 
processes, although this must clearly be the result. The clear emphasis in the White Paper (as the 
above UUK reference exemplifies, DfES: 2003, p72) is instead, the development of a ‘fair’ 
admissions process to identify ‘the most talented applicants’ and/or those who have the ‘potential to 
benefit’. The exclusion of categories of potential participants not identified as being in either group is 
implicitly legitimised by the fact that the processes of selection are (or should be) ‘fair’. These ‘non-
recognised’ participants correspond to the third category of potential applicants (discussed above) 
and are effectively excluded from the text, although their exclusion is not made explicit. The 
association of principles of fairness with the regulation of access to higher education operates to 
populate the discursive space that descriptions of excluded groups might occupy. 
 
The only instance of such unregulated access for an open category of participants is negatively 
presented by the text as a cautionary tale. 
 
But we must make sure that institutions are not exploiting their most vulnerable students 
by making up the numbers with students who cannot cope. (DfES: 2003, p75) 
 
‘Vulnerable students’ are mentioned six times in the text. Four instances describe extra funds to be 
made available for such students and one instance describes the need for effective support 
mechanisms to retain them. This means that in four out of six instances the identification as 
‘vulnerable’ is associated with not having enough money to study and one identifies effective support 
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for them. Presumably, if it is appropriate to provide effective support for these ‘vulnerable students’ 
they are recognised as having ‘potential to benefit’ from it. In five out of six instances there is no 
association between being a vulnerable student and not having the potential to benefit. However, the 
excerpt above explicitly relates ‘vulnerable students’ with ‘students who cannot cope’. The excerpt 
follows a section concerning extra funds that it is proposed will be available for under-represented 
groups and the reference to ‘not exploiting…by making up the numbers’ can be read as a warning to 
higher education institutions not to provide access to those ‘who cannot cope’.  
 
The Open University could provide an example of the universal mode of participation as it has an 
‘open entry philosophy’ (http://www.open.ac.uk/about/ou/p3.shtml - last accessed 10.3.08) that does 
not regulate access to its higher education provision. However, the Open University is only referred 
to within the White Paper in association with the flexibility of delivery afforded by its “on-line services 
for its courses” (DfES: 2003, p64). The White Paper does not propose to introduce unregulated 
access to higher education for all and as such, effectively excludes the universal mode of 
participation in the description of the future of higher education. 
 
The exclusion of instances of the universal mode of participation could be read as being in tension 
with the way that the White Paper positions the individual economic benefits of higher education. The 
White Paper describes these benefits in the context of ‘the case for expanding higher education’. The 
open and unregulated opportunity to purchase higher education and thereby gain access to the 
associated benefits would constitute a universal mode of participation. Indeed the White paper does 
make an explicit link between individual benefits and payment for them. 
 
As we are asking new students to pay for the benefits they get from higher education, to 
build sustainable funding freedoms for the future, we believe that it is also right that those 
who have already benefited from higher education should be able to contribute.  
(DfES: 2003, p76) 
 
The White Paper also describes the establishment of a ‘market rate’. 
 
They may charge overseas students, part-time students, and post graduate students market 
rates for fees. (DfES: 2003, p77) 
 
If access to higher education was determined solely on the basis of being able to pay for it, it could 
constitute a form of universal participation in the sense that access would otherwise be unregulated. 
However, the White Paper excludes an explicit association of payment for higher education with 
universal access, to support expansion whilst retaining regulatory authority. 
 
T H E  B E S P O K E  M O D E  O F  P A R T I C I P A T I O N  
Descriptions of the selective mode of higher education participation in the White Paper are 
individualised in the context of institutional mechanisms to recognise ‘the talented and best’. The 
mass mode of participation regulates access but opens the category of participants. Access to higher 
education is unregulated in universal and bespoke modes, transferring authority for access from 
institutions to participants. The bespoke mode however, includes descriptions that also close the 
category of participant. An example of this mode could be where the category of participant is closed 
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to the extent that the authority to determine access to higher education lies with an individual 
participant. For example, the White Paper describes how higher education can be reconstructed as 
personalised development. 
 
Lifelong learning therefore implies a fundamental shift from the ‘once in a lifetime’ approach 
to higher education to one of educational progression linked to a process of continuous 
personal and professional development. (DfES: 2003, p16) 
 
This excerpt, however, falls short of describing unregulated access to higher education to facilitate 
personal and professional development. 
 
Another example of a closed category of potential participants is ‘employers’. If access is 
unregulated then ‘employers’ (in this example) could determine the extent (and perhaps the form) of 
access to higher education. In other words, they could participate as much or as little as they wished 
and presumably in a manner they wished. The transfer of the authority to determine access to higher 
education also operates to individualise (close) the category of participant in doing so. In our 
example ‘employers’ would be described as a closed category of participant that is constructed in 
relation to unregulated access to higher education. For example, ‘employers’ could be described as a 
category of participant that are able to purchase unregulated higher education in the form of tailored 
training courses from private training providers. The term ‘employers’ becomes recontextualised in 
the context of descriptions of higher education participation.  
 
The White Paper includes 51 references to ‘employer(s)’ several of which refer to the need for higher 
education institutions to collaborate effectively with employers: for example, 
 
Establishing close relationships between employers in particular industrial sectors and the 
relevant faculties in institutions is critical to preparing new entrants to the workforce and to 
continuous professional development…helping employers to act as intelligent customers of 
universities so that courses that have the needs of employers at heart are developed and 
successfully marketed. (DfES: 2003, p42) 
 
The Government’s Skills Strategy, to be published this year, will set out our proposals for 
raising the skills of the workforce at all levels, and ensuring that the education and training 
system responds effectively to demand from employers. (DfES: 2003, p58) 
 
However, although these descriptions propose that higher education courses are responsive to ‘the 
needs of employers’ or ‘demand from employers’, they do not necessarily signify unregulated 
access. The description of employers as ‘intelligent customers’ could be read as a transference of 
authority for determining access but it is unclear if employer customers would still need to 
demonstrate potential to benefit. Whilst there may be implicit indications that the White Paper is 
signifying a direction of change towards the bespoke mode of participation it is not explicitly 
evidenced in the text. 
 
The following section will attempt to analyse how the oppositions and alliances described above are 
operating to constitute modes of discursive objectification. 
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Modes of discursive objectification and the White Paper 
Chapter three described modes of discursive objectification. These are summarised again in the 
table below (previously listed as Figure 6). 
 
Discursive exchange Objectification 
 Open Closed 
Singular Aesthetic Iconic/symbolic 
Homogeneous Commodified Institutional 
 
The analysis so far has attempted to demonstrate how the White Paper is operating to 
recontextualise higher education practice as governmental practice. In describing ‘the future of 
higher education’ the White Paper constructs oppositions and alliances that are positioned in 
dynamic relation to each other. In addition, I have attempted to illustrate this by focussing on the 
analysis of modes of higher education participation.  
 
The following sections will attempt to construct a description of how the White Paper is operating to 
(re)produce the idea of the commodification of higher education. Evidence that the White Paper is 
operating to do this will be provided by considering the relative presence of the commodified mode of 
discursive objectification in the construction of higher education as a textual object. I will consider the 
distribution of the main higher education reforms described in the text in relation to modes of 
discursive objectification.  
 
T H E  R E C O G N I T I O N  O F  O F F I C I A L  T I T L E  A N D  S T A T U S   
The White Paper text itself constitutes an iconic/symbolic objectification as a specific (singular) 
Command Paper legitimated through the symbolic authority of the Government and the Head of 
State. It is a singularised description of higher education, exchanged euphemistically with its 
intended audiences. The traditionally recognised form of Command Papers (of which the White 
Paper is a specific example) would seem to constitute an institutional objectification. Command 
Papers regulate discursive exchange and provide a homogeneous framework that operates to 
euphemistically structure individual governmental texts.   
 
The White Paper also describes the creation of a range of other officially recognised bodies. These 
include: a ‘Teaching Quality Academy’ (later to become the Higher Education Academy); ‘Foundation 
Degree Forward’ – “a network of Universities which are leading the development of foundation 
degrees” (DfES: 2003, p57); ‘Centres of Excellence for Teaching and Learning’; a new Arts and 
Humanities Research Council; and an ‘Access Regulator’  “to promote wider access and to ensure 
that admissions procedures are fair, professional and transparent” (DfES: 2003, p8). These textual 
constructions can be described as constituting an iconic/symbolic objectification. In each case the 
description of these singularised textual entities constitutes a recontextualisation of higher education 
practice legitimised through the (proposed) exchange of symbolic capital.  
 
The White Paper describes proposals to introduce changes to the criteria for awarding ‘University 
title’ to institutions that only award taught degrees, as opposed to the requirement to also 
demonstrate strength in research. 
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We propose to change the system, so that the University title is awarded on the basis of 
taught degree awarding powers, student numbers, and the range of subjects offered. This 
will send an important signal about the importance of teaching, and about the benefits for 
some institutions of focusing their efforts on teaching well. (DfES: 2003, p55) 
 
These proposals require an institution to submit to ‘closed’ bureaucratic procedures in order for 
recognition as a ‘University’ to be conferred. This constitutes an individualisation of those institutions 
that apply; in exchange for the symbolic capital that the legal status associated with University title 
confers. The White Paper later emphasises that the Government controls the award of University title 
and provides a somewhat euphemistic rationale for retaining such powers. 
 
It is essential to retain external control over both degree-awarding powers and university 
title, because the Government has a responsibility to make sure that standards are met 
before degrees can be awarded or an institution can become a university. (DfES: 2003, p79) 
 
It could of course be possible that ‘standards’ might also be met by allowing institutions to self-
determine what such standard should be, rather than a government having this responsibility. In any 
case, it is clear that the determination of the ‘standards’ that Government require institutions to 
conform to, is not open. In retaining the power to change the criteria for awarding University title, the 
White Paper closes the discursive exchange and constitutes an iconic/symbolic objectification of 
higher education. 
 
B U R E A U C R A T I C  S Y S T E M S  A N D  F R A M E W O R K S   
The White Paper also describes proposals to recognise ‘outstanding teachers’ and ‘excellent 
researchers’. The symbolic recognition of individual teachers and researchers would constitute a 
euphemistic exchange as the principles upon which such recognition is bestowed are institutionally 
(governmentally) regulated. However, the reward for ‘outstanding teachers’ is constituted within a 
‘National Teaching Fellowship Scheme” and the scheme, as opposed to each instance of individual 
recognition, constitutes an institutional objectification. Similarly, the proposals for “better pay for 
excellent researchers” are described as resulting from an overall increase in funds available to higher 
education institutions. The White Paper states that the Government will  
 
develop and reward talented researchers, with rigorous new standards for government 
funded research postgraduate places. (DfES: 2003,p6) 
 
It is a little unclear what kind of a ‘reward’ the development of ‘rigorous new standards’ constitutes 
and as such, this can be read as a euphemistic and homogenising (institutional) objectification of 
higher education. The description of proposals to review the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) 
also constitutes an institutional objectification. 
 
HEFCE (together with the equivalent bodies in the devolved administrations) is undertaking 
a review of research assessment which will investigate different approaches to the definition 
and evaluation of research quality, drawing on the lessons of both the recent RAE and other 
models of research assessment. (DfES: 2003, p30) 
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These types of bureaucratic systems can be read as homogenising strategies that constitute 
institutional objectification. To take another example, the White Paper describes proposals to 
introduce a requirement for higher education institutions wishing to charge variable tuition fees to 
produce an approved ‘Access Agreement’. It is proposed that these agreements will describe how 
institutions will use a proportion of the additional fee income to encourage the participation of under-
represented groups in higher education. It is also proposed that Access Agreements be approved by 
the ‘Access Regulator’ and in addition that they 
 
…will be monitored, and the Regulator will have the power to withdraw approval for variable 
fees, or impose financial penalties, if the Agreements are not fulfilled. (DfES: 2003, p75) 
 
The text also states that the Access Regulator “will develop a framework for Access Agreements for 
each institution” (DfES: 2003, p68). This signifies that while the role of Access Regulator constitutes 
an iconic/symbolic objectification, the framework of the Access Agreements constitute an institutional 
objectification. Individual Access Agreements produced by higher educational institutions could be 
read as instances of aesthetic objectification to the extent that they constitute singular and explicit 
descriptions of higher education practice. However, given that the Access Agreement ‘framework’ will 
regulate the approval of such documents, the form of discursive exchange is not open and (once 
approved), individual institutions’ Access Agreements would constitute iconic/symbolic objectification. 
 
As discussed above, the White Paper describes proposals to expand higher education to provide 
access to a wider range of participants. One of the ways the text proposes to achieve this is by 
further developing systems for describing higher education through credit. 
 
Credit systems, which make it possible to break off and start again without having to repeat 
learning, will become increasingly important as the routes into and through higher education 
become more varied…Many institutions have internal credit systems, and there are a 
number of consortia with shared ones…HEFCE will work with partners in the sector – from 
2003 onwards – to build upon the best current practice, and to scale this up so that there is 
widespread and consistent use of credit across higher education. (DfES: 2003, p64) 
 
Credit systems provide a bureaucratic means of establishing the equivalence of individual instances 
of higher education so that comparisons can be made. They provide the metric that can establish the 
relative value of individual higher education courses, qualifications, modules, units etc. Such systems 
are homogenising but the principles that determine the operation of such systems are institutional 
and closed. 
 
E N G A G E D  C I T I Z E N S  A N D  C O H E S I V E  C O M M U N I T I E S  
As discussed previously, the White Paper describes the social benefits of higher education and 
refers to Home Office evidence that access to higher education generates more ‘engaged citizens’ 
and ‘cohesive communities’ (DfES: 2003, p59). Here the text operates to recontextualise higher 
education as governmental practice. If social cohesion is a legitimate target of governmental action, 
then publicly funded higher education can be reconstructed as a means to achieving it. ‘Higher 
education’ described as that which generates engaged citizens and cohesive communities 
represents a homogenising move in the context of closed discursive practice.  The text does not 
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make explicit what an ‘engaged’ citizen or a ‘cohesive’ community is and as such, the discourse 
remains closed. Such descriptions can then constitute an institutional (governmental) objectification 
of higher education. The description of the social benefits of higher education is couched in terms of 
its individual benefits and is cited within the case for higher education expansion. Collective non-
economic benefits are associated with individual and national economic benefits by physical location 
within the text. This construction operates to de-emphasise the homogeneous and euphemistic from 
of the description, by juxtapositioning it with its opposite.  
 
I N S T I T U T I O N A L  A U T O N O M Y  A N D  D I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I S S I O N  
The White Paper devotes a whole chapter to describing arrangements for higher education 
institution’s ‘freedom and funding’.  
 
…higher education institutions need real freedom – including the freedom to raise their own 
funding, independent of government – if they are to flourish. They are already free and 
autonomous institutions, with the power to determine their academic and operational future; 
lead, manage, and appoint their own staff; determine their estates strategies; and manage 
their resources as they see fit (DfES: 2003, p77) 
 
This chapter of the text describes proposals to allow institutions to introduce variable tuition fees, 
enhance endowment schemes, and reduce unnecessary bureaucracy and to support the 
development of institutional leadership. In doing so the White Paper describes higher education as 
that which is constructed autonomously by individual institutions. This constitutes a singularised 
construction in the context of open discursive exchange, or what I have called aesthetic discursive 
objectification. Similarly, earlier in the text the White Paper describes and supports the construction 
of diverse missions by individual higher education institutions, although, references to recognition 
through funding systems, would seem to imply a concurrent iconic/symbolic and institutional 
construction.  
 
Government will continue to be the principal funder of higher education, but we need to 
move to a funding regime which enables each institution to choose its mission and the 
funding streams necessary to support it, and to make sure that our system recognises and 
celebrates different missions properly. (DfES: 2003, p20) 
 
Here the White Paper is, on the one hand, seemingly constructing higher education as that which is 
autonomously determined by higher education institutions. On the other hand, this institutional 
autonomy is only available where an institution ‘chooses’ its mission in such a way that ‘our system 
recognises and celebrates different missions properly’. In other words, the choices of institutional 
mission will need to conform to governmental funding systems in order to be recognised, which 
would mean that the discursive exchange is not open. If the discursive exchange were closed, then 
this would constitute an iconic/symbolic objectification rather than the aesthetic construction that is 
being presented by the text. 
 
E X C H A N G E  A N D  E C O N O M I C  B E N E F I T  
The White Paper proposes the expansion of ‘knowledge exchanges’ where universities and business 
work collaboratively to consider ways in which both higher education and industry sectors can work 
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together for their mutual benefit. 
 
Knowledge Exchanges will be skilled in meeting business needs, and will be able both to 
serve needs from within their own consortium, and to signpost businesses to other Higher 
Education institutions which may better meet a particular need. (DfES: 2003, p39) 
 
A specific example of the kind of work knowledge exchanges will be expected to undertake is also 
provided, focusing on the work of the London Higher Education Consortium (LHEC). 
 
The central purposes of the consortium are to enhance London’s national and international 
reputation as a place for study and research, and develop the city’s competitiveness and 
innovation. To achieve these goals, the LHEC champions collaboration between educational 
institutions and businesses. It supports academic research and contract work for business, 
and encourages senior business managers to serve on institutional governing bodies and to 
provide inputs into course design and development. (DfES: 2003, p40) 
 
This could perhaps be read as a commodified objectification of higher education in that it explicitly 
describes higher education (in the form of academic research and contract work) as that which can 
be openly exchanged with business. However, the White Paper falls short of describing this activity 
as being exchanged for money as a homogeneous comparable textual object. Rather, the text 
describes the exemplar knowledge exchange as having a central purpose ‘to enhance London’s 
national and international reputation’. The establishment of ‘reputation’ would constitute a 
singularising move that would also close the discursive exchange. As such, it would constitute an 
iconic/symbolic objectification. Similarly, the encouragement for ‘senior business managers to serve 
on institutional governing bodies’ hardly seems like the construction of higher education as that 
which is openly exchanged. 
 
The description of the individual and national economic benefits of higher education, presented as 
‘the case for expansion’ of higher education (described above), is explicitly related to the exchange 
and production of economic capital. It is an attempt at an explicit description of the costs and benefits 
of higher education as viewed from a governmental perspective. The White Paper makes explicit 
reference to research from Universities UK that describes the specific economic contribution of 
higher education to the national economy. Similarly the White Paper describes the earnings and 
employment benefits an individual can (on average) expect to gain as a consequence of participating 
in higher education.  
 
Such descriptions could be read as commodified objectification of higher education. It is also the 
case that such descriptions rely on ‘strong correlation’ of, for example, higher earnings with higher 
education, where correlation may not in fact demonstrate causality. However, this analysis is 
concerned with textual construction rather than causality. On the other hand, it may be the case that 
such descriptions are only partially explicit, or open. The White Paper does not attempt to describe 
the economic value of higher education in relation to an explicit ‘market price’. It rather attempts to 
rationalise the proposal to increase public funding and to introduce variable tuition fees payable by 
those who participate in higher education. The text aligns the increase in public funding to the 
economic value of higher education as described by a lobby group of providers of higher education. 
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In addition, the text refers to “a comprehensive review of academic literature [that] suggests there is 
compelling evidence that education increases productivity” (DfES: 2003, p58), although, the 
reference in the White Paper also openly describes the limitations of the paper cited. 
 
The Returns to Education: A Review of the Macro-Economic Literature; Barbara Sianesi and 
John Van Reenen, (March 2002: Institute for Fiscal Studies Working Paper 2002/05.) – It 
should be noted, though, that there are both data limitations and methodological problems in 
isolating the contribution of any particular factor empirically. (DfES: 2003, p58) 
 
The acknowledged limitations of the review may somewhat undermine the ‘compelling’ nature of the 
evidence referred to by the White Paper. The reference itself however, is a recontextualisation of 
higher education that constitutes an aesthetic objectification. 
 
The reference to the Home Office, Universities UK, and the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development), as sources of evidence to support the description of the economic 
value of higher education, can also be read as iconic/symbolic objectification. Each body is 
reconstituted by the White Paper as an authoritative source of evidence to support the proposition 
presented. In the context of the discursive exchange instanced by the White Paper the authority of 
these singular bodies is euphemistically constituted to endorse a seemingly explicit description of the 
economic value of higher education. 
 
I N T E L L I G E N T  C U S T O M E R S  
The White Paper proposes introducing an annual student survey to capture and publicise student 
views about the teaching quality of the higher education institution they have studied at. At the same 
time it is proposed that summaries of external examiner reports are also published. Both would be 
available on a publicly accessible website. The White Paper describes this as a means to enable 
‘students’ to become ‘intelligent customers’ of higher education provision. 
 
To become intelligent customers of an increasingly diverse provision, and to meet their own 
increasing diverse needs, students need accessible information. (DfES: 2003, p47) 
 
At the same time the White Paper also proposes that ‘employers’ also need help from sector skills 
councils in becoming ‘intelligent customers’ of higher education institutions. 
 
Sector skills councils also have a key role in bringing together universities and employers, 
and in helping employers to act as intelligent customers of universities so that courses that 
have the needs of employers at heart are developed and successfully marketed.  
(DfES: 2003, p42) 
 
Sector skills councils are described by the text as “bodies with responsibility for ensuring that the 
skills needs of their industry ‘sector’ are met” (DfES: 2003, p105). As such, they are positioned as the 
voice of employers in specific industry sectors. In both these instances higher education is described 
as that which is available to ‘customers’ (students or employers) to meet their needs. This would 
seem to clearly construct higher education as a commodified objectification, in that the discursive 
exchange that is described is open in the sense that it is publicly accessible. In addition, students 
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and ‘sector skills councils’ are allocated an authorial voice in constructing the descriptions of ‘higher 
education’ that are publicly exchanged. 
 
It could be argued however, that the construction of the national student survey itself, might 
constitute an institutional objectification as it provides a closed framework within which individual 
student views are institutionalised. Similarly, sector skills councils are governmental bodies which act 
to define the needs of specific industry sectors by institutionalising information gathered from 
individual employers. What is clear however is that the White Paper is operating to explicitly 
construct a commodified objectification of higher education, even where this is in the context of 
institutional or governmental mechanisms. Both students and employers are presented as 
consumers of higher education. On the one hand, the homogeneous description of the quality of 
higher education teaching in individual institutions is positioned as a commodified objectification that 
is recontextualised through bureaucratic mechanisms. On the other hand, higher education is 
presented as that which can (and should) be (re)constructed in relation to the needs of employers as 
recontextualised by sector skills councils. Neither instances represent entirely open discursive 
exchange but they do constitute a (re)production of the idea of the commodification of higher 
education. 
 
T H E  R E L A T I V E  O P E N N E S S  O F  I N D I V I D U A L  E C O N O M I C  V A L U E  
Here I am going to broaden the boundary of the object text a little and include a brief overview of the 
survey, referred to in the White Paper, providing evidence of the individual economic benefits of 
higher education. I think it is appropriate to do so, as I aim to establish that the White Papers 
description of evidence to support the description of explicit economic benefits, is at least partially 
closed and/or euphemistic. The evidence cited is “Taylor Nelson Sofres Omnibus Survey, 2002” 
(DfES: 2003, p59). However, the reference provided is to the results of the survey, rather than a 
document describing any analysis of these results
5
. So the description of higher education leading to 
an average of 50% more earnings, or of participants being ‘half as likely to be unemployed’ and 
having ‘double the number of job promotions’, is not explicitly available within the reference text 
provided. The survey referred to is clearly singularised through the identification of the authors – 
‘Taylor Nelson Sofres’. However, the lack of access to the interpretation of the results referenced 
could be read as a form of institutional objectification of higher education. Where the survey results 
relate to higher education, they stand as a homogenised ‘description’ drawn from individual 
responses to a set of 25 questions. Only 6 of these questions are explicitly related to higher 
education.  
 
• Question 2a asks ‘Please can you tell me which of the descriptions here applies to you?’ 
 and one response category offered is ‘I am a student at university or similar higher 
 education institute’.  
• Question 2b asks ‘Which of the following education levels are your children or grandchildren 
 in?’ and one possible response category is ‘University’.  
• Question 21 asks ‘Currently around 40% of people aged 18 - 30 are in higher education. By 
 2010 the Government aims to widen access to universities and has set a target to raise this 
 to 50%. Do you agree or disagree with this aim? 67% of respondents agreed. 
• Question 22a asks ‘Why do you agree with this aim of widening access to higher education? 
 Response categories include; ‘Helps children to get a better job/Get on in life/better standard 
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 of living’ (9%); ‘People need education to get jobs’ (5%); ‘High unemployment/better chance 
 of getting a job’ (4%); ‘Country needs skilled/ educated people/ shortage’ (3%). 
 NB: The highest percentage response to this question was 37% for ‘Benefits to individual 
 students’ 
• Question 22b asks ‘Why do you disagree with this aim of widening access to higher 
 education? Response categories include; ‘Degrees would be devalued/mean nothing’ (6%); 
 ‘Should be for the best people/elite/based on ability’ (3%); ‘Too many people with degrees’ 
 (9%); ‘Not enough graduate jobs to go around’ (7%). 
• Question 23 asks for responses to the idea of ‘Students contribution to higher education’. 
 Responses included; ‘Students should pay all of their living costs but should get 
 government help with their tuition  fees’ (35%); ‘Students should pay something towards both 
 their tuition fees and living costs’ (30%); ‘Students should pay all of their tuition fees but 
 should get government help with living costs’ (9%); ‘Students should pay all their own tuition 
 fees and all their own living costs’ (2%). 
 
The other questions in the survey are concerned with gathering opinion about general standards in 
education, spending priorities, basic skills and so on. The survey was not actually commissioned to 
find out if participation in higher education brought individual economic benefits, as the DfES 
description of it makes clear. 
 
In November 2001 the Department for Education and Skills commissioned RSGB Omnibus, 
a Division of Taylor Nelson Sofres, to ask the publics view of the education service 
nationally. The main purpose of the survey was to help inform the Departments 
communication strategy (http://www.dfes.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/RRP/u013879/index.shtml - 
last accessed 20.3.08) 
 
Not only is the survey not primarily about higher education; where it is, it samples opinions about 
higher education and does not provide evidence of actual earnings, employment and promotions 
resulting from higher education. A reader of the White Paper cannot access the analysis of the 
survey results that provides evidence of the descriptions of individual economic benefits. In this 
instance, the reference provided does not describe any limitations or possible methodological 
problems in reaching the conclusions it is used to support. It seems clear however, that the way that 
the survey has been used to ‘inform the Departments communication strategy’, is to add weight to 
the description of the individual economic benefits of higher education in the White Paper, as ‘well 
documented’ and as such authoritative. The strategy is to claim authority for a very explicit 
description of individual economic benefits by reference to a survey from an established market 
research organisation. This strategy is employed even though the survey in question was not 
designed, and is arguably inadequate, to do so. 
 
The White Paper also does not refer to this survey anywhere else in the text despite the results 
seemingly being of direct relevance to the acceptability of policies to widen participation and 
introduce variable tuition fees. As such, the evidence described by the White Paper, for the individual 
economic benefits of higher education, seems rather less explicit than it is presented to be. This 
reference could then perhaps be described as a more ‘institutional’ as opposed to a ‘commodified’ 
objectification of higher education. Access to the discursive exchange that might support the 
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conclusions stated is closed. On the other hand, the textual object that is constructed (justifiable or 
not) does, on the face of it, constitute an explicit description of economic value. This is a 
homogenising move as higher education is constructed as that which has economic (comparable as 
opposed to singular) value. As such, the White Paper seems to be attempting to construct a 
commodified objectification of higher education, by openly exchanging information about the 
economic value of higher education. However, the principles upon which this particular textual 
construction is based are not in fact made available to the audience. The White Paper can then be 
said to be operating to regulate access to these principles, as a pedagogic text. This would mean 
that the objectification of higher education aligned with descriptions of economic benefit would be 
more appropriately described as institutional as opposed to commodified.  
 
The dynamic and strategic distribution of textual objects within the White Paper is summarised in 
Figure 11 below. 
 
Aesthetic discursive objectification 
Autonomy of individual Higher Education 
Institution mission 
 
Iconic/symbolic discursive objectification 
The White Paper  
As an instance of a Command Paper 
 
Governmental Agencies 
HEFCE, QAA, Teaching Quality Academy, Foundation 
Degree Forward, Centres of Excellence for Teaching and 




Commodified discursive objectification 
Intelligent customers 




The national economic benefits of Higher 
Education 
 
The individual economic benefits of Higher 
Education 
 
Institutional discursive objectification 
Criteria for awarding University title 
 
National Teaching Fellowship Scheme 
 
Research Assessment Exercise 
 




The social benefits of Higher Education 
 
F I G U R E  1 1 :  T H E  D Y N A M I C  D I S T R I B U T I O N  O F  D I S C U R S I V E  O B J E C T S  I N  T H E  W H I T E  P A P E R  
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the White Paper would seem to suggest that the text operates to recontextualise 
higher education as governmental practice. In doing so it employs a comprehensive range of modes 
of discursive objectification, including the commodified mode. The text (re)produces the idea of the 
commodification of higher education, indeed the text seems to explicitly seek to do this.  
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The text explicitly constructs audience voices as ‘partners’ in the delivery of the future of higher 
education. Indeed the inclusion of the identified partners comprises part of the construction of higher 
education as a textual object. For example, higher education is constructed as that which should 
operate in partnership with ‘employers’. The Government is positioned as the prime authorial voice 
with a ‘responsibility’ to plan, structure and regulate higher education including the identification of 
the principles and values upon which governmental action is operated. ‘Fair access’ to higher 
education is highlighted as a fundamental principle within the text. This is primarily described in 
relation to the identification of better ways in which higher education institutions can identify those 
who represent ‘the talented and best’ or those with ‘potential to benefit’ from higher education. The 
mechanisms for recognising potential participants as talented or as having potential remains highly 
institutionalised and regulated in opposition to an open higher education market or commodified 
mode.  
 
The White Paper also constructs a variety of iconic/symbolic agencies with a range of governmental 
regulatory powers. Each of these agencies is also associated with specific bureaucratic systems that 
serve to both constitute some agencies (university title, degree awarding powers etc) and to regulate 
the practice of those same agencies. The seemingly open opportunity for higher education 
institutions to define their institutional mission (and as such their singular identity) is highly regulated 
by bureaucratic systems that are designed to measure the quality of outputs and allocate public 
resources accordingly. 
 
Both students and employers are described as potential ‘intelligent customers’ of higher education. 
However, the analysis would seem to indicate that these descriptions fall short of open discursive 
exchange. The former is reliant on a bureaucratically administered survey of student opinion of 
teaching quality in individual institutions. The latter is a recontextualisation of employer needs by 
organisations (sector skills councils) that are licensed by the Secretary of State for Education and 
Skills (DfES). Even the references to ‘knowledge exchanges’, which sound like they could constitute 
an open and homogeneous description turn out rather to be concerned with euphemistic reputation 
and status.  
 
The case for the expansion of higher education explicitly attempts to describe higher education in 
relation to its national and individual economic value. The White Paper does this to attempt to 
present a cost/benefit description to rationalise the allocation of public funding to higher education 
and the introduction of variable tuition fees for individual students. This is perhaps the most explicit 
indication of the text operating to (re)produce of the idea of the commodification of higher education. 
However, the case for the national economic value of higher education that is presented seems far 
from ‘compelling’. The evidence presented is either a description of the higher education sector’s 
economic value by a lobby group (UUK) from the sector, or is explicitly identified as limited and 
methodologically problematic. Similarly, the evidence for the claims concerning the individual 
economic benefits associated with higher education participation are certainly not explicitly available 
and may even be misrepresentative. In either case, the point is that the discursive exchange as 
constructed in the text is (at least partially) not open and to this degree that which is described may 
not constitute a commodified objectification. On the other hand, it could of course be argued that the 
text does construct higher education as a commodified object even if the way that it operates to do 
this is itself not explicit. 
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The broad purpose of White Papers is to announce planned legislation and to persuade those who 
can affect the processes of parliamentary approval and implementation of the merit of such 
proposals. In explicitly describing higher education in terms of its economic value, the text employs 
the idea of its commodification to persuade the intended audience(s) that the level of public 
investment and individual financial contribution is value for money. Given the unconvincing nature of 
the evidence to support this idea however, it would seem to represent a form of textual slight of hand. 
Whilst seeming to explicitly relate higher education to economic value, the White Paper is busy 
constructing highly bureaucratic systems and agencies designed to maintain regulatory authority and 
governmental power over the future of higher education. 
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L O C A T I N G  T H E  S C H W A R T Z  R E P O R T  W I T H I N  T H E  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  F I E L D  
The object text for analysis in this chapter is the Fair admissions to higher education: 
recommendations for good practice produced by Admissions to Higher Education Steering Group 
(AHESG) chaired by Stephen Schwartz and known as The Schwartz Report. The text was published 
in 2004 by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES). 
 
In 2003 the UK Government commissioned a review into the methods that higher education 
institutions use to assess the merit of the applications that they receive following the “public debate 
about the criteria that universities and colleges should apply in deciding which applicants to admit” 
(AHESG: September 2003, p5). For example, the Times Higher Education Supplement reported one 
speaker from a conference concerning admissions to higher education entitled ‘Fair enough?’ as 
saying 
 
It is arguable that applying the same entry requirements for all students amounts to indirect 
discrimination because treating all people the same would significantly disadvantage an 
identifiable group for no good reason. In such circumstances, different treatment is justified 
or may even be required precisely because its purpose is to assist a disadvantaged group. 
(THES: 31.1.2003) 
 
The then Secretary of State Charles Clark, asked Stephen Schwartz, Vice Chancellor of Brunel 
University, to lead the Steering Group (AHESG) of the Admissions to Higher Education Review 
which was specifically commissioned to ‘reinforce public confidence’ in the fairness of higher 
education admission systems. The appointed AHESG membership, in addition to the chair, included; 
one Vice Chancellor and one Rector and Chief Executive of UK Universities; the Head of Admissions 
at the University of Cambridge; the Chairman of TESCO; the Chairman of the Sutton Trust; the Chief 
Executive of UCAS; the Chief Executive of HEFCE; one Headteacher of a Secondary Public School; 
one Headteacher of a Comprehensive Secondary State School; and one Principal of a Further 
Education College. 
 
The terms of reference for the Steering Group were as follows: 
 
To report to the Secretary of State for Education and Skills on the options which English 
institutions providing Higher Education should consider adopting in assessing the merit of 
applicants and their achievement and potential for different types of courses. 
To report on practical implementation of such options using evidence-based good practice. 
To report on the high-level principles underpinning such approaches which institutions would 
be expected to adopt. 
 
The Group should consider in particular:  
a) the need to reinforce public confidence in the fairness and transparency of admissions 
 arrangements;  
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b) the diversity in the missions of providers of Higher Education, and of their students;  
c) maintaining the autonomy of institutions in academic matters including the systems and 
 processes by which applicants are admitted. 
 The report to the Secretary of State should be submitted by May 2004 following a period 
 of consultation with universities and the wider public.  
 (AHESG: September 2003, Appendix 4) 
 
The Schwartz Report (AHESG: September 2004) was produced following a two-phase consultation 
process. The first phase described ‘key issues relating to fair admissions to higher education’ 
(AHESG: September 2003). The second phase included the production of draft recommendations 
concerning the principles of fair admissions to higher education in a document entitled Fair 
admissions to higher education: draft recommendations for consultation (AHESG: April 2004). The 
final report (and the object text for analysis in this chapter) was published in September 2004 and it 
stated that, 
 
It is our intention that this report acts both as a catalyst for action, and as a practical guide to 
fair admissions to which institutions can refer in reviewing and developing their admissions 
policies and processes. (AHESG: September 2004, p2) 
 
The final report is, I argue, the product of the operation of ‘technologies of discourse’ in the 
(re)production of ‘true knowledge’ about higher education practice. The following section will describe 
the location of the object text within the specialised theoretical discursive field constructed by this 
thesis and provide an overview of the method of analysis that will be employed in this chapter. 
 
T H E  A N A L Y S I S  O F  T H E  S C H W A R T Z  R E P O R T   
In describing the higher education discursive field, chapter two described Foucaultian ‘technologies 
of truth’ following Simola et al (1998) which included ‘technologies of self’, ‘technologies of 
government’ and ‘technologies of discourse’. This chapter will focus on the analysis of The Schwartz 
Report as an example of ‘technologies of discourse’. The process of appointing an official steering 
group to consult and then report on good practice is an example of a technology employed to 
constitute ‘what’ is the ‘true knowledge’ about fair higher education admissions. As an example of a 
technology of discourse, The Schwartz Report operates to describe what is and what is not written 
(or spoken) about fair higher education admissions. It also describes who is authorised to speak and 
who is not, about fair higher education admissions and how those who are authorised should speak. 
I argue that one of the significant ways in which The Schwartz Report operates to construct higher 
education as ‘fair admissions practice’ is to create oppositions and alliances between specific 
‘authors’ and ‘audiences’ such as the Admissions to Higher Education Steering Group and Higher 
Education Institutions. 
 
In other words, the specific nature of the description of higher education, (re)produced within The 
Schwartz Report, is determined by what is included and what is excluded in the construction of such 
oppositions and alliances. The activity that the object text is concerned with is the practice of higher 
education and the description of this practice is, I argue, a recontextualisation of it as ‘fair admissions 
practice’. This not to say that all higher education practice is somehow subsumed within admissions 
practice but rather to say that the language of higher education practice is re-described by The 
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Schwartz Report in relation to the principles of admissions practice. The Schwartz Report employs 
an elaborated language of fair admissions practice to construct ‘higher education’ as that which 
should be described in relation to ‘high-level principles’ underpinning fair admissions including; 
transparency; selecting for merit, potential and diversity; reliability, validity and relevance; minimising 
barriers; professionalism (AHESG: September 2004). I will not be arguing that the description of 
higher education within The Schwartz Report is right or wrong but I will rather seeking to generate a 
description of ‘how’ it is operating within the higher education field. 
 
As a consequence of the identification of oppositions and alliances within The Schwartz Report, I will 
construct a discursive space from oppositions concerning ‘modes of assessing merit and potential’. 
The Schwartz Report’s terms of reference are centrally concerned with providing guidance about fair 
ways to assess the merit of applicants to higher education institutions. The oppositions and alliances 
instanced within the text construct a specific recontextualisation of higher education practice as fair 
admissions practice. The various modes of assessing merit I will describe will not seek to establish 
concrete instances of each mode but will rather be concerned with the dynamic relations between 
modes. The relational discursive space constructed, however, will comprehensively contain all 
possible variables in consideration of the oppositions used to construct the space. In this instance 
the oppositions identified within the text will be ‘validity/non-validity’ and ‘reliability/non-reliability’ 
which are described within the object text. 
 
I will then recontextualise this analysis and the oppositions and alliances identified as a consequence 
of it, in relation to the discursive space, previously described in chapter three, that is concerned with 
modes of discursive objectification. This space is constructed by considering the dynamic relations 
between two oppositions; singular/homogeneous objectification and open/closed discursive 
exchange. As one of the modes of discursive objectification described is the ‘commodified mode’ this 
space can be employed to describe how and the extent to which, the object text is operating in this 
mode. In other words, I argue that the analysis of the specific description of higher education within 
The Schwartz Report can be employed to construct a relatively coherent description of the extent to 
which the text operates to (re)produce or resist the idea of the commodification of higher education. 
 
To summarise, the method of analysis in this chapter will produce a ‘constructive description’ 
including: 
 
1. The introduction to the location of The Schwartz Report within the higher education field (as 
discussed above). 
2. An overview of the authorial and audience voices constructed in my transaction with The 
Schwartz Report (reconstructed in the reader’s transaction with this text) 
3. An analysis of how The Schwartz Report is operating to recontextualise ‘higher education’ as fair 
admissions practice. 
4. The identification and analysis of oppositions and alliances within The Schwartz Report to 
construct a specialised and localised mode of action – ‘modes of assessing merit’. 
5. The recontexualisation of oppositions and alliances described in the analysis (items 1-4 above) 
in relation to modes of discursive objectification. 
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6. An analysis of the dynamics of the distribution and exclusion of textual objects in relation to 
modes of discursive objectification, including the extent to which the text is operating in the 
commodified mode. 
 
Authorial and audience voices in The Schwartz Report 
The primary authorial voice indicated within The Schwartz Report is the Admissions to Higher 
Education Steering Group (AHESG). The appointment, by the UK Government (DfES), of non-
government members to this group enables the text to be described as being the product of ‘an 
independent review’ of fair admissions practices in the higher education sector. However, while the 
term ‘independent’ here can be read as signifying that appointees are not directly representative of 
the UK Government, it is clear that the steering group does not, on the whole, represent 
‘uninterested’ parties. All members of the group (with the exception of the Chairman of Tesco) have a 
fairly direct interest in higher education, hence their description as ‘stakeholders’. Three members 
represent the university sector as providers of higher education and three members represent 
institutions that have an interest in preparing applicants for higher education. The Sutton Trust has 
an interest in providing support for disadvantaged groups accessing higher education and two 
members represent either funding higher education or administering the process of admissions. The 
Chairman of Tesco is a representative of business that may have an interest in graduate recruitment 
and higher-level training.  
 
The rationale for the appointment of these particular individuals is not made explicit within the text 
but it can be described as constituting what is known as a group of ‘the great and the good’. They all 
hold senior positions in their individual organisations and can, it must be presumed, bring expertise 
to the review in hand. Whilst they each bring a specific perspective they have been charged with 
producing a report that describes best practice for the sector as a whole. The Steering Group 
operates as a collective entity that has a single authorial voice. Individual voices of members of the 
Steering Group are not made available within the text. On the one hand, the Steering Group’s 
authority is underpinned by its seniority and relative diversity, on the other hand, this diversity is 
homogenised in the processes of textual production as the Steering Group is constituted by the text 
as a single author.  
 
The one exception to this is the Foreword by the chair of Steering Group, Stephen Schwartz. As is 
usual practice for such reports, the chair describes the general context of the review and lends 
personal support for the project that has been undertaken. As the leading member of the Steering 
Group, the chair constitutes an individual with which the report can be associated without at the 
same time establishing individual authorship. 
 
These technologies largely exclude the description of the DfES, or the Government, as authors of the 
report, as the Foreword by Stephen Schwartz makes clear. 
 
I was asked by Charles Clarke, Secretary of State for Education and Skills, to lead an 
independent review of the options that English higher education institutions should consider 
when assessing the merit of applicants for their courses, and to report on the high-level 
principles underlying these options. I was supported in this review by a Steering Group 
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representing a range of stakeholders. Our review began in June 2003, and this is our final 
report. (AHESG: September 2004, p2) 
 
The fact that the process is described as an ‘independent review’ establishes an authorial distance 
between the government, who have commissioned the review and the Steering Group. It is of course 
the case that the chair and all committee members were appointed by the DfES, including the Chief 
Executive of HEFCE, who fund the four higher education institutions represented. It is also the case 
that the DfES determined the specific terms of reference of the review. These are clearly described 
within The Schwartz Report text and to this degree at least, the DfES can be described as a partial 
author. The DfES and in particular the Secretary of State, are also explicitly identified as the prime 
audience of the final report as the commissioning body in the terms of reference above. 
 
The terms of reference also identify that the report should result from consultation with ‘universities 
and the wider public’. This broad description was unpacked on the consultation response form (for 
both phase one and two), which stated that   
 
This consultation is primarily aimed at: 
Institutions Offering Higher Education 
Schools & Colleges 
Young People 
Organisations Working with/Advising Young People 
Students’ Unions 
Employers’ Organisations (AHESG: September 2003a, p1) 
 
The Schwartz Report overview of consultation responses (p66-67) indicates that over a third of 
responses for both phases came from higher education institutions. It is clear then that the 
consultation process described with the text includes the identification of the organisations above as 
audiences for the consultation texts. However, given that The Schwartz Report text is described as 
‘recommendations for good practice’, it seems also to be clear that the practice being described is 
that of those involved in making decisions about admitting applicants to higher education. In the 
terms of reference and elsewhere in the text, it is made clear that higher education institutions have 
autonomy in making such decisions. 
 
The Steering Group wishes to affirm its belief in the autonomy of institutions over admissions 
policies and decisions. (AHESG: September 2004, p6) 
 
It would seem reasonable to conclude that while the audience for the consultation phases of the 
review included a range of organisations and to a degree ’the wider public’, the primary audience for 
the final Schwartz Report text (aside from the Secretary of State) is universities and other institutions 
providing higher education.  
 
The recontextualisation of higher education as fair admissions practice 
This section will focus primarily on the ‘problems’ in higher education admissions described by the 
text and the ‘high-level principles’ produced as solutions to these problems. 
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The Schwartz Report describes university and college admissions systems and practices as 
generally fair and including many aspects of good practice but also identifies a range of issues and 
problems that the Report seeks to address. The Report seeks to address these issues by describing 
the ‘high-level principles’ for fair admissions, guidelines for how these principles can be implemented 
by higher education institutions and wider recommendations for other stakeholders. The problems 
and solutions described within the text construct a range of oppositions and alliances that I argue 
operate to recontextualise higher education. The text describes the problems with higher education 
admissions as follows; 
 
The Steering Group has identified the following problems to which it believes solutions are 
needed as we move towards the goal of admissions processes which are both fair and seen 
to be fair: 
There are differing interpretations of merit and fairness; 
It can be difficult for applicants to know how they will be assessed; 
The information used in assessing applicants may not be equally reliable and consistent; 
Some courses have high drop-out rates, which may be related to admissions processes; 
For courses that are over-subscribed, it can be difficult for admissions staff to select from a 
growing pool of highly-qualified applicants; 
Some applicants face a burden of additional assessment; 
There is uneven awareness of and response to the increasing diversity of applicants, 
qualifications and pathways into higher education; 
Most offers depend on predicted grades, not confirmed examination results; 
The legislation applicable to admissions is complex and there is uneven understanding of 
what it means for admissions policies and processes. (AHESG: September 2004, p21/22) 
 
In relation to the problem of ‘differing interpretations of merit and fairness’, the text describes an 
opposition between merit that is established through the achievement of the highest exams marks 
alone and a more individualised and holistic assessment of achievement and potential. The latter 
description of merit includes considerations of the type of school an applicant might have attended, 
obstacles that an applicant might have overcome and the positive contribution an applicant might 
make to the ‘diversity of the student community’. The Report also states that equal examination 
results do not necessarily equate to equal potential, citing evidence that state school entrants with 
equal examination grades do better than independent school entrants. However, the Report doesn’t 
make a recommendation to resolve this opposition but rather recommends that each higher 
education institution makes explicit how it describes merit: in other words, to make explicit where 
each institution’s description of merit sits on the continuum between reliance on examination results 
alone and individual, holistic assessment of achievement and potential based on a wide range of 
indicators. In describing ‘merit and fairness’ in this way the text positions ‘fairness’ as explicitness. 
The text recontextualises higher education practice as that which requires explicitness in relation to 
the specific description of merit applied in the process of admitting students. 
 
This ‘problem’ is also related to the issue, described in the text, of it being difficult for applicants to 
know how they will be assessed in the process of admission to higher education. 
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Transparency is important to enable all applicants to make the right choices…students will 
be placed more obviously in the role of consumers. (AHESG: September 2004, p25) 
 
In fact the text states that  
 
Transparency produces informed consumers [bold in the original text as a heading] 
Transparency about admissions policies, criteria and processes has the additional benefit of 
aiding self-selection by applicants. (AHESG: September 2004, p25)  
 
This establishes a non-explicit opposition with what might be ‘opaque’ admission procedures and 
‘uninformed’ consumers but also describes higher education as that which places students in the role 
of consumers (informed or otherwise). This constructs an opposition between students as consumers 
(of higher education) and students not conceived of as consumers at all but this opposition is not 
made explicit. The explicit emphasis within the text upon ‘informed’ (and therefore also uninformed) 
consumers invites acquiescence to the description of students as consumers. Here the text operates 
to construct higher education as that which students consume and invites the reading that ‘fair’ 
consumption requires consumers to be informed. 
 
This is further emphasised in an earlier section of the text when it describes higher education as a 
valuable commodity. 
 
A fair and transparent admissions system is essential for all applicants. Higher education is 
a valuable commodity: it can affect salary, job security and power to influence society. The 
number of people in England who seek an HE qualification has grown enormously, with over 
934,000 full-time undergraduate students and an additional 521,000 studying part-time. 
Overall, the benefits of HE are strong. But they also vary considerably from course to course 
and between institutions, in terms of both the learning experience and graduate outcomes. 
The sector is diverse and choice of course and institution matters. In this context, it is vital 
that all stakeholders in the admissions process – applicants, parents, schools, colleges, 
teaching and admissions staff – believe the system is fair. (AHESG: September 2004, p4) 
 
Here higher education is constructed as a commodity that brings specific benefits to those who gain 
access to it. In this description, the higher education commodity market includes products of differing 
value in terms of the benefits they can bring. The proposition described by The Schwartz Report is 
that the currency that enables a consumer to gain access to the higher education products of the 
highest value (in terms of ‘salary, job security and power’) is merit, rather than money for example. 
Merit is not explicitly opposed to money within the text as the means to gain access to high value 
higher education products but it is clear that the reference to higher education as a commodity aligns 
it with the practices of financial exchange. The recommendation that the determination of merit be 
transparent and explicit to applicants is similar to Bourdieu’s description of economic exchange 
(Bourdieu,1986) as based on an explicit price. The text would appear to be operating to construct 
merit as an explicit currency that can operate in a similar fashion to the way that money operates to 
establish market price and value in the exchange of traditional commodities. However, by the same 
token the variable and institutionally specific descriptions of merit, highlighted by the text, might also 
be described as ‘euphemistic’ (as opposed to explicit), drawing on Bourdieu’s description of the 
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exchange of symbolic goods (Bourdieu: 1998) as discussed in chapter three. Admissions processes 
are in this context a means through which the amount of admission ‘currency’ (merit) an applicant 
possesses is established and this will be contingent upon the specific way in which it is measured by 
each individual institution. 
 
There is also a clear opposition here between ‘self-selection’ and selection by something other than 
‘self’, ‘institutional selection’ perhaps. ‘Transparency about admissions’ is described as having the 
benefits of lessening ‘wasted choices’, lowering ‘drop-out rates’ and preventing applicants ‘wrongly 
discounting themselves’ from courses (AHESG: September 2004, p25). In this description 
’transparency’ is positioned as a mechanism through which applicants can recognise themselves as 
having or not having ‘merit’ in relation to specific higher education courses. Self-selection requires 
the willingness of the applicant to subjectify themselves in relation to specific descriptions of merit (as 
a knowledge regime) through self-examination.  
 
The Schwartz Report describes problems concerning the reliability of the information used in 
assessing applicants. Issues identified include examination results not always being a reliable 
indicator of future success, the variable reliability of personal statements and the lack of consensus 
concerning the reliability and validity of different methods of assessment (AHESG: September 2004, 
p26). Here a clear opposition is constructed between types of information that are ‘reliable and valid’ 
and types that are not. There is also an opposition between forms of information derived from 
externally regulated examination results and those that are derived from personal statements. 
However, the issue described in relation to personal statements is not that they are self-generated as 
such but rather that the provenance of the information may be questionable (perhaps as a 
consequence of not being regulated). 
 
Similarly, the problems of high drop-out rates for some courses are described as relating to the need 
for the review of the reliability of assessment methods employed during the admissions process and 
the level of support for ‘widening participation’ learners. It is also stated that it is unfair to admit 
applicants that are unlikely to succeed as a means of meeting institutional recruitment targets. Here 
presumably, low drop-out rates would be related to reliable assessment methods and an appropriate 
level of support for ‘widening participation’ learners. A distinction is being made between widening 
participation applicants and other applicants in terms of the level of support provided which is 
different from describing the varying reliability of assessment methods. Similarly, a distinction can be 
drawn between ‘applicants’ and ‘learners’, both of which are mentioned in the text, where the latter 
represents an applicant that has been admitted to a course of study. The text implies that ‘support’ 
for widening participation applicants in something that might occur once a ‘learner’ has been 
admitted to a higher education course. However, it is not clears within the text if such support, if 
available during the admissions process, would merely require the use of reliable and valid methods 
of assessing the merit of applicants or would be supplementary to this. 
 
The text describes the problem of over-subscribed courses selecting from a “growing pool of highly 
qualified applicants” (AHESG: September 2004, p27). The similarity of the levels of the qualifications 
of applicants is described as leading to an unpredictability of outcomes in the admissions process 
and the perception of unfairness. The lack of transparency in the process is also described as 
exacerbating the problem. Here the text is describing some higher education institutions as having a 
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problem in selecting from a category of applicants who all have ‘merit’ and the potential to benefit 
from an oversubscribed course. The problem described is not one of identifying which applicants 
have merit but rather one of identifying which applicants have more merit in relation to other 
applicants who also have a high level of merit. Higher education is as such, constructed as a 
potentially scarce good, for which it is fair to provide access to, on a competitive basis, related to the 
amount of merit that an applicant possesses. 
 
Linked with the above is the ‘burden of additional assessment’, where for example, institutions 
require applicants to sit additional tests and conduct interviews to determine the merit of applications 
to higher education. The text describes issues relating to the additional financial burden such 
activities can have on applicants which could provide an uneven ground for some applicants to 
compete. The text does not describe the opposition here with the potential benefits that might be 
associated with additional assessment. It is possible, for example, that applicants might gain insight 
into the requirements of the course they are applying to inform their choice of course. However, the 
text positions this issue in relation to the principle of ‘minimising barriers’ that are ‘irrelevant to the 
assessment’ of applicants. 
 
The text identifies a problem with the ‘uneven awareness of and response to the diversity of 
applicants and qualifications’. Issues described include the uneven recognition and awareness of 
non-A level qualifications and the explicit exclusion of these qualifications by some institutions, as 
well as the lack of a national system of credit to enable to equivalent recognition of qualifications. 
The phrase ‘uneven awareness and response’ points up an opposition between institutions that are 
aware of and recognise non-A level qualifications and those that do not, which enables the 
unevenness described, to be mapped. The ’problem’ here is described in terms of ‘awareness and 
response’ rather than, for example, fairness and merit. In relation to the ‘response’ of those making 
decisions concerning the admissions of students, lack of awareness of non-A level qualifications is 
also described as “not…a legitimate reason for not considering an applicant” (AHESG: September 
2004, p28). This establishes an opposition between legitimate reasons for non-selection and non-
legitimate reasons. However, that The Schwartz Report states that 
 
The Admissions to Higher Education Steering Group believes in the autonomy of institutions 
over admissions policies and decisions. Fairness does not mean that governments should 
choose students. Preserving academic freedom requires that academic institutions retain 
three basic rights in relation to teaching: the right to choose who will teach, what will be 
taught and to whom. This means that the specific applicants that a university or college 
accepts should be a matter for each institution and no one else. Moreover, it should be 
clearly recognised that it is perfectly legitimate for admissions staff to seek out the most 
academically excellent students. Admissions must, however, be fair to applicants, and in 
developing its recommendations, the Steering Group has paid particular attention to the 
interests of applicants. (AHESG: September 2004, p30) 
 
This means that individual higher education institutions determine the legitimacy of reasons for non-
consideration of an applicant with non-A level qualifications. In other words, if an institution decides 
to exclude applicants with non-A level qualifications, where the institution is aware of such 
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qualifications, this can be legitimate and fair according to the description of fair admissions in The 
Schwartz Report.  
 
This of course does not necessarily mean that it might not be equally fair for the Government to 
choose students, even if this is not a position supported by the text. The Schwartz Report bases its 
‘belief’ in the autonomy of institutions in making decisions concerning the admission of students on 
the value of ‘academic freedom’, in particular, the right of each higher education institution to choose 
whom it will teach. The text weighs this right against what sounds like a duty to (‘admissions must’) 
be fair to applicants. By seeking to define fair admissions the text identifies, by exclusion, admissions 
practices that are not fair. 
 
After considering the issues, evidence and arguments summarised in the earlier parts of this 
report, the Steering Group has reached the opinion that fair admissions system is one that 
provides equal opportunity for all individuals, regardless of background.  
(AHESG: September 2004, p30) 
 
In other words, admissions practices that do not provide ‘equal opportunity for all individuals, 
regardless of background’ are not fair. Given the full range of possibilities that are implied by the text, 
it would seem at least conceivable that institutional autonomy could result in unfair admissions 
practice. By the same token, it seems possible that Government responsibility for admissions 
decisions could result in fair admissions practice. Indeed the problems described in the text that 
relate to the lack of a national credit system could be related to Government level action. However, 
the text makes it clear that the principle of institutional autonomy is not debatable. It constitutes an 
example of a technology of discourse that excludes statements that might question institutional 
autonomy. The internal rules of the discourse (for example, the terms of reference of the Steering 
Group) operate to reproduce the ‘true knowledge’ about higher education admissions and at the 
same time exclude questions concerning the legitimacy of institutional autonomy. 
 
The text also identifies that the admissions system is mostly based on predicted, rather than 
confirmed examination results, which the text describes as less reliable given that only 50% turn out 
to be accurate. As such the text identifies this practice as unfair and recommends introducing a 
system of post-qualification applications (PQA). Once again it is the reliability of the admissions 
system in identifying merit, as the currency of admissions, that the text is concerned with. In this 
instance the text operates to align fairness with reliability and unfairness with unreliability. The text 
supports this position by reference to anecdotal evidence. 
 
There is anecdotal evidence that some students currently might not choose to apply at all, or 
may restrict their choice of course because they do not think their marks will be good 
enough. (AHESG: September 2004, p29) 
 
This excerpt identifies a potential barrier for some applicants who might be less confident of their 
merit when unable to make applications based on results rather than predictions and this is 
positioned as the source of the unfairness described. Another way of saying this might be that those 
who are less used to being described as having merit are likely to be less adept at using it, or 
following Bourdieu, they lack the cultural capital to mobilise their human assets. 
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Lastly the text identifies the problem that “not all admissions staff are clear that improving access to 
HE for disadvantaged or under-represented groups is a legitimate aim for institutions” (AHESG: 
September 2004, p29). The text includes implicit opposition concerning institutional aims that are 
legitimate or non-legitimate as well as oppositions between aims that seek academic excellence as 
opposed to providing opportunity for disadvantaged or under-represented groups. There is also a 
potential opposition between legitimacy of claims for access to higher education as determined by 
the law and legitimacy as determined by institutional autonomy. However, these oppositions are 
resolved within the text by relating them to matters of the professionalism in admissions. This 
strategy largely avoids discussion concerning the legitimacy of individual institutional aims beyond 
compliance with disability and discrimination, human rights and European Union legislation. Rather, 
the issue, as described by the text, can be resolved by institutions raising the awareness of their 
admissions staff through appropriate training.  
 
If the text had described the problem as institutions not describing improving access as a legitimate 
aim the text would have been operating outside its terms of reference by questioning institutional 
autonomy to decide such matters. The internal rules of discourse (the terms of reference) are 
operating to determine what can and what cannot be said. In this instance the internal rules of the 
discourse have regulated the description of the problems with fair admissions to higher education. If 
this is the case then it seems likely that the descriptions of the high-level principles, positioned as the 
solution to these problems, are also regulated by the internal rules of the discourse and systems of 
exclusion. 
 
H I G H - L E V E L  P R I N C I P L E S  
The Schwartz Report describes five high-level principles that it recommends that higher education 
institutions consider to address the problems in admissions identified by the Report. 
 
Transparency 
Principle 1: A fair admissions system should be transparent 
Selecting for merit, potential and diversity 
Principle 2: A fair admissions system should enable institutions to select students who are 
able to complete the course as judged by their achievements and their potential 
Reliability, validity and relevance 
Principle 3: A fair admissions system should strive to use assessment methods that are 
reliable and valid 
Minimising barriers 
Principle 4: A fair admissions system should seek to minimise barriers for applicants 
Professionalism 
Principle 5: A fair admissions system should be professional in every respect and 
underpinned by appropriate institutional structures and processes  
(AHESG: September 2004, NB these principles have been extracted from the following 
pages of the text - p33-42)  
 
In relation to the principle of ‘transparency’ the text recommends that institutions should provide clear 
information concerning the criteria and methods used by an institutions in assessing merit and 
potential including the extent to which wider contextual factors are included. In relation to ‘selecting 
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for merit, potential and diversity’ two key tenets are described: “Ability to complete the course is an 
essential criterion for admission to HE; Applicants should be assessed as individuals.” (AHESG: 
September 2004, p35). In relation to the principle of ‘reliability, validity and relevance’ the text 
acknowledges that both quantitative and qualitative methods of establishing merit and potential can 
be relevant to admissions processes.  
 
In describing the principle of ‘minimising barriers’ the text identifies a range of potential barriers that 
are ‘irrelevant to admissions requirements’. The text describes such barriers as including those in the 
areas of; “Means of assessment; the varying resources and support available to applicants; 
Disability; The type of an applicant’s qualifications.” (AHESG: September 2004, p41). The principle of 
‘professionalism’ in admissions is described by the text as requiring clear institutional responsibilities 
in managing admissions, appropriate resources to be allocated and admissions staff to be 
appropriately trained. 
 
The relationship described by the text between ‘problems’ and ‘high-level principles’ operates to 
construct the discursive space within which higher education practice is recontextualised as fair 
admissions to higher education practice. In other words, higher education is recontextualised as a 
specific textual object formed in the context of the oppositions and alliances instanced within the text. 
This specific higher education discursive object is constructed in the space between these 
oppositions and alliances. Appendix 9 ‘Problems, Principles and Recommendations’ of the text 
presents an illustration of the discursive framework within which, fair admissions to higher education 
is constructed. The table relates ‘problems’ in higher education admissions (as discussed above) to 
the specific ‘principles’ of fair admissions described within the text. The table has been reproduced 





Differing interpretations of merit and fairness Transparency 
Selecting for merit, potential and diversity 
 





Information used in assessing applicants may not be 
equally reliable and consistent 
Selecting for merit, potential and diversity 
Reliability, validity and relevance 
Some courses have high drop-out rates Transparency 
Selecting for merit, potential and diversity 
Reliability, validity and relevance 
Professionalism 
For over-subscribed courses, it can be difficult for 
admissions staff to select from a growing pool of highly-
qualified applicants 
Transparency 
Selecting for merit, potential and diversity 
Reliability, validity and relevance 
Minimising the barriers 
Some applicants face a burden of additional assessment Minimising the barriers 
Uneven awareness of and response to the diversity of 
applicants, qualifications and pathways 
Professionalism 
Most offers depend on predicted not actual grades  
Relevant legislation is complex and there is uneven 
understanding of it 
Transparency 
Selecting for merit, potential and diversity 
Reliability, validity and relevance 
Minimising the barriers 
Professionalism 
 
F I G U R E  1 2 :  P R O B L E M S ,  P R I N C I P L E S  A N D  R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S   
( A H E S G :  S E P T E M B E R  2 0 0 4 ,  P 8 6 )  
 
The ‘problem’ that ‘most offers depend on predicted not actual grades’, is not related (within the text) 
to any ‘principle’. This is because the principles of fair admissions described by the text are to guide 
the practice of higher education institutions, whereas the issues of predicted grades is identified as a 
systemic problem that individual institutions cannot resolve. This does highlight the way in which the 
principles are constructed. Principles do not relate to the practice of higher education admissions 
outside the context of individual higher education institutions. Practice that is more generally 
described is not related to ‘principles’ of fair admissions but rather to ‘recommendations’. 
 
This is in contrast with the other problems described. For example, the problem of ‘differing 
interpretations of merit and fairness’ is related to the principles of ‘transparency’ and ‘selecting for 
merit, potential and diversity’. In other words, in this instance ‘differing interpretations’ is described as 
the problem to which ‘transparency’, in relation to the description of merit a specific institution 
employs in making decisions about who to admit to its courses, is the solution. It would of course 
have been possible to oppose ‘differing interpretations’ with ‘a consistent interpretation’ of merit but 
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this would have been contrary to the terms of reference of the Steering Group to maintain 
institutional autonomy in determining academic matters. Despite the emphasis on assessing merit 
within the text, there is no definition of it, beyond the identification of possible ways of assessing it. 
The closest the text gets to a definition of merit is in describing ‘ability to complete the course’ as an 
essential criterion for admission to higher education. However, whilst the text may be identifying this 
‘tenet’ as essential (necessary) it is clearly not sufficient otherwise the text would include a 
recommendation that all applicants who met this minimum threshold should be admitted to the 
course they applied for. 
 
If we consider another example from the Appendix 9 table the text is more definitive. The ‘problem’ 
that ’information used in assessing applicants may not be equally reliable and consistent’ is related to 
the ‘principles’ of ‘selecting for merit, potential and diversity’ and ‘reliability, validity and relevance’. In 
particular, the problem of a lack of reliability and consistency is related to principles of reliability and 
validity. Reliability and validity are defined by the text as follows: 
 
In this context, the Steering Group defines ‘reliable’ as meaning that two people applying the 
same method would reach the same conclusion about the same person, and ‘valid’ as 
meaning that the method predicts what it is supposed to predict.  
(AHESG: September 2004, p 40, note 70) 
 
Reliability and validity are defined by the text in such a way as to clearly encompass the opposite of 
each term, ‘non-reliability’ and ‘non-validity’. In order to gain further insight into how the text is 
operating, these oppositions will be used to construct a discursive space to describe modes of 
assessing merit and potential that are instanced within the text. 
 
Modes of assessing merit and potential 
 
O P P O S I T I O N S  A N D  A L L I A N C E S  C O N C E R N I N G  ‘ M O D E S  O F  A S S E S S I N G  M E R I T  A N D  
P O T E N T I A L ’  
The Admissions to Higher Education Steering Group terms of reference were to report on the options 
that higher education institutions should consider when assessing the merit of applicants. The 
Schwartz Report employs the term ‘merit’
6
 to describe the extent to which an applicant to higher 
education has the ability to complete the higher education course they are applying to. At the same 
time, it is the currency, which applicants may have in variable amounts, that is measured by higher 
education institutions, to select one applicant over another. The text also describes merit as that 
which will be defined differently by individual higher education institutions depending upon the 
relative emphasis on various ways of assessing merit such as examination results and more holistic 
information about individual applicants.  
 
As we have seen, the definition of validity described by the text is that a method of predicting merit 
and potential, predicts what it is supposed to predict. The definition of reliability is that two people 
applying the same method of assessing merit would reach the same conclusion about the same 
application. The oppositions that I will relate to these terms are, firstly, non-validity, which would 
describe a method that does not predict merit and potential; and secondly, non-reliability, which 
would describe a method that would not result in the same assessment of merit and potential of an 
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applicant if applied by two different assessors. The reliable/non-reliable opposition concerns the 
reproducibility of admissions practices. Reliable practices would operate to individualise applicants in 
relation to a reproducible means of describing merit and potential to benefit from higher education. A 
non-reliable method would, on the contrary, not be reproducible and would operate to constitute a 
unique or personal description of an applicant’s merit and potential to benefit. This provides two 
binary variables, valid/non-valid and reliable/non-reliable, that can be employed to construct a 
relational discursive space within which all possible variables concerning the modes of assessing 




M O D E S  O F  A S S E S S I N G  M E R I T  A N D  P O T E N T I A L  A N D  T H E  S C H W A R T Z  R E P O R T  
This section will describe each of four ‘modes of assessing merit and potential’ with specific 
reference to The Schwartz Report text. This will include nepotistic, reproductive, impartial and 




Non-reliable Endorsed Nepotistic 
Reliable Impartial Reproductive 
 
F I G U R E  1 3 :  M O D E S  O F  A S S E S S I N G  M E R I T  A N D  P O T E N T I A L  
 
A mode of assessing merit and potential that was described as valid but non-reliable would constitute 
that which operated to predict what it is supposed to predict but is not reproducible when applied by 
another assessor. For example, references or personal statements are described within the text as 
being of value in assessing ‘contextual factors’ that may affect the judgment about an applicant’s 
overall merit and potential. In other words, the text is positioning references and personal statements 
as a valid means of assessing an applicant’s merit and potential. However, the text also describes a 
range of problems with this method. 
 
There is wide variation in the support provided to applicants in preparing their personal 
statements for application forms. Although guidance is provided by the Universities and 
Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS), it is not always clear to applicants that information 
about contextual factors could be relevant. Levels of understanding of what is required vary 
significantly among staff who advise applicants or write references. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that some staff and parents advise to the extent that the personal statement 
cannot be seen as the applicant’s own work. At the other extreme, mature applicants not 
enrolled at a school or college may rely entirely on their own judgment.  
(AHESG: September 2004, p26) 
and 
there are variations in the extent to which personal statements and references include 
information about, for example, disruptions to schooling, socio-economic context, home 
responsibilities or other challenges applicants might have had to overcome. The extent to 
which personal statements and references help admissions staff assess suitability for a 
subject also varies. (AHESG: September 2004, p47) 
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The recommendation of The Schwartz Report to address the issue of the non-reliability of references 
and personal statements is that application forms should be redesigned to “elicit relevant information 
more consistently” (AHESG: September 2004, 47). Recommendations include introducing systems 
that would structure references and personal statements in relation to specified prompts. In other 
words, greater reliability would be provided by homogenising the range of statements made by those 
producing references and personal statements by guiding them to use statements that are pre-
prepared. The Schwartz Report proposes a move from a more singular (and therefore less reliable) 
mode to a more homogeneous mode to establish fairness in this method of assessing merit. This 
would constitute a move from the endorsed mode to impartial mode in the relational space I have 
constructed.  
   
A mode of assessing merit and potential that was both non-reliable and non-valid would be 
diametrically opposed to fair admissions as described by The Schwartz Report, as it is to the 
impartial mode in the relational space above. A method of assessing merit and potential that was 
described as not predicting what it was supposed to predict would represent a means of selecting 
applicants on the basis of something other then merit (as described by the text). As a non-reliable 
method it would also constitute a singular instance of selection that could not be reproduced. For 
example, if an admissions tutor for a higher education programme selected an individual applicant on 
the basis that he knew the applicant’s family and wished for one reason or another to treat this 
specific application with undue favour, then it would constitute the nepotistic mode. For example, the 
text states that 
 
Admissions criteria should not include factors irrelevant to the assessment of merit. For 
example, this means that institutions should not give preference to the relatives of graduates 
or benefactors. (AHESG: September 2004, p38) 
 
If however, such non-valid practice became systemic (therefore not singular) it would by definition be 
reproducible and as such reliable. For example, the text states that: 
 
Applicants should be assessed as individuals: it is not appropriate to treat one applicant 
automatically more or less favourably by virtue of his or her background or school/college.  
(AHESG: September 2004, p35) 
 
In other words, the text is describing the use of background or school/college as the means of 
assessing merit as non-valid. This practice could, however, be a reliable way of making decisions 
about who to admit, as the practice of privileging applicants from a particular type of background, or 
a particular school or type of school, is reproducible. 
 
The mode of assessing merit I have described as reproductive describes a reliable means of 
assessing merit that is non-valid (as in the above example). Methods of assessment operating in the 
reproductive mode are those that reproduce that which they purport to measure in the process of 
misrecognising merit and potential. Where individual higher education institutions exclude ‘wider 
contextual factors’, contrary to the recommendation of the text, and focus on examination results 
alone, then it is possible that those applicants with the most merit and potential will not be selected. 
As the text states,  
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The type of school attended affects the predictive validity of examination grades…The 
evidence…suggests that equal examination grades do not necessarily represent equal 
potential. (AHESG: September 2004, p22) 
 
In such an instance, the applicants that would be selected would be those with the highest 
examination grades on the basis that this aspect alone is a valid indicator of merit and potential. If 
however the school type was not taken into account then the validity of the assessment method 
would be in question and could constitute a misrecognition of applicants’ examination grades as 
merit and potential. Such a method would however be reliable as another admissions tutor 
employing the same method would be likely to reproduce the same result. In this example, the 
description of merit and potential as excluding wider contextual factors (such as type of school), 
would determine the method of its assessment, which would operate to reproduce the description of 
merit and potential in the individualisation of admitted applicants. 
 
Another potential example of reliable yet non-valid assessment of merit and potential is where an 
institution does not recognise certain kinds of qualifications within the admissions process. The text 
identifies the non-recognition of some qualifying courses as a problem that needs to be addressed.  
 
while the Steering Group considers that curriculum development is outside its remit, it does 
note that some institutions effectively exclude learners with vocational and Access 
qualifications from many of their courses. (AHESG: September 2004, p27) 
 
However, the issue of validity here is positioned as a matter for individual institutional autonomy 
although the text does provide recommended guidelines for the implementation of the identified 
principles of fair admissions. For example, the principle of ‘the minimising of barriers’ recommends 
that: 
 
Admissions processes should seek to minimise any barriers that are irrelevant to admissions 
requirements. This guideline applies to barriers potentially arising from: 
•  Means of assessment; 
•  The varying resources and support available to applicants; 
•  Disability; 
•  The type of an applicant’s qualifications. (AHESG: September 2004, p41) 
 
Similarly, the text makes clear that 
 
The Steering Group does not consider lack of familiarity with an applicant’s qualifications to 
be a legitimate reason for not considering that applicant. (AHESG: September 2004, p28) 
 
In fact the text recommends that admissions staff are appropriately trained in accordance with the 
principle of ‘professionalism’ in admissions. 
 
Training for those assessing applications is likely to include information about external 
issues, such as the full range of UK Level 3 qualifications, progression routes, equal 
opportunities, and relevant legislation. (AHESG: September 2004, p42) 
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However, the positioning of the recognition, or otherwise, of non-A level qualifications as a matter of 
the professionalism of admissions staff is a strategy that enables non-recognition of these equivalent 
qualifications to be described as valid. There is a clear tension in the text here, as it modulates 
between the non-recognition of some qualification as a problem for fair admissions and the 
requirement that institutional autonomy be maintained. As I have argued previously, the text does 
allude to the possibility that autonomous institutions can operate unfairly in their admissions practice 
but cannot resolve the issue described, as a consequence of the internal rules of discourse, 
determined by the terms of reference of its production. The tension between descriptions of practice 
in the impartial and reproductive modes is mirrored in the relationship between validity of specific 
methods of assessing merit and potential that present barriers for some applicants and the ‘trump 
card’ of institutional autonomy. 
 
Modes of discursive objectification and the Schwartz Report 
Chapter three described modes of discursive objectification, these are summarised again in the table 
below (previously listed as Figure 6). 
 
Discursive exchange Objectification 
 Open Closed 
Singular Aesthetic Iconic/symbolic 
Homogeneous Commodified Institutional 
 
This section will relate the oppositions and alliances that have been identified in the analysis of The 
Schwartz Report to the discursive space concerning modes of discursive objectification described in 
chapter three. This space is constructed by relating two binary variables, singular/homogeneous 
objectification and explicit/euphemistic discursive exchange. Singular objectification describes 
discursive objects that are unique and non-comparable, whereas homogeneous objectification 
describes them as comparable with other textual objects. Open discursive exchange describes the 
construction of discursive objects that is not regulated where the process of discursive formation is 
open. Closed discursive exchange describes discursive formation that is regulated.  
 
By relating each binary variable to the other, I have constructed a discursive space that contains all 
possible variables in the description of four modes of discursive objectification. The aesthetic mode 
describes the construction of discursive objects that are singular or unique and where discursive 
exchange is open or unregulated. The iconic/symbolic mode describes the construction of discursive 
objects that are also singular but where discursive exchange is closed or regulated. The institutional 
mode describes the construction of discursive objects that are homogeneous, comparable or 
reproducible where discursive exchange is regulated. Lastly, the commodified mode describes the 
construction of discursive objects that are homogeneous and comparable with other textual objects 
and where discursive exchange is open. 
 
A N A L Y S I S  O F  D I S C U R S I V E  O B J E C T I F I C A T I O N  I N  T H E  S C H W A R T Z  R E P O R T  
Instances of aesthetic objectification include the production of The Schwartz Report itself that is 
explicitly described as resulting from the work of the Admissions in Higher Education Steering Group 
which positions it as a singular and unique textual object. The Report describes itself as the product 
of an ‘independent review’, where the independence of the group signifies an open discursive 
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exchange. However, the text also describes the terms of reference provided to the Steering Group by 
the DfES and establishes that the Steering Group were all appointed by the DfES. This identifies at 
least a degree of regulation in the formation of the Steering Group and its subsequent activities that 
establishes a dynamic between the description of the Report as an instance of aesthetic and/or 
iconic/symbolic and/or institutional objectification.  
 
The Steering Group itself constitutes an iconic/symbolic objectification, as a consequence of the 
authority bestowed upon the Group by the DfES, to both conduct the review into higher education 
admissions and to produce the subsequent Report. The Steering Group is appointed by the DfES as 
the body that has the authority to produce statements about fair admissions to higher education. The 
process of appointment is regulated and controlled by the DfES. In other words, the independence 
and discursive openness associated with the processes of the production of The Schwartz Report 
are in dynamic tension with its explicit regulation. 
 
The recommendation within the text for individual higher education institutions to produce and 
publicise their particular definition and approach to assessing merit and potential can also be read as 
an instance of aesthetic objectification. The Report does not seek to regulate the way that individual 
institutions describe merit as the text describes this as a matter of institutional academic autonomy. 
The description of merit by each individual institution is a singular and unique instance of open 
discursive exchange. However, this is dependent upon the regulated autonomy of individual higher 
education institutions constituting an iconic/symbolic objectification.  
 
Maintaining the autonomy of higher education institutions is clearly described within the terms of 
reference for the Steering Group provided by the DfES, as such it is an instance of closed discursive 
exchange. The description of ‘higher education institutions’ is a homogeneous categorisation, which 
signifies institutional objectification. This provides a good illustration of the dynamic nature of 
discursive objectification described by the modal relationships between identified instances within the 
text. The aesthetic objectification of individual descriptions of merit is dependent upon the 
iconic/symbolic objectification of the autonomy of individual institutions, which is predicated upon an 
institutional objectification of the general principle of such autonomy. 
 
The description of the role of personal statements and individual holistic information in the 
assessment of merit can also be read as an instance of aesthetic objectification. Personal 
statements and individual information are, by definition, singular in construction and explicitly 
opposed to formal examination grades as a means of assessing merit.  The description of the 
problems with personal statements and holistic information in terms of reliability recommends the 
introduction of a more systematised approach to gathering such information. This textual 
construction is an attempt to describe the practice of personal statements and holistic assessment in 
such as way as to move it towards a more institutional mode. Similarly, the description of the 
assessment of merit based on individual examination grades is an iconic/symbolic objectification as it 
is singular and regulated. This is of course also predicated on the institutional objectification of the 
examinations system. 
 
Other institutional objectifications include the recommendations to: revise the UCAS application form 
to provide clearer prompts and guidance for those completing personal statements and references; 
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develop a national system for the recognition of credit to establish the equivalence of qualifications; 
develop a post qualifications admissions (PQA) system to avoid the uncertainty surrounding 
predicted grades; and the ‘outline model of institutional admissions policy’ as a means to embed the 
principles of fair admissions described in the text in individual institutional practices. Each of these 
examples provides a regulated institutionalised framework that operates to structure other 
descriptions of higher education. A characteristic of institutional objectification is that it is normally 
associated with the iconic/symbolic objectification of an identified authoritative body to operationalise 
the structures described. 
 
Instances of the commodified mode include the explicit description of higher education as a valuable 
commodity and the description of the need for applicants to higher education courses to become 
informed consumers. The description of higher education as a valuable commodity also indicates 
that the financial and other benefits that are associated with higher education “vary considerably from 
course to course and between institutions” (AHESG: September 2004, p4). There is an implicit 
relationship here with the status and market position of individual higher education institutions and 
courses. This could construct a dynamic between the commodified description of higher education 
and the iconic/symbolic description of individual institutions.  
 
The description of the ‘informed consumer’ of higher education within the text is associated with the 
principle of transparency, which recommends that institutions make explicit their individual definitions 
of merit and the processes by which applicants’ merit will be assessed. However, whilst on the one 
hand the text positions merit as a kind of common currency to secure admission to higher education, 
the principle of transparency, as described in the text, does not require, or recommend, a 
homogeneous means of measuring it. This is as a consequence of the unassailability of the principle 
of institutional autonomy in academic matters, including the means by which merit is ascertained in 
making decisions about admitting applicants to courses. 
 
The Schwartz Report constructs higher education as a commodified discursive object in terms of the 
financial and other benefits that are associated with its consumption but the currency (merit) that 
provides access to it is not common or homogeneous and is regulated by differing interpretations of it 
by individual institutions. This means that despite The Schwartz Report describing higher education 
as a commodity, its relative value is not open to homogeneous or comparable description in terms of 
the merit required to consume it. The ‘price’ required to consume higher education (in terms of merit) 
is not explicit and as a consequence discursive exchange is not open. While individual institutions 
regulate descriptions of merit, higher education cannot be fully objectified as a commodity. 
 
The distribution of the ‘high-level principles’ in relation to modes of discursive objectification also 
demonstrates dynamic relationships. The principle of ‘transparency’ relates to the aesthetic, the 
institutional and the commodified modes. In the aesthetic mode transparency can be read as the 
open description of individual institutions interpretation of merit and admissions practices. In the 
institutional mode transparency is associated with standards of professionalism in admissions. In the 
commodified mode, it is the explicit information that ‘produces informed consumers’ of higher 
education. The principle of ‘selecting for merit, potential and diversity’ can be read as constituting an 
aesthetic objectification as individual institutions are invited by the text to produce unique 
interpretations of it. On the other hand, once constructed, this is a practice regulated by institutions, 
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which would then constitute an iconic/symbolic objectification. This principle can also be read as 
constituting an institutional objectification where it is described in relation to the establishment of 
professional standards in admissions. The principle of ‘validity, reliability and relevance’ is distributed 
in a fragmented fashion. For example, ‘Validity’ traverses both iconic/symbolic and institutional 
modes. In the iconic/symbolic mode, validity is positioned as a matter for individual institutions to 
determine, in relation to each institution’s definition of merit. In the institutional mode, determining 
validity is a matter related to the principle of the ‘professionalism’ of admissions systems. Similarly, 
the principle of ‘minimising barriers’ is related to the relevance of admissions criteria, which is also 
related, by the text, to systems for establishing professionalism in admissions and as such, 
constitutes an institutional objectification. ‘Reliability’ traverses both the institutional and the 
commodified modes. In the institutional mode reliability is also positioned as matter of standards of 
professionalism in admissions. In the commodified mode, it is potentially that which operates to 
establish the common currency of merit, although this implicit description is in opposition to 
institutional autonomy. This demonstrates further the tension in the principle of ‘validity, reliability and 
relevance’ as validity and reliability are operating across different modes. 
 
The Schwartz Report operates to construct a variety of discursive objects. The above analysis 
describes these objects in relation to modes of discursive objectification including aesthetic, 
iconic/symbolic, institutional and commodified modes. The analysis also describes how some textual 
objects are constructed in dynamic tension by operating across different modes. Similarly, the 
analysis describes how in some instances The Schwartz Report operates to reposition established 
higher education textual objects to promote change in higher education practice: for example, the 
description of a more institutionalised mode of personal statement production in the recommendation 
to provide prompts in a revised UCAS application form. In other instances the text operates to 
reproduce established descriptions of higher education: for example, the reinforcement of the 
principle that higher education institutions must have autonomy in academic decisions, including 
admissions. Figure 14 below provides an illustration of the dynamic distribution of textual objects in 
relation to modes of discursive objectification. 
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Aesthetic discursive objectification 
 
The Schwartz Report 
As the product of an ‘independent’ review 
 
Individual HEI descriptions of ‘merit and 
potential’ 
 
Personal statements and individual holistic 
information in applications to HE 
 
Transparency 
Making explicit individual HEI’s interpretation of merit  
 
Selecting for merit, potential and diversity 
The individual interpretation of merit by HEIs 
Iconic/symbolic discursive objectification 
 
The Admissions to Higher Education Steering 
Group - As an appointed governmental group 
 
The autonomy of HEIs in academic matters 
 
 




As determined by individual HEI interpretations of merit  
 
Selecting for merit, potential and diversityThe 
regulation of the interpretation of merit by HEIs 
Commodified discursive objectification 
 
HE as a ‘valuable commodity’ 
 
The ‘informed consumer’ of higher education 
 















As the establishment of the common currency of merit 
Implicit reference in tension with institutional 
autonomy 
Institutional discursive objectification 
 
National credit systems 
 
Outline model of institutional admissions policy 
 
Post qualification admissions (PQA) 
 
Revised UCAS application forms 
To include prompts for the production of personal 
statements 
 
Transparency   
As a professional standard in admissions 
 
Selecting for merit, potential and diversity 
As a professional standard in admissions 
 
Validity - As a professional standard in admissions 
 
Reliability - As a professional standard in admissions 
 
Minimising barriers and relevance (of 
assessment methods)  
As professional standards in admissions 
 
Professionalism  
Common standards in admission practice 
 




In relation to the modes of assessing merit described above, The Schwartz Report itself can be 
described as operating in ‘reproductive’ mode. The fact that the Steering Group’s terms of reference 
determine that institutional autonomy is not debatable means that institutional descriptions of merit 
cannot be coherently challenged on the basis of their validity, only upon their reliability. Reliability is 
positioned as primarily a matter of professionalism in admissions whereas validity is primarily a 
matter of institutional autonomy. 
 
This description is also reflected in the modulation of the principles of validity and reliability in relation 
to modes of discursive objectification. The modulation of descriptions of validity enables The 
Schwartz Report to recommend that the validity of individual interpretations of merit by higher 
education institutions be reviewed as a matter of professionalism in admissions, whilst at the same 
time, maintaining the iconic/symbolic status of the autonomy of higher education institutions in 
academic matters including the validity of individual interpretations of merit in admission decisions. 
Similarly, the reliability of methods of assessing merit in admissions cannot provide a means of 
operating as a common currency, or metric, by which merit can be measured, as merit is not 
described homogeneously. The measure of merit is variable and unique to each institution’s 
interpretation.  
 
The iconic/symbolic status of institutional autonomy in all academic matters relating to the provision 
of higher education creates a tension within the text where higher education is described as a 
valuable commodity. Higher education is described as individual, singular and unique and also as 
comparable and homogeneous. The construction of institutionalised or bureaucratic systems and 
standards can, on the one hand, be read as a strategy to promote a homogeneous ground from 
which, or with which, individual interpretations of merit can be ascertained. However, the description 
of such systems and standards in relation to the principle of professionalism, acknowledges that in 
order to be operationalised they need endorsement by individual higher education institutions.  
 
All five of the high-level principles of admissions, described by the text, can be read as operating in 
the institutional mode, as professional standards. This indicates that the text is primarily seeking to 
regularise admissions practice. However, while professional standards in admissions practice remain 
within the remit of individual higher education institutions to determine, the force of regulation is 
limited by the iconic/symbolic status of these institutions. The Schwartz Report explicitly describes 
higher education as a valuable commodity and yet the text operates to both reinforce the autonomy 
of institutions and promote professional standards and practices, albeit that they have limited 
regulatory force. It can be concluded therefore that, on this reading, The Schwartz Report explicitly 
reproduces the idea of the commodification of higher education but primarily operates to maintain the 




Chapter seven - Conclusion 
 
Breaking the spell of the educational principle 
This thesis set out to investigate a specific area of philosophical and sociological discourse that 
includes descriptions of the commodification of higher education. This area of discourse has been 
located in relation to a range of antecedent theoretical descriptions concerning the nature, value and 
purpose of higher education. I have argued that some of these descriptions have adopted 
oppositional or allied positions concerning the idea of the commodification of higher education, in 
relation to implicit or explicit educational principles. I have also argued that such descriptions are 
concerned with establishing the extent to which higher education represents the realisation of an 
educational principle of one kind or another. As such, they operate to reproduce the principles with 
which descriptions of higher education are allied or opposed. The description of commodification as 
the partial or flawed realisation of such principles can also be used to provide a rationale for change 
in higher education practice.  
 
For example, in an article entitled ‘UK urged not to follow US lead’, Robert Reich (‘former senior 
advisor to Bill Clinton’) is described as warning the UK that: 
 
…the core role of universities as centres of free inquiry is being “corrupted” as market forces 
take hold of higher education…Higher education in America is being transformed from a 
public good to a private commodity, and the very nature and meaning of higher education is 
narrowing dangerously. (THES: 12.3.04) 
 
Here the nature and meaning of higher education is associated with ‘free inquiry’ as a public good 
which is contrasted with its description as a dangerously narrow commodity. The statement implies 
that higher education is or has been a public good, a state from which it is now being ‘corrupted’. 
However, as Brighouse has argued (discussed in chapter one), some level of commodification is 
“unavoidable and unobjectionable” (Brighouse: 2000, p48) in that for one thing money changes 
hands in the process of delivering teaching. The statement also implies that higher education should 
be a public good and should not be a commodity, which in turn implies some form of moral principle. 
Again, Brighouse (2000) concludes that he can identify nothing inherent in the kind of ‘good’ that 
education might be, that would preclude it being distributed through market mechanisms. However, 
Brighouse is able to reach this conclusion because he positions egalitarian liberal social justice as 
the trump moral principle. In other words, for Brighouse where market forms of distribution are 
compatible with the principle of egalitarian liberal social justice they can be justified. This approach 
shifts the principle being used to legitimise one or other description of higher education to another 
level (that of society) but does serve to undermine the idea that higher education itself (as cultural 
practice) must be underpinned by particular principles. 
 
The above statement from Reich also implies that it is possible to ascertain ‘the nature and meaning 
of higher education’ and that this includes a ‘core role’ in sustaining ‘free inquiry’. Once again an 
educational principle is in play that seems to require ‘free enquiry’ to be an inherent aspect of 
something that is described as higher education. At the heart of such statements lies the conception 
of “the person as a self reflective and self realising moral agent” (Hunter: 1994, p2), (as discussed in 
chapter one) reconstituted as an educational principle of free enquiry. The commodification of higher 
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education is positioned in pejorative opposition to such educational principles as a ‘corrupted’ 
realisation of them. However, if higher education is thought of as a historically contingent social 
activity or cultural practice, then the description or construction of higher education principles can 
themselves be thought of as historically contingent. Thinking of higher education in this way means 
that the idea of the commodification of higher education can be described without recourse to 
positioning it in relation to the realisation, or otherwise, of any principled perspective concerning 
higher education’s ‘nature or purpose’. 
 
More recently, in a report entitled HE as a Global Community, Rajani Naidoo describes the need for 
further research to “protect developing countries from the most corrosive forms of commodification” 
(THES: 9.3.07). The report argues that 
 
Commercial forces worldwide have propelled universities to function less as institutions, with 
social, cultural and indeed intellectual objectives, and more as producers of commodities 
that can be sold in the international marketplace. (THES 9.3.07) 
 
Naidoo associates ‘appropriate’ higher education with ‘social, cultural and intellectual objectives’, 
which is contrasted with higher education that is corroded by commodification. It is interesting that 
‘commercial forces’ are positioned in opposition to social, cultural and intellectual objectives. If for 
example, Kopytoff (1986) is right and exchange is a universal feature of human social activity (as 
discussed in chapter three), then the functioning of universities in ‘the international marketplace’ 
could just as well be thought of as a feature of the social structure and cultural practices of 
universities rather than something to which they are opposed. Once again, the construction of the 
opposition between universities functioning to produce commodities and universities pursuing social, 
cultural and intellectual objectives relies on a positioning of commodification as a ‘corrosion’ of a 
principled view of the nature and purpose of higher education. 
 
The discourse concerning the commodification of higher education also includes the opposition of 
the ‘use-value’ of higher education representing its genuine’ or real nature, value or purpose, and its 
‘exchange-value’ as empty expression. For example, Bob Brecher (Director of the Centre for Applied 
Philosophy, Politics and Ethics at Brighton University) has written that: 
 
For some time now, degrees have been increasingly regarded as a commodity, to be bought 
and sold like any other…a commodity whose worth is a matter solely of their perceived 
exchange value. Never mind the content: the packaging is everything. So long as the name 
is right, the content and its quality are irrelevant…Perhaps its not too late to…construct a 
system and structure of genuine higher education. (THES: 14.6.06) 
 
and recently in promoting a campaign for ‘critical higher education’ he has said that: 
 
…a critical higher education is one that encourages scepticism of authority, the ability to 
weigh argument and to distinguish it from rhetoric…That sort of thing is being replaced by a 
wholly economic view of universities as providing the corporate state with a compliant and 
unthinking workforce, a view of education as a commodity rather than as a process, a set of 
‘inputs’ to be delivered and consumed rather than as a conversation. (THE 24.1.08) 
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Similarly, in an article entitled ‘Sausage factory culture puts the squeeze on ideas’ Hugh Hubbard 
(senior research fellow at Leeds University) is quoted as saying: 
 
…the ideology of market managerialism is now pushing into British universities with 
escalating ferocity. This managerialism and auditing culture results in the systematic 
corruption of knowledge, the dumbing down of the intellect and a Philistinism of learning that 
affects both the form and content of all our intellectual endeavours. (THES: 5.5.06) 
 
The reference to ‘managerialism and auditing culture’ is also relevant to the idea that the introduction 
of bureaucratic quality assurance systems facilitates a higher education exchange market by 
quantifying and standardising higher education as a product. For example, Phipps (2005) argues that 
the dominant discourse in higher education constitutes a marketised system of audit and quality 
assurance (see also Peters 2005). 
 
This is what we might term the default discourse –a technicist and managerial view of 
research that plays to the auditors as audience and ‘does training’ to the students…In many 
ways, astoundingly, but also unsurprisingly in a marketised system of higher education, this 
dominant discourse relies on a banking model of education. (Phipps, 2005, p38-39) 
 
Read this way, quality assurance processes (such as Academic Review) are being constituted as an 
exchange technology that drives the commodification of the higher education system: in other words, 
a means by which higher education is standardised and quantified to enable an equivalent market 
value to be established. The above description of higher education presents the view that ‘a 
marketised system of higher education’ constitutes a dominant discourse that reflects the system of 
financial exchange. However, the idea that ‘auditing culture’ inevitably leads to a more commodified 
or marketised system of higher education ignores the possibility that bureaucratic systems can just 
as well underpin the authority of both individual academic production and institutional autonomy in 
academic matters. That is to say, quality audit systems can provide the institutional homogeneous 
context for singularised descriptions of higher education. For example, the bureaucratic system for 
recognising an institution as having degree-awarding powers and university title (discussed in 
chapter two) is the means through which individual higher education institution autonomy is 
constituted. 
 
The implication of these types of descriptions of higher education is that discourse is limited to one-
dimensional binary oppositions (genuine/corrupted, market/non-market, use-value/exchange-value 
etc) that ironically, operate to close the discursive space concerning higher education. The approach 
taken within the thesis has been to attempt to open this discursive space and to consider how official 
higher education texts are strategically operating to construct higher education. The application of 
this method has demonstrated a more sophisticated means (than reliance on ‘market/non-market’ 
approaches for example) to describe how the idea of the commodification of higher education can be 
strategically employed within official texts to regulate and/or promote various aspects of practice 




Constructive description as a productive method of textual analysis 
 
T H E  E M E R G E N C E  O F  M O D E S  O F  A C T I O N   
The textual object that I have constructed (this thesis as text) describes an analytical methodology 
that does not seek to produce a representation of ‘reality’ either by ‘discovery’ or ‘critique’ (see 
Dowling, in press). I have not attempted to discover the ‘genuine’ or ‘real’ nature, value or purpose of 
higher education. Nor have I attempted a critique of existing practice by identifying its shortcomings 
in relation to the realisation of an educational principle. Rather, I have attempted to read official 
higher education texts as instances of socio-cultural action that are historically contingent and are 
constituted by the strategic formation, maintenance and/or destabilising of oppositions and alliances. 
 
In promoting this thesis as an original contribution to knowledge of the subject (in this case an 
intersection of philosophical and sociological fields), I have attempted to produce a text that is an 
integrated whole and that presents a coherent argument. Specifically, the method I have used to 
construct the analysis of official higher education texts has sought to produce relative coherence 
between my descriptions of these texts and the specialised theory I have developed. My analysis of 
antecedent texts within the philosophical and sociological theoretical fields has resulted in the 
development of my specialised theory or ‘organisational language’. This organisational language has 
provided the specialised theoretical context to produce an analysis or elaborated description, of the 
empirical data that has emerged in my reading of selected official higher education texts.  
 
I would argue that it is not possible or desirable to produce an analysis that establishes absolute 
coherence between empirical and theoretical fields. I have attempted to be explicit in describing the 
process of construction that I have been engaged with but there has not been an attempt to use my 
organisational language to define empirical instances. To do so would be to attempt closure of the 
discursive space. Rather, as Dowling has put it: 
 
My project has been to attempt to develop a sociological organisational language that does 
not seek or claim to describe that which lies beyond its ability to theorise. This is not a 
closed system, but one that learns from its theoretical and empirical encounters. (Dowling, in 
press and http://homepage.mac.com/paulcdowling/ioe/timely_utterance/page02.html - last 
accessed 7.10.08) 
 
The method I have employed to analyse official higher education texts has sought to identify the 
oppositions and alliances that have emerged in my reading of these texts and has constructed 
discursive spaces from the binary variables that are constituted by these oppositions and alliances. I 
have then used these spaces to map the discursive strategies being employed within texts. Following 
Dowling (2004, 2004a, 2007, in press), I have described these spaces as modes of action. This 
method has provided a means to describe the strategic dynamics and modalities constructed in each 
of the official higher education texts that I have analysed. I have argued that the relationship between 
these modalities operates to strategically construct specific descriptions of higher education practice.  
 
The description of a text as predominantly aligning with one mode of action (strategy) implies a 
corresponding relative opposition to other possible modes but does not imply that this description is 
necessarily confined to one mode to the exclusion of others. By way of analogy, I can think of the 
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way that the binary variable of low/high-pressure within a weather system. Low-pressure areas are 
dynamically implicated in high-pressure areas, the dominance of one entails the weakness of the 
other somewhere else on the weather map constituted by the relative density of air at a particular 
moment. Modes of action describe textual strategies constituted by binary variables that have 
emerged from my reading of the text. My analysis has demonstrated that texts can deploy more than 
one and potentially all strategies available within a given discursive space.  
 
For example, in my analysis of the QAA Handbook for Academic Review (chapter four) I describe a 
discursive space called modes of review. This space was constructed by relating the binary variables 
concerning insider/outsider relations to the peer group whose practice is under review with the binary 
variable of hierarchical /non-hierarchical authority relations to the subject peer group. From this 
emerged four modes of review, facilitation/therapy, inspection, peer review and peer exchange. This 
analysis focused on the dynamics or modalities evidenced in the specific ways in which textual 
subjectivities (for example, Review Coordinator, Specialist Reviewer and Subject Review Facilitator) 
are constructed.  
 
This analysis indicated that the subjectivities constructed by the Handbook do not operate 
significantly in the peer exchange mode even though this mode is alluded to in the text. Interestingly, 
those subjectivities that are constructed as representative of the QAA (Review Coordinator, 
Specialist Reviewer) are positioned (in the context of the Academic Review) in a hierarchical relation 
to the subject peer group. In other words, the text presents Academic Review to some extent as a 
non-hierarchical peer exchange, whilst operating to constitute Review Coordinators and Specialist 
Reviewers in a hierarchical, and as such, regulatory relation to those whose practice is under review. 
Whilst this may not be surprising, it does indicate two things. Firstly, official higher education texts 
can construct descriptions of higher education practice strategically, presenting constructions that 
operate in different, multiple and competing modes in addressing different audiences. Secondly, that 
the Handbook text presents higher education (quality assurance) practice as constituted by open 
peer exchange but primarily operates to close discursive practice. 
 
I have sought to allow my organisational language to ‘learn’ by not imposing my theoretical 
framework upon texts but by constructing discursive spaces drawn from my reading of each text that 
operate to reconstitute or further elaborate my organisational language. In this way, my specialised 
theory has informed my reading of texts and the empirical data that has emerged in this reading has 
informed my specialised theory. In other words, the discursive spaces that I have used to describe 
strategies at play have emerged from my reading of each text. The benefit of this approach is that it 
establishes a relative coherence between theoretical and empirical fields without closing discursive 
space and without constituting conceptual violence to the text being analysed. As such my analysis 
is constituted as an artefact rather than as a representation. 
 
C O M M O D I F I C A T I O N  A S  A  M O D A L I T Y  O F  D I S C U R S I V E  O B J E C T I F I C A T I O N  
The central research question of this thesis concerns how official texts that describe higher 
education, operate to (re)produce and/or resist the idea of its commodification. I have taken the 
position (following Foucault 1972) that texts, as well as constructing subjectivities (for example, 
author and audience), also ‘construct the objects of which they speak’, in other words, discursive 
objectivities or textual objects. The particular textual objects that this thesis has been concerned with 
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are descriptions of higher education. I have constructed a means to describe commodification as a 
discursive strategy or more specifically what I have called the commodified mode of discursive 
objectification. 
 
I have constructed this discursive space from the oppositions and alliances that have emerged in my 
reading of theoretical antecedent texts (specifically Bourdieu and Kopytoff). This discursive space 
has been constructed from the binary variables of open/closed discursive exchange and 
singular/homogeneous objectification. I have sought to analyse official higher education texts to find 
out the extent to which they are operating in this mode. In addition, I have sought to analyse the 
dynamic relations between the commodified mode and other modes to describe the strategic 
dynamics of the various descriptions of higher education within official texts. The method I have 
developed has also opened the discursive space concerning the commodification of higher education 
to provide a means of describing how texts, or discursive objects are operating in the higher 
education field.  
 
This constitutes an original contribution to the field by developing a unique method of describing 
instances of commodification as one of four possible modes of discursive objectification. This 
enables all possible instances of discursive objectification to be described in relation to one, or more, 
of the four modes - iconic/symbolic, institutional, aesthetic and the commodified mode. The 
description of instances of ‘commodification’, as a modality, provides the opportunity to describe the 
dynamic relationships between modes in the strategic construction of textual objects. This breaks the 
reliance on the binary opposition of concepts such as ‘use-value/exchange-value’ in describing 
commodification, which is implicated in reproductive principled perspectives as discussed above. 
The thesis has demonstrated that this method can provide researchers and practitioners with a 
productive means to describe how texts are constructed to gain strategic advantage in the discursive 
field. Seen as one of a range of strategies (modes) of discursive objectification, ‘commodification’ 
can be described not as a ‘corruption’ of ‘genuine’ higher education but rather, as a textual 
construction aligned or opposed with other textual constructions such as authors and audiences. 
This approach has constituted an opening of the discursive space concerning the idea of the 
commodification of higher education. 
 
Summary of the findings from the analysis of official higher education texts 
 
H O W  O F F I C I A L  T E X T S  O P E R A T E  S T R A T E G I C A L L Y  T O  D E S C R I B E  H I G H E R  E D U C A T I O N  
P R A C T I C E  
Much of the current debate concerning the commodification of higher education is described as a 
matter of government policy. For example, one recent article entitled ‘Market focus at odds with 
scholars’ priorities for sector’ quotes Roger Brown (Professor of Higher Education at Liverpool Hope 
University) as saying that: 
 
It’s clear that the majority of academic staff are out of sympathy with the general thrust of 
government policy on higher education. If the future unfolds as one fears it will, with ever-
increasing resource pressures and greater consumerism and so on, then where are the 
academic staff going to be found to deliver it? (THE: 19.6.08) 
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The analysis of a range of official texts has provided a means to test the extent to which the view that 
governmental action is operating to drive the commodification of higher education is supported by the 
evidence presented by such texts. The conclusions drawn from the analysis indicate that while 
official texts do operate to describe higher education in relation to market value, they primarily 
operate to resist its commodification. 
 
The thesis provides insight into how individual official texts operate to construct aspects of higher 
education practice and employ different strategies to present these constructions to various 
audiences. At the same time strategies that position audiences in relation to each other and in 
relation to textual authors construct descriptions that include a range of degrees of imperatives for 
action. The selected texts also operate to constitute a range of governmental agencies and 
institutions that explicitly relate to the imperatives described.  
 
The QAA Handbook for Academic Review text was selected for analysis as an example of 
‘technologies of subjectivity’, describing the process of determining ‘who’ are the officially ‘approved’ 
providers of higher education. The Future of Higher Education White Paper was selected as an 
example of ‘technologies of government’ describing an official rationale for governmental action and 
‘why’ the Government is right to implement change in higher education provision. The Schwartz 
Report was selected, as an example of ‘technologies of discourse’ describing the ‘true knowledge’ 
about fair higher education admissions. In each case, the analysis of these official texts identified the 
ways in which they operate to construct aspects of higher education practice and employ different 
strategies to present these constructions to various audiences. The analysis has demonstrated that 
each text operates differently in relation to the explicitness of the degrees of imperatives that it 
constitutes.  
 
T H E  A N A L Y S I S  O F  E M E R G E N T  M O D E S  O F  A C T I O N  W I T H I N  O F F I C I A L  T E X T S  
The QAA Handbook describes processes through which individual institutions will be approved or 
otherwise, as such the description of Academic Review explicitly identifies its regulatory function. 
However, the text also describes processes of ‘self-evaluation’ and ‘peer review’ that operate to 
partially position the authority for such approval on the one hand with individual institutions and with 
the academic community on the other. Governmental regulation is presented as ‘self-evaluation’ and 
‘peer review’ as higher education practice is recontextualised as quality assurance practice. The 
processes of Academic Review described within the Handbook operate to require institutions to 
internalise a specialised language for describing higher education practice and to recognise 
themselves in relation to descriptions produced in this language. This self-recognition also invites 
identification with a description of an academic peer community with the authority to make final 
judgments about academic quality.  
 
These textual constructions constitute a complex description of higher education practice that 
includes a dynamic relation between various modes of discursive action. Academic Review is 
presented as being based on institutional self-evaluation but the forms of self-evaluation are 
prescribed by bureaucratic systems and procedures. Similarly Academic Review is presented as 
constituting an open exchange between academic peers and yet only those officially recognised by 
the QAA can contribute to making final judgments of academic quality. These constructions are 
constituted in dynamic relation with each other as the Handbook text operates to emphasise and de-
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emphasise different modes of action. My point here, to reiterate, is not a critique of the QAA or of the 
Academic Review process but rather to describe how the text is operating to construct the processes 
of approval of institutions that provide higher education. 
 
The Future of Higher Education White Paper provides a rationale for the expansion of higher 
education participation and the introduction of variable tuition fees by describing the individual and 
national economic benefits of doing so and by asserting a fundamental principle of social justice. At 
the same time the White Paper explicitly reinforces the institutional autonomy of higher education 
institutions. By considering these textual constructions in relation to modes of higher education 
participation it has been possible to describe how the White Paper is operating to balance these 
potentially competing agendas. This text operates to elide the opposition between selecting the most 
talented and providing opportunity for all those who have the potential to benefit from higher 
education. The text also effectively excludes descriptions of the universal mode of participation by 
primarily constituting descriptions of higher education participation that are institutionally regulated. 
The analysis has provided insight into how authority relations between government and its 
associated agencies, higher education institutions and students are strategically described. In this 
context, the White Paper describes ways in which higher education institutions will be ‘examined’ as 
a disciplining practice, for example, by conforming to the requirements of the ‘Access Regulator’
8
. In 
other words, the White Paper operates to promote the maintenance of the balance of forces between 
governmental power and university power, whilst at the same time introducing regulatory 
mechanisms designed to promote the expansion of higher education. 
 
It is unsurprising then that the Government chose to instigate reform in higher education admissions, 
not through direct legislation that could challenge institutional autonomy but rather through an 
‘independent review’. The Schwartz Report’s terms of reference required that institutional autonomy 
in academic matters be maintained and that the Steering Group report on the options for assessing 
the merit of applications. This technology of discourse operated to exclude descriptions of fair 
admissions practice that challenge institutional autonomy. Rather, the text positions fair admissions 
practice as primarily a matter of the professionalism of individual institutions. This means that whilst 
The Schwartz Report promotes the consideration of the reliability and validity of assessment 
methods, the validity of a method is for individual institutions to determine. For example, if an 
institution decides to not recognise equivalent non-A level entry qualifications, then this practice 
could still be described as fair in relation to the Schwartz principles, if the institution in question had 
established to its own satisfaction that this was a valid means of assessing applicants. This is not to 
say, that such an approach is right or wrong but rather to describe how the text is operating to 
produce the ‘true knowledge’ about fair admissions to higher education.  
 
The method of analysis I have employed in relation to all three example official texts has provided an 
insight into how they construct specific descriptions of higher education. These texts operate to 
include some descriptions and exclude others strategically constituting oppositions and alliances 
between the textual objects constructed. The analysis of the dynamic relation between such 
constructions has enabled me to describe how these texts are operating strategically within the 




A L T E R N A T I V E  M O D E S  O F  A C T I O N  
The analysis of other kinds of official texts using the same method may have provided different 
findings. Similarly, other authors could identify different oppositions and alliances in their reading of 
these or other texts and construct different modes of action. It is also the case that the analysis 
presented does not include all possible modes of action and I could have constructed other 
discursive spaces than those included in my analysis. For example, as indicated above the QAA 
Handbook states that Academic Review is based on self-evaluation. This opens the possibility for the 
binary variable ‘self/external evaluation’. At the same time the Handbook describes the principles that 
self-evaluation must adhere to in order to gain recognition in the context of Academic Review, as 
such these principles are pre-determined. This provides for the possibility for the binary variable 
‘open/closed principles of evaluation’. By relating these binary variables I could have provided an 
analysis of the QAA Handbook by constituting a discursive space that described modes of evaluation 
(see Bravenboer 2008). Each mode of action that emerges in the reading of a text constitutes a 
particular way of conceptualising or describing it. 
 
The modes of action that I have described have been constructed from the analysis of oppositions 
and alliances that have emerged in my reading of each text. Further work could include consideration 
of a wider range of possible modes of action in the analysis of each text and the analysis concerning 
additional modes of action could provide a richer and more textured description of individual texts. 
However, each specific mode of action within the thesis is designed to facilitate the description of the 
relationships between textual instances that are possible within the specialised and localised 
discursive space constructed. As such this approach provides for a comprehensive range of possible 
descriptions provided by any individual discursive space, as each space contains all possible modes 
in relation to the specific binary variables used to construct it.  
 
T H E  A N A L Y S I S  O F  M O D E S  O F  D I S C U R S I V E  O B J E C T I F I C A T I O N  W I T H I N  O F F I C I A L  
T E X T S  
I have attempted to demonstrate that it is possible to consider the ways in which descriptions of 
higher education operate in the commodified mode without recourse to principled oppositional 
approaches. As a consequence, it has been possible to describe how the official texts selected for 
analysis strategically position higher education in the commodified mode to different degrees, in 
different ways and in dynamic relation to other modes.  
 
For example, the analysis of the QAA Handbook indicates that it does not explicitly refer to higher 
education as a commodity. It does state that it is operating to provide HEFCE with a means to 
ensure that it is securing ‘value from public investment’ but this is the only explicit association with 
financial exchange within the text. Academic Review is however, the means through which ‘value’ is 
described and measured and only that which has been described by the process of Academic 
Review as of ‘approved’ quality, will be funded. The description of higher education value is related 
to highly institutionalised systems and procedures that operate as disciplining practices to 
individualise providers of higher education as ‘approved’ or otherwise. The Handbook operates to 
regulate discursive exchange (in the interaction between the text and reader) by constructing 
subjectivities (for example, ‘Reviewers’) that demarcate who can speak, what can be said and by 
whom, as well as institutionalised technologies that determine how they can speak (for example Self-
Evaluation Documents).  
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The Handbook describes a range of bureaucratic and regulated systems that I argue constitute 
institutional objectification, which operates to close discursive exchange. The description of these 
systems is homogeneous in that they provide a means with which to compare instances of higher 
education practice. However, the Handbook does not describe a standardised system that might 
facilitate open discursive exchange operating in commodified mode. Rather, the Handbook describes 
quality assurance systems and procedures that primarily operate to singularise higher education 
practice (for example in Final Judgement Reports) constituting iconic/symbolic as opposed to 
commodified discursive objectification. The ‘value’ of higher education that is described by the 
Academic Review process is a singular value determined in relation to individual institutions stated 
aims; it is not a common value that establishes a comparable currency. As such, the analysis has 
demonstrated that the descriptions of higher education within the Handbook primarily operate to 
resist the reproduction of the idea of the commodification of higher education. This conclusion can be 
contrasted with the view that a quality ‘audit culture’ (as evidenced by the QAA Handbook for 
Academic Review) is necessarily a driver towards marketised or commodified higher education 
practice. 
 
In contrast, the analysis of The Future of Higher Education White Paper indicates that it does make 
explicit reference to the individual and national economic value of higher education, in making the 
case for the introduction of variable tuition fees and the expansion of higher education. In addition, 
the text describes both students and employers as potential ‘intelligent customers’ of higher 
education institutions. These descriptions would seem explicitly to reproduce the idea that higher 
education is a commodity that is of economic value and is sold to customers. Superficially, this 
reading could add weight to the view that Government policy is driving a change in the practice of 
higher education towards a more commodified system. However, the analysis of the White Paper 
also indicates that it deploys a range of descriptions of higher education that operate strategically in 
relation to different modes of objectification, as a means of promoting the legislative changes it 
proposes.  
 
These legislative changes primarily relate to the creation of both individual agencies with 
iconic/symbolic authority to regulate higher education practice, for example the ‘Access Regulator’, 
and institutional bureaucratic systems that provide the means of doing the same. The textual 
construction of these agencies and systems operate within the text to close discursive exchange by 
presenting aspects higher education practice as that which requires regulation. This means that 
whilst the White Paper seemingly reproduces higher education as a commodified textual object, this 
description is strategically deployed as a persuasive device to legitimise the construction of 
institutional systems that operate to resist the commodified mode. On the one hand, higher education 
is explicitly described as an individual and national economic benefit or good, whilst on the other, it is 
also presented as that which universities have institutional autonomy to determine or define in 
relation to each institution’s individual mission, positioned as what I have called an aesthetic 
objectification.  
 
The findings from the analysis of the White Paper indicate that it is simultaneously operating multiple 
modalities of discursive objectification, which undermines the idea that the text is primarily operating 
to reproduce the idea of the commodification of higher education. Despite the explicit nature of the 
association of higher education with economic benefit, it seems clear that the commodified mode is 
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not predominant amongst other modes. The White Paper is rather, predominantly operating to 
describe singular authorities and agencies whose role is to further regulate various aspects of higher 
education practice. It is also operating to describe the introduction of a range of bureaucratic systems 
and procedures. It is possible that this could be misread as necessarily constituting a means through 
which higher education is commodified by providing a standardising metric in relation to which it is 
measured and quantified. However, the analysis of the text in relation to modes of discursive 
objectification provides the opportunity to read the strategic dynamic moves between what I call 
institutional objectification (the description of institutionalised systems, frameworks etc) and other 
modes. So for example, the description of the introduction of the ‘Access Agreement’ can be read as 
a bureaucratic mechanism primarily related to the iconic/symbolic description of the ‘Office for Fair 
Access’ (OFFA) as a singularised institution and the ‘Access Regulator’.  
 
The analysis of The Schwartz Report indicates that it makes an explicit reference to higher education 
as a valuable commodity that provides financial as well as other benefits, in describing the need for a 
fair admissions system. This text also describes the need for transparency in admissions systems to 
produce ‘intelligent consumers’ of higher education. The text also positions fairness in admissions to 
higher education in terms of fair access to a valuable good, rather than as something inherent in the 
meaning, nature or purpose of higher education. Such descriptions clearly reproduce the idea that 
higher education is a commodity but the text also includes a range of other descriptions that operate 
differently. For example, the analysis of the text identifies that higher education is described as 
something that applicants can have differing amounts of ‘merit and potential’ in relation to. As such, 
merit and potential seem to be positioned as the currency that determines admission to the benefits 
of higher education. However, this is not a common currency, rather each individual institution is 
positioned by the text as describing its own currency, its own definition of merit and potential, in 
accordance with the principle of institutional autonomy. This principle is written into the Admissions to 
Higher Education Steering Group’s terms of reference and has been maintained in the Group’s final 
report (the object text analysed).  
 
By reading The Schwartz Report in relation to modes of discursive objectification it has been 
possible to describe the text as a complex utterance that strategically positions higher education as a 
commodity in relation to other oppositional constructions. A superficial or more literal reading might 
have (quite understandably) taken the text as a concrete example of how official or governmental 
bodies are driving the commodification of higher education. The results from the analysis have found 
that the text describes a range of institutionalised systems, framework and principles that could, in 
theory, standardise a common currency of ‘merit and potential’. Such a description could have 
indicated that the text was indeed predominantly operating in the commodified mode. However, the 
findings of my analysis also indicate that the text specifically avoids describing a ‘common’ or 
homogeneous description of merit and potential. In reinforcing the iconic/symbolic authority of 
individual institutions to determine how merit and potential will be recognised, The Schwartz Report 
primarily operates to resist commodification. This is a move away from an open and homogenised 
description of merit and potential towards a closed and singular description. The recommendations 
described in the text all amount to a matter of guidelines for institutional professionalism in 
admissions as a means of regulating discursive exchange but without the iconic/symbolic authority to 
enforce them. This specific reading has only been possible as a consequence of the particular 
analytical methodology employed within the thesis. 
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The analysis of official texts has provided examples of how the White Paper and The Schwartz 
Report employ descriptions of higher education in the commodified mode strategically to legitimise 
the introduction of governmental agencies and systems. These agencies and systems operate 
primarily to resist the commodification of higher education. In the case of the QAA Handbook explicit 
descriptions of higher education in the commodified mode are not significantly employed. The 
Handbook does introduce a range of bureaucratic mechanisms that are designed to standardise 
higher education quality assurance practices and procedures. However, these constructions primarily 
relate to and underpin the iconic/symbolic authority of QAA Reviewers rather than facilitating 
commodification.  
 
The Handbook also strategically employs descriptions of higher education in the aesthetic mode to 
promote the regularisation of practice. For example, the text describes processes where higher 
education institutions are invited to submit singular and unique descriptions of their practice in self-
evaluation documents. These unique constructions are then described as being subject to ‘peer 
review’ reflecting the language of academic production. The Handbook employs the language of an 
established academic practice to apprentice readers (higher education institutions and practitioners) 
into the practice of quality assurance.  
 
In the case of the White Paper, the language of economic value is employed to legitimise higher 
education reforms designed to expand participation in higher education. The White Paper also 
describes reforms that operate to regularise practice by maintaining and constituting the 
iconic/symbolic authority of governmental agencies and individual higher education institutions. The 
Schwartz Report describes higher education as a valuable commodity but the text primarily operates 
to reinforce institutional autonomy in determining fair admissions. The prospect of a common 
currency of merit and potential is raised but once again trumped by iconic/symbolic authority. 
 
In each case, the language of open discursive exchange is strategically employed to promote 
descriptions of higher education that are operating to close or regularise discursive exchange. The 
results of the analysis can be said to find a common strategic approach in the official texts described 
in the thesis. All three examples strategically import an organisational language of open exchange 
(aesthetic or commodified) to describe and promote higher education practices that operate to do the 
reverse. This provides evidence of a dissonance between language and practice in the official 
discourse of higher education. Once again, it is important to note that I do not offer this conclusion as 
critique as this may for example, be a very effective way for official texts to operate. I have been 
concerned with providing a constructive description of how official texts are operating. However, the 
strategic deployment of official descriptions of higher education has been identified as a 
consequence of the specific method applied to construct the analysis within this thesis and this 
constitutes an original contribution to knowledge in the field. This may indicate the modus operandi of 
official texts but it may also be possible that the use of this strategy is evident in a wider range of 
contexts. 
 
Further implications of the thesis for higher education practice 
The outcomes of the research have significant implications for practitioners and researchers who are 
investigating or implementing higher education policy, as described above, for example, by providing 
an alternative method of analysis to describe the strategic construction and modes of action of official 
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texts that promote and implement policy. Specifically, as a consequence of the research undertaken, 
practitioners and researchers have available to them a new way of describing commodification as a 
textual modality rather than an object associated with ‘use-value’ and ‘exchange-value’. The method 
is also equally applicable to the analysis of any form of text, including those not related to the higher 
education field. For example, it could be interesting to construct an analysis of ‘eBay’, the online 
auction and shopping website, as object text, to consider the extent to which it operates in other 
modes than the commodified mode. Similarly, it could be interesting to investigate religious television 
programmes as object texts, to ascertain the extent to which they operate outside the iconic/symbolic 
mode. Perhaps also a work of art could be analysed to consider the extent to which it operated in the 
institutional mode, and so on. 
 
It would also be possible to use the method described, to construct an analysis of different kinds of 
texts that are within the higher education field, for example, by analysing the discourse of academic 
practitioners through the collection of interview transcripts, or higher education institution texts such 
as, self-evaluation or policy documents. These different kinds of texts could be compared and 
contrasted to consider how they distribute descriptions of higher education in relation to modes of 
discursive objectification. It would also be possible to conduct longitudinal studies that analyse a 
particular kind of text that had been produced a number of times, such as a prospectus, over a 
period of time to identify patterns and changes in descriptions of higher education. Further work 
could also be undertaken that focused specifically on how aesthetic, iconic/symbolic or institutional 
modes of objectification are instanced within texts as opposed to concentrating on the commodified 
mode. 
 
The conclusions drawn from the analysis of official higher education texts have directly informed my 
own practice. For example, my analysis of The Schwartz Report describes the ways in which the text 
operates to reinforce the predominance of institutional autonomy of universities in all academic 
matters. As a consequence of the reproduction of institutional autonomy within the text, the space to 
describe merit and potential as a ‘common currency’ is significantly closed. The text emphasises 
‘institutional autonomy’ in determining higher education admission practices and as such is 
predominantly operating in a singularised iconic/symbolic mode. This means that the practice 
described by the text positions individual higher education institutions as independently determining 
which kinds of qualifications they will recognise and which they will not. In this sense, a more open 
and homogeneous description of ‘merit and potential’ as the currency of fair admissions in the 
commodified mode could promote a more explicit and transparent systems of admissions. 
 
For example, as a Director within a Lifelong Learning Network
9
 I work to open and construct 
opportunities through which students/learners
10
 can progress to higher education through vocational, 
applied, work-based or other non-A Level
11
 routes. This practice includes establishing institutional 
recognition of equivalent entry qualifications in admissions practices. One of the mechanisms I have 
developed to achieve this is the introduction of ‘progression accords’ (see Betts and Bravenboer, 
2008 and Bravenboer, 2008a). These constitute localised agreements between institutions and 
organisations involved in learner progression to higher education. Progression accords establish the 
recognition of (non-A Level) equivalent entry qualifications and best practice in promoting 
progression opportunities. I have developed this practice as an attempt to address the lack of clarity 
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and consistency constituted by the emphasis on institutional autonomy in admissions to higher 
education as evidenced in my reading of the White Paper, The Schwartz Report and other texts.  
 
Further implications for practice have also been highlighted by recent attempts by the Government to 
address the issue of ‘fair admissions’ more broadly in the field. This has included proposals to 
require higher education institutions to include admissions policies within Office for Fair Access 
(OFFA) Access Agreements
12
. Access Agreements are required by legislation to be provided and 
approved by OFFA if universities wish to charge variable tuition fees. This could be read as a 
challenge to institutional autonomy as it would bring an aspect of admissions practice in scope of the 
legislation surrounding tuition fees. Interestingly however, Sir Martin Harris, the Director of OFFA, 
has sought to reinforce the autonomy of higher education institutions. 
 
The Secretary of State has asked David Eastwood [Chief Executive of HEFCE] and myself 
to look at how higher education institutions' widening-participation and fair-access policies 
might be brought together in a single document. We are happy to do this…He has also 
asked us to look at how admissions policies might be made transparent, perhaps by being 
published as an annexe to this new single document or perhaps in some other way. We will 
give our views by September on how this might best be done. However we take this forward, 
individual decisions on admissions will remain a matter for institutions themselves.  
(THE: 12.6.08) 
 
This indicates that the strategic positioning of higher education admissions practices as described 
within my analysis of official texts could directly inform the practice of senior managers in formulating 
institutional policy with regards to admissions practice. It could also inform the practice of those 
higher education practitioners who work to implement and review admission and progression 
practices. For example, some higher education institutions in the East of England have sought to 
embed progression accords within institutional practices such as teaching and learning strategies, 




I have demonstrated above how this work has influenced my own practice but further study could 
also be undertaken to attempt to establish the relationship between the description of how official 
higher education texts are operating and the performance of the practices they describe. Evidence 
could perhaps be gathered that indicated how textual constructions within official texts are 
recontextualised in practice. For example, further study could include the analysis of a sample of 
institutional Self-Evaluation Documents constructed in the enactment of the Academic Review 
processes described within the Handbook. This could be used to identify the relationship between 
the strategies employed by the Handbook and those employed by individual institutional authors. 
Other forms of empirical data could also be gathered (for example from interviews with academic 
staff whose practice is under review, Students and QAA Reviewers etc) to provide the opportunity for 
analysis at differing levels including governmental, institutional and practitioner texts. 
 
In conclusion, my position is that constructive description is a productive method of analysis that 
provides a means of generating descriptions of the complex strategic operation of official higher 
education texts. In addition, by describing the strategic operation of texts in relation to modes of 
discursive objectification I have opened the discursive space concerning the idea of commodification 
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and introduced a new way to describe how texts might be operating in the commodified and other 
modes. I have demonstrated the implications of this in my analysis of official higher education texts 
and indicated how the approach and findings of this research have informed my own practice and 
could inform the practice of others in the field. Lastly, in constructing this thesis I have attempted to 
be explicit in identifying the strategies that I have employed to align my description of the work with 
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Notes 
                                                        
1 See Lukes (2006) for an interesting analysis of various criticisms of the ‘invasion’ of commodification and 
marketisation into public spheres of life. 
 
2
 The previous (1998) Subject Review methodology resulted in scores between 1 and 4 in six ‘aspects of provision’. As 
a consequence the maximum ‘score’ for all aspects was 24. 
 
3 For the purposes of this analysis unregulated access will mean access to higher education that is not formally 
regulated by a Governmental agency or institution 
 




 See  http://www.dfes.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/RRP/u013879/index.shtml for a link to the Taylor Nelson Sofres Omnibus 
Survey, 2002 
 
6 In some instances the text implies that merit is a measurement of previous achievement (perhaps in the form of 
examination results) and that potential is measured by ‘wider contextual factors’. I will use the term ‘merit’ to be 
synonymous with ‘merit and potential’ as the text defines one in terms of the other. For example, the principle of 
selecting for merit, potential and diversity states that “Ability to complete the course is an essential criterion for 
admission to HE” (AHESG, September 2004, p35). 
 
7 The terms non-reliable and non-valid are preferred here to unreliable and invalid as a consequence of the potentially 
unhelpful connotations that the latter terms bring. 
 
8 Later to be described as the Director of the Office for Fair Access 
 
9 Lifelong Learning Networks were proposed in the Future of Higher Education White Paper and have been funded by 
HEFCE since 2005. “The overall objective for Lifelong Learning Networks (LLNs) is to improve the coherence, clarity 
and certainty of progression opportunities for vocational learners into and through higher education.” HEFCE 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/widen/lln/ - last accessed 14.10.08 
 
10 I will use the term ‘learner’ here to signify the inclusion of both ‘students’ studying at traditional educational 
institutions and others who may be learning at work or in other settings. 
 
11 “There are far fewer progression opportunities for learners on vocational programmes than for those on an academic 
route. About 90 per cent of those on conventional A-level programmes enter higher education, but only 40-50 per cent 
of those qualifying at Level 3 in vocational subjects do so. Those who do enter HE from vocational learning programmes 
often find that progression within higher education is also problematic. There are fewer choices open to them, and 
greater uncertainty attaches to the choices that do exist.” HEFCE 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/circlets/2004/cl12_04/cl12_04.pdf - last accessed 14-10-08 
 
12 “Without an access agreement approved by the Director [of OFFA], an institution will not be able to charge tuition 
fees for full-time students above the standard level…Institutions are required to use some of the money raised through 
tuition fees to provide bursaries or other financial support for students from under-represented groups, or to fund 
outreach activities to encourage more applications from under-represented groups.” Office for Fair Access 
http://www.offa.org.uk/access-agreements/basics/ - last accessed 14.10.08 
 
13 See ‘Embedding Progression Accords in HEI Practice’ 
http://www.move.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=15&Itemid=77&limit=4&limitstart=4 - last 
accessed 14.10.08 
